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Abstract
PASTORAL THEOLOGY: CREATING NEW SPACES
The social sciences, in particular sociology and psychology, have played an 
important role in the development of practical theology as a discrete 
discipline. They have also provided the organisational tools which 
practical theology has relied upon to maintain credibility within academia. 
Those who deploy the methods of the social sciences believe that they 
provide us with a reliable account of reality, justified by their scientific and 
empirical standards.
The use of such methods does, however, carry with it very specific 
conceptions of the nature of human action and what it is to be human. In 
practice, practical theology has (in some areas) been compromised by such 
methods. Within the discipline, there has been a reduced emphasis on the 
Divine and the Spirit. Many practical theologians express discomfort at the 
use of theological and religious terminology. Some practical theologians 
have sought to justify their presence in secular academia by becoming 
purveyors of moral science or practical wisdom, which leads to an 
inevitable narrowing of the remit of the discipline. Excluding the spirit 
leaves practical theology as just another subsidiary of sociological and 
cultural studies — offering similar explanations of the human condition.
In this thesis, with reference to contemporary practical theologians, it is 
shown how the spirit is largely excluded from the discipline. Thereafter, it 
is argued that a new consideration of the work of theorists such as 
Schleiermacher and Deleuze can overcome this exclusion.
Schleiermacher's conception of the historical and finite spirit and his 
theology of absolute dependency are used to develop an aesthetic approach 
to practical theology. This provides an understanding of the human 
condition that is not just phenomenological but includes the spirit. This 
approach is illustrated using examples from the works of three artists 
(Barbara Hepworth, Tacita Dean and Zoë Leonard) plus a reflective 
Midrash from feminist theologian Heather Walton. Each of these provides 
a unique aesthetic approach to the human condition that makes it possible 
to expand the realm of the pastoral and create new spaces in which 
individual lives can transcend their particular circumstances.
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Introduction
METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICAL THEOLOGY
This thesis focuses on the issue of method in practical theology. In this 
context method will be understood as consisting of techniques and 
strategies that are implemented within the discipline in order to construct 
the relationship between theological discourse and current understandings 
of the human condition. I shall explore how method has been crucial to the 
development of practical theology as a contemporary discipline and has 
served important pedagogical functions securing its place within the 
Academy. I shall show how the methods that are deployed within practical 
theology serve to justify the application of a theological perspective to 
contemporary moral issues. Methods are also research tools used by 
scholars within practical theology to turn experiential data into Icnowledge. 
Method thus plays a hugely significant role but serious problems can arise 
if we do not continually question the validity or appropriateness of the 
various approaches which are adopted.
Debates about the nature and consequences of methodology involve the 
critical evaluation of research and investigative techniques in current 
practice. This scrutiny is necessary because method is not an abstract 
concept, it is deeply contextual and we must understand changes in method 
in the light of responses to cultural and epistemological shifts. Debates on 
methodology often seek to analyse the relationship between method and 
prevailing cultural assumptions and epistemologies. This thesis is an
exercise in methodology insofar as it explores the impact that 
contemporary currents of thought, including postmodernism, have upon 
current practice.
Practical theology has been relatively adept at responding to cultural 
changes in the past. It has emerged as a progressive, modern and 
modernising discipline in the contemporary university. It has been forward- 
thinking, eagerly adopting new investigative strategies—which have 
become highly influential in the shaping of the discipline.
Practical theology has made a particular alliance with the social sciences. I 
shall argue that this alliance is understandable, as both practical theology 
and the social sciences are modernist projects emerging from the 
epistemological innovations of the enlightenment. These epistemological 
foundations of the enlightenment project are now being challenged by a 
postmodernist critique. In light of this development the thesis will examine 
contemporary responses to postmodernism within practical theology.
It will also be argued here that the dependency on social theory can lead to 
a concept of humanity that fails to aclcnowledge theological understandings 
and perspectives. The application of social theory can occlude other aspects 
of existence, particularly those which have preoccupied theologians in the 
past. This thesis is particularly concerned with the notion of ‘ spirit’ 
which is absent or implicitly denied in some of the sociological approaches 
that have been adopted. This present work will be an attempt to find a way 
towards revisioning the discipline in a form that acknowledges the 
theological imperative within it.
To achieve this goal the thesis employs a critical analysis of the work 
contemporary theorists, including Gilles Deleuze, to demonstrate the 
radical epistemologies of postmodern thought. There has been a tendency 
within practical theology to minimise or even ignore the challenges from 
postmodernism but I shall show how practical theology can be creative and 
that we have the resources to meet them. Identifying these resources may 
entail a return to the roots of modern practical theology, and I find 
inspiration in Schleiermacher’s imaginative responses, deeply influenced 
by romanticism, to the challenges of his time. I will show how such 
aesthetic resources may be more appropriate than empirical ones for the 
creation of new spaces in the application of practical theology and how the 
creative imagination is required to reconnect us to the divine and the 
theological core of the discipline. My work thus represents an invitation to 
discover the ways in which a turn to the aesthetic, inspired by the work of 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, might generate new potentialities for practical 
theology.
This thesis is set out in two parts. The first section consisting of chapters 1, 
2 and 3 addresses the use of method in practical theology and considers the 
consequences that this has had for the development of the discipline. In the 
second section, chapters 4 and 5 focus on how to resolve the problems that 
various methods have generated. Thereafter Chapter 6 gives practical 
demonstration of the solution at which this thesis has arrived.
In Chapter 1 ,1 consider the relationship between method and the 
development of practical theology. What impact does method have on the
identity and status of practical theology as a discipline? Practical theology, 
it is often observed, is an Enlightenment product. However, there are new 
epistemological and ontological theories that challenge the analytical tools 
of modernity and practical theology now faces some difficulty with the 
issues raised by postmodern theoretical approaches. For example practical 
theology has in the past worked with concepts of the subject, truth and 
morality that are incompatible with some aspects of postmodern theory. 
How should practical theology respond?
Chapter 2 examines the responses to postmodernism from two theorists, 
Elaine Graham and Friedrich Schweitzer. Who are chosen because they are 
representative of contemporary theorists within practical theology 
responding to postmodernism. While there are differences between them, 
what they essentially have in common is that they both treat 
postmodernism as problematic. Graham and Schweitzer each wish to retain 
certain elements of modernity and embrace those aspects of postmodernity 
that they believe to be positive. They wish to steer practical theology 
through a period of anxiety and emerge with a working model that contains 
the best characteristics from both.
I will argue that, because Graham and Schweitzer theorise in terms of 
crisis, they construct a model that cannot maximize the new conceptual 
tools of postmodernism. Graham wishes to extended modernity and 
Schweitzer wants to create a new postmodern paradigm. Elaine Graham 
starts out by seeking to provide a transition between modernity and 
postmodernity. Yet, she actually opts for a sociological model of'high' 
modernity ('extended' or reflective modernity) such as that offered by
theorists like Anthony Giddens.
Schweitzer's proposal is to seek a new paradigm. However, he ultimately 
settles for a modified modernity and attempts to supplement it with aspects 
from postmodern ontology, thereby constructing what he believes to be the 
concept of a 'postmodern life cycle'. Graham and Schweitzer each tried to 
construct a 'third way' model. Nevertheless, I will suggest that their models 
both fail to give postmodernism an adequate hearing on its own terms.
In Chapter 3 ,1 examine some theorists who work with the conceptual tools 
of a postmodern epistemology. Don Ihde (one of the first postmodern 
philosophers of technological science) argues for a 'living authors' only 
approach to his subject. He examines the impact that perception makes on 
the construction of knowledge and believes that this is more important than 
the notion of progression through historical development.
Donna Haraway is also critical of our conceptualisation of knowledge and 
examines how women scientists are too easily co-opted into patriarchal 
academic disciplines. She also contributes to our understanding of how 
knowledge is authenticated and her theory of dispersed subjectivity also 
helps us to understand more about the transference of knowledge.
In the same chapter, I also examine the Santiago Theory of Autopoiesis. 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, both biologists, use this to 
demonstrate how living systems interpret the world according to their finite 
and limited experience in and of said world. In addition, the work of 
Jacques Ranciere helps to show how, in the west, the concept of a divided
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intellect impacts on what we believe about knowledge. He argued that 
knowledge is creative and that the spirit/imagination plays a role in this. To 
illustrate his theory Ranciere used the creative writings of those who lived 
at the margins of culture. This group of theorists have contributed much to 
a thoughtful critique of traditional empiricism.
Chapter 4 introduces the work of Gilles Deleuze. If practical theology is to 
genuinely explore and maximize the use of new conceptual tools, it might 
benefit from the work of such a theorist— who has emerged as one of the 
most radical thinkers in areas concerned with epistemology and ontology. 
Deleuze challenges both the remit of traditional philosophy and the very 
foundation of what we take to be critical thinking. I will suggest that his 
work can help to provide new and valuable insight into the work of 
Friedrich Schleiermacher and help us to recover him as an important figure 
for contemporary practical theology.
Chapter 5 examines the earlier work of Friedrich Schleiermacher — and 
particularly Speeches which was first published in 1799. It is argued here 
that he was co-opted into the new humanities by one of the founders of 
modern social science, the theorist Wilhelm Dilthey. Schleiermacher is also 
regarded as the founder of modern theology. It will be argued here that 
much of what was innovative in Speeches has effectively been theorised 
out of his work. Dilthey's interpretation for example, emphasised the 
rational aspects of his theory. The church on the other hand tended to see 
him as an organiser of church offices. This chapter re-examines Speeches 
and argues that its radical introduction of the historicised spirit is valuable 
to the development of contemporary practical theology. The work of
11
Deleuze is used in this chapter to redeploy Schleiermacher in the creation 
of new pastoral spaces.
Finally in Chapter 6 there is a demonstration of how aesthetics can be used 
in practical theology to reveal the importance of the spirit in the 
transcending of human circumstances, while simultaneously being 
committed to a fate in this world. Through the examples of artists Barbara 
Hepworth, Tacita Dean, Zoë Leonard and the pastoral reflection of 
theologian Heather Walton, we can demonstrate how new spaces in which 
to undertake practical theology can be created. The works I have chosen are 
all concerned with memorializing and grief.
The social sciences are predominantly concerned with a phenomenological 
understanding of the human condition, not with the presence of spirit in the 
world. This thesis is an attempt to resolve some of the contradictions which 
come from using methods which may undermine the ethos and purpose of 
practical theology. Our discipline can only strengthen its place in academia 
by demonstrating that it has a unique ability to create new spaces for 
understanding the human condition, without having to erase either theology 
from its theory or the notion of the spirit from its practice in the world.
In order to aid navigation through the thesis it might be helpful to give 
definitions here of key terms and the way they are employed in the current 
context.
12
Pastoral Theology Within the discipline both the terms ‘practical’ and 
‘pastoral’ are frequently deployed to categorise an approach to 
theology. It is worth noting that the terms are contextualised by the authors 
who choose to use them. Therefore both have legitimacy but the choice of 
one or another tends to indicate the methodological inclinations of the 
author. Practical theology is likely to be favoured when empirical and 
sociological analyses are used. The term pastoral theology is still in use but 
less so in contemporary work. The use of the term ‘pastoral’ in the title of 
the present work indicates a personal preference, but also the desire to 
rework the theological associations inherent in the term. In this instance 
‘pastoral’ is not identical with its historical uses but it serves as a 
channel through which theology can engage with certain aspects of 
contemporary culture in order to create new spaces in which to explore the 
manifestation of spirit in the world. It is also intended as an alternative to 
the use of practical and the association practical has with those theorists 
who use it in conjunction with methods from the social sciences. Practical 
is associated with the application of moral theory/practical wisdom and 
pastoral is historically linked with the movement between spaces (town/ 
conurbation country/ arcadia) The concept of pastoral space is deployed in 
the present work as a route for creating new territory and as a move away 
from prescriptive theory to creative theology. The spirit can be actualised 
in these creative spaces and be communicated in particular circumstances 
but only when individuals are immersed in the process and are not merely 
the recipients of an external moral law/rule. The pastoral is also used in this 
thesis to denote a space in which individuals can transcend prevailing 
trends in morality and explore the relationship between spirit and the world
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in a space beyond the confines of historical relationships. Schleiermacher’s 
work for example benefited from the opportunity he had to engage with the 
thinkers beyond the formal boundaries of the Church. Pastoral can be a 
space of the imagination, a poetic/aesthetic creation. In this sense the last 
chapter is intended to be a ‘pastoral sampler’ of different approaches of 
which the purpose is to provide a space for memorialising and grief.
Aesthetic: In the sense that it is being deployed in this thesis aesthetics is 
the capacity for different art forms to respond creatively to experience, to 
have the capacity to convey and receive meaning, values and beliefs 
through art, literature, poetry and technology. The examples used in the 
thesis demonstrate how aesthetics can radically alter the perception of a 
given situation. It is an ethical aesthetic which seeks justice rather than an 
eternal or intransient truth. This is not to suggest that existing conditions 
can be transformed using only the creative imagination but that this process 
enables multiple aspects of a situation to be explored, to be made visible.
Art can challenge and reshape the formulaic responses that we rely on to 
understand the world. The aesthetic is a means of exposing our 
preconceptions to particular aspects that we would not ordinarily consider. 
This is demonstrated through the work of the different authors I have 
selected in chapter 6. The aesthetic has the capacity to alter our 
subjectivity, to take us beyond the ‘common sense’ or cultural response to 
certain events and situations. Art can be a connective tissue, as in the case 
of Zoe Leonard, or it can be a means for altering the moral perspective as 
we see in the work of Tacita Dean. Art allows other ‘spaces’ of reality to 
become perceptible, for pastoral theology this would involve the creation of 
new sacred spaces as witnessed in the work of Heather Walton. The
14
aesthetic can have an ethical imperative when it involves moving beyond 
the realm of familiarity and challenging our image of reality. Art has an 
aesthetic function of transformation. In this thesis aesthetics is the means 
for becoming ethical as opposed to an approach which assumes prescribed 
moral positions. The aesthetic is therefore a way of immersing oneself in 
an ethical process. Art involves posing questions, making new 
combinations and going beyond a static perception of ‘reality’.
Spirit: The concept of spirit in this thesis is taken from the work of 
Schleiermacher. It is seen as finite and historicising, that aspect of being 
human that makes it possible for a continuous dialectical movement 
between inner consciousness and the world. For Schleiermacher this meant 
the mediation of the absolute in the historical. Spirit denotes the human 
turn to the absolute, to God, but also the individuals commitment and 
engagement with the world. This movement is described by 
Schleiermacher as an overwhelming compulsion to be taken up in the 
world, to fully participate in existence.
15
PART ONE
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Chapter 1
METHOD AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
IN CONTEMPORARY PRACTICAL THEOLOGY
We are told finally, that all we need to think well, to think truthfully, is a method. Method is an 
artifice but one through which we are brought back to the nature of thought, through which we 
adhere to this nature and ward off the effect of alien forces which alter it and distract us. 
Through method we ward off error. Time and place matter little if we apply method: it enables 
us to enter the domain of "that which is valid for all times and place". (Deleuze 2002, 103)
Practical theologians have spent a great deal of time and effort on the 
problem of method, yet it remains a contested and under-theorised area of 
the discipline of practical theology.^ The objective of this thesis is the 
analysis of two epistemological traditions, modernism and postmodernism, 
and the methods through which these are given form within contemporary 
practical theology. The terms modernism and postmodernism are often 
contested, and this ambiguity has given rise to some of the methodological 
anxiety that has beset contemporary theory. I will be seeking to 
demonstrate that method itself is involved in the constitution of theoretical 
perspectives and that these theoretical perspectives and the methods 
through which they are established contain implicit and constraining 
assumptions about the nature of human life.
' As demonstrated, for example, in the publication Practical Theology — International Perspectives Vol.34,1999. 
Editors Friedrich Schweitzer and Johannes A. Van der Ven have taken substantial contributions from the 
international community of practical theologians dedicated to the subject area of methodology and professional 
identity in contemporary practical theology,
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It is my intention to demonstrate that the theoretical approaches taken and 
the methods integral to them delineate the subject area, in the sense of 
identifying what is seen as the proper focus of enquiry. More importantly, 
they embody specific assumptions about what it means to be human and 
what it is to undertake human action. In other words, I will show how 
theoretical perspectives and the methods that accompany them serve to 
conform to certain ontological presuppositions.
It will be argued that for practical theology this creates a tension between 
the precepts inherent in the conceptual tools and organizing principles of 
particular theoretical and methodological positions and those aspects of 
existence which have traditionally been the primary concern of practical 
theology. For example, when we use sociological tools to analyse human 
experience these leave out the spiritual dimension of life and the possibility 
of a divine presence interacting with humanity. Bluntly put, they encourage 
us to develop a theology that is reticent about the spirit.
There are three major areas within practical theology in which particular 
tensions related to theory and methods are manifest. Firstly, practical 
theology has experienced a shift in authority. It is no longer accountable 
exclusively to ecclesiastical authority as it has a commitment to the 
standards and expectations of the modern university. Practical theologians 
are aware of this status and the corresponding research and pedagogical 
responsibilities that follow from it.
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Indeed a key reason for the adoption of methodologies, which are identified 
as scientific, is their perceived objectivity and empirical standing. It is one 
reason why leading figures in the discipline such as Johannes A. Van der 
Ven have argued for an empirical and scientific grounding for practical 
theology:
The question has to be asked, which methodology is relevant for practical theology. A multitude 
of methodologies, that are factually used in practical-theological studies, can be distinguished. 
Historical, hermeneutical and ideology-critical approaches appear to be very enriching. 
Linguistic methods are also successfully applied, like for instance semiotics, and metaphor- 
analytical and speech acts-analytical techniques. Next to these methods, the empiilcal approach 
can be relevant for practical theology. (Van der Ven, 1999 Vol.34, 323)
Secondly, practical theology borrows and assimilates greatly from the 
social sciences — making it highly dependent on disciplines that use 
conceptual formations that may sit uncomfortably outside the remit of 
practical theology. Methods deployed in the social sciences seek to explain 
the world in a way that reduces God and spirituality to constructs 
explicated through social, economic and cultural categories. Although 
sometimes useful, the methods of the social sciences can have the effect of 
despiritualising practical theology as a discipline, reducing its capacity to 
address the sacred and spiritual dimensions of human existence.
Thirdly, the nature of enquiry within practical theology has now become 
problematic because these methods have themselves come under scrutiny 
from postmodern critiques. Having collaborated eagerly with the traditions 
of modernity embraced by the academy, practical theology now finds itself 
called upon to respond to the epistemological challenges of postmodernism 
to these same methodological conventions.
19
There is a pressing need for practical theology to address these challenges. 
It will be argued here that, in so doing, it has the opportunity to re-integrate 
into the body of its thought those theological concerns that have been 
marginalised by its recent methodological preoccupations. It will also be 
argued that art and contemporary culture can create new spaces that can 
provide the opening for practical theology to engage in an understanding of 
the human situation with a new emphasis on the spirit. But first, the 
significance and the difficulties of method will be considered.
1.1 A Good Enough Method: From Existentialism to Correlation
Who art thou? From whence dost thou come? What is thy employment?
What will become of thee?
(Voltaire 1767)
To understand man, we must develop a 'philosophical anthropology' the existing tools and 
methods of the natural sciences, of traditional sociology and anthropology, are not adequate. 
What is needed is a new kind of reason.
(Sartre 1960b, xi)
In her introduction to Jean Paul Sartre's preface to Critique o f Dialectical 
Reason (1960a) Hazel Barnes sets out the rationale behind what was to 
emerge from this work as the separate shorter publication entitled The 
Problem o f Method (1960b). Later this was published under the title of, The 
Search for a Method (1963). Barnes explains, in the introduction to her 
translation of this work, that Sartre wrote this as an attempt to reconcile 
existentialism with Karl Marx's theory of historical materialism. He seeks to 
understand humanity without reducing experience to biological or economic 
determinism. (Barnes 1963)
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Sartre's quest was to find a way of explaining the 'transitory and fragmented' 
nature of being without losing sight of contextual influences on the 
individual. Can freedom and spontaneity be reconciled with a method that 
'reads' the world through its economic, sociological and political structures? 
This title and quest resonates with the present concern about the advantages 
and limitations of contemporary methods in practical theology.
Sartre wanted to understand how it is that individuals take willing 
possession of their fate in the world and make life an act of creation. The 
notion of an autonomous subject with the freedom to make life choices 
provides the ontological basis of Sartre's existentialism.
What is interesting about this later work is its optimistic and reconciliatory 
theme, Sartre takes the relative anarchy of existentialism and the restraints of 
economic determinism and explores some of the most perplexing questions 
about human existence. But why, in this mature work, should the world's 
most renowned proponent of twentieth century existentialism turn to 
historical materialism and declare it to be the definitive method of social 
enquiry?
Sartre is examining the process by which individuals internalize their life 
circumstances and, by so doing, give a legitimate authenticity to those 
historical relationships that structure human existence. Put another way, 
the problem of method lies in trying to reconcile historical preconditions, 
or a universal fate, with haecceity — the individual's commitment to these 
circumstances.
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This is not 'the best of all possible worlds' for many individuals so the 
question for Sartre is why do individuals, regardless of the conditions of 
their historical circumstances, take possession of a particular life. Personal 
identity and personal experience are continuing concerns and both fold into 
each other. Sartre's aim was to find a means of understanding the 
relationship between the personal and the determined experience.
It is evident that the individual has constraints on choice; a tension exists 
between desire and history in which commitment becomes the movement 
that reduces this anxiety. Sartre's use of historical materialism is an attempt 
to fashion a new reasoning (or radical way of thinking) about this 
relationship between freedom, determinism and existence. He is searching 
for the right formula with which to disclose what is knowable about the 
human condition. In this Sartre is still faithful to the enlightenment mission 
that there is something objectively knowable about humanity but which, as 
yet, we have not developed the right methodological tools to reveal.
Sartre's contribution to this challenge is to highlight the ideological problems 
with reason or thinking as tools of control with a legitimating function. It is 
crucial to first understand the nature of reason and its inherent problems. The 
powers of reason are a double-edged sword that can hinder as well as 
enhance our understanding. For as Sartre claims philosophy is:
Simultaneously a totalization of knowledge, a method, a regulative idea, an offensive weapon, 
and a community of language, if this 'vision of the world' is also an instrument which ferments 
rotten societies, if this particular conception of a man or of a group of men becomes the culture 
and sometimes the nature of a whole class —  then it is very clear that the periods of 
philosophical creation are rare. (Sartre 1963, 6)
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Reason is itself historical, emerging from the particular civilization it 
serves. The philosopher 'effects the unification of everything that is laiown', 
according to the 'guiding schemata' of a particular period of history:
Under certain well-defined circumstances a philosophy is developed for the purpose of giving 
expression to the general movement of the society. So long as the philosophy is alive, it serves 
as a cultural milieu for its contemporaries. (Sartre 1963, 3)
The problem is: How do we step outside a particular ideological regime and 
initiate any genuine new way of thinking? Epistemological traditions have a 
strong propensity for reinforcing and repeating patterns of knowledge and 
understanding. We believe method is what we need to thinlc correctly about 
the world.
The paradox is that methods and the conceptual assumptions that they 
embody can actually put restraints on our thinking. Method should prevent 
error but it may also prove to be restrictive. Sartre's point is that methods are 
both the repositories for epistemological traditions and the sentinels of 
particular intellectual ideologies. In other words, they perform a function 
beyond that of being mere pedagogical and research tools.
What exactly is the human condition amidst the kaleidoscope of cultural 
configurations? In the end, for Sartre, it is an act of faith that humans have 
the power of existential choice. He chose to situate existentialism within 
the boundaries of historical materialism, in his recognition that freedom is a 
problematic notion.
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Sartre's quest for the right method to explore the human condition 
essentially parallels the practice of some theologians who utilize the 
methods of social science — in that they believe in the movement of spirit 
or God that is somehow beyond or underlying the various social conditions 
which these approaches are identifying. Distinguishing the presence of 
such a spirit is difficult to reconcile with some of these methods. Yet it is 
often deemed to be the task of practical theologians to understand the 
religious and spiritual aspects of existence as major forces for morality in 
the social world.
For Paul Tillich (1886-1965), existence itself was a fallen/estranged state in 
which humanity becomes aware and anxious about its finite condition. 
Existentialism was to underpin his theory of correlation and provide (for 
him) a crucial means of addressing the human condition. In Theology o f  
Culture, first published in 1959, Tillich addresses the problem of 
deliberating whether religion is a 'creative element of the human spirit' or 
divine revelation:
If one replies that religion is an aspect of man's spiritual life, they [theologians] will turn away. 
Then some secular scientists will ask whether religion is to be considered a lasting quality of the 
human spirit instead of an effect of changing psychological and sociological conditions. And if 
one answers that religion is a necessary aspect of man's spiritual life, they turn away like the 
theologians, but in the opposite direction. (Tillich 1975, 3)
The focus of Tillich's work was the reconciliation of religious faith with an 
increasingly sceptical contemporary culture. His argument was simply that 
in all cultural forms religion would actualize itself. He was also very clear 
about the need for theology to develop a theological method that was 
compatible with his conception of it as a 'concrete and normative science of 
religion':
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It is not a sound procedure to borrow a method for a special realm of inquiry from another realm 
in which this method has been successfully used. It seems on that the emphasis on the so called 
"empirical" method in theology has not grown out of actual theological demands but has been 
imposed on theology under the pressure of a "methodological imperialism" exercised by the 
pattern of natural sciences. This subjection of theology to a strange pattern has resulted in an 
undue extension of the concept "empirical" and the lack of a clear distinction between the 
different meanings of "experience" in the theological enterprise. (Tillich 1987, 127)
'Religion in the light of science and philosophy' was the focus of the 1952 
Terry Foundation lectures, delivered by Tillich and later published as The 
Courage To Be.^ In this work, Tillich assimilates Heidegger's existential 
philosophy and Spinoza's concept of conatus to form his concept of courage 
established as the parallel to his 'ontology of anxiety':
Courage as a human act, as a matter of valuation is an ethical concept. Courage as the universal 
and essential self affirmation of one's being is an ontological concept. The courage to be is the 
ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which 
conflict with his essential self-affirmation. (1961, 3)
Tillich further believed that Sartre's work provided a critical psychological 
dimension to Heidegger's philosophy^:
Sartre carried through the consequences of Heidegger's Existentialist analysis without mystical 
restrictions. This is the reason he has become the symbol of present day Existentialism, a 
position which is deserved not so much by the originality of his basic concepts as by the 
radicalism, consistency and psychological adequacy with which he has carried them through. 
(1961, 142)
This affirmation of Sartre's particular interpretation of Heidegger is also 
present in his later work, Theology o f Culture in which he described Sartre 
as 'the psychological interpreter of Heidegger', Tillich is in no doubt about 
the importance of existentialism as a working theoiy: 'existentialism as a
Tillich gave the 27"’ series of the Terry Foundation lectures at Yale University in 1952; the first edition of The 
Courage To Be emerged as the seminal work that was to link Tillich with existentialism later that year.
Tillich preferred the psychological immanence of Sartre's interpretation of existentialism to Heidegger's romantic 
mysticism and origin myths about embryonic epistemology and classical Greek culture. (See Heidegger's 'What is 
Philosophy',)
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philosophy speaks of the universal human situation' (Tillich 1975, 118); but 
he is also aware that in itself existentialism is not free from ideological 
influences. He is not entirely in agreement with Sartre's brand of 
existentialism, but he nonetheless finds Sartre's concept of fear cmcial in his 
interpretation of anxiety as ontology.
Tillich's work is crucial in understanding the development of twentieth 
century practical theology. In every sense he was constructing a theology 
and not merely assimilating existing methods. Every science has its basic 
principles and, for Tillich's systematic theology, these are the central tenets 
of existentialism. This allowed an inteipretation of the Christian narratives 
of the fall and salvation as a process of psychological healing:
The universal fall —  fall meaning the transition from essential goodness into existential 
estrangement from oneself, which happens in every living being and in every time. (Tillich 
1975, 118)
The result is a theology of a timeless fall, in which each generation has to 
find its way back to wholeness. Christian theology is not a thing apart from 
culture and Tillich's aim is to take humanity's ultimate questions and 
address these through the Christian faith. This desire to make theology 
relevant to humanity's immediate circumstances has become the hallmark 
of modern practical theology. In turn, this leads to a quest to construct an 
appropriate and effective method with which this desire can be actualized. 
Method, for Tillich, is therefore at the heart of the reconciliation of the 
religious and the secular:
For the religious and the secular realm are in the same predicament. Neither of them should be 
in separation from the other, and both should realize that their very existence as separated is an 
emergency, that both of them are rooted in religion in the larger sense of the word, in an 
experience of ultimate concern. (Tillich 1975, 9)
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Tillich retains concepts of'creative courage' and the 'human spirit' at the core 
of his search for a suitable method. He believes that loiowledge and religion 
have the same grounding in spirit/ The religious aspect is not in any sense a 
separate criterion. It is not optional but is an integral part of method. In 
this,Tillich goes some way towards integrating the spirit with the methods of 
the social sciences. This has eluded much contemporary practical theology.
For some theologians like Seward Hiltner (1910-84), new methods provided 
the means to restructure practical theology. Hiltner had three significant 
issues which he believed were important for the future of practical theology:
Firstly, that practical theology needs to be open and enquiring and not spend 
so much time looking backwards, as Christian revelation is ongoing; 
secondly, that practical theology should not be limited to the church 
tradition/hierarchy and clerical affairs; thirdly, that practical theology should 
become involved in the process of revelation through personal and historical 
encounters rather than 'Olympian first causes' (Hiltner 1958, 221). 
Contemporary epistemologies were to become essential to the total process 
of what Hiltner conceived to be a new Systematic practical theology:
Theologians have of course taken different stands about the relation of theology to culture. 
Methodologically speaking, however, all great theologians have taken culture or human 
knowledge in general, quite seriously. In his day Thomas Aquinas was a daring innovationist by 
insisting on relating Aristotelian thought to theology. (Hiltner 1958, 222)
A theme that also provides the foundations of Karl Rahner's theology of knowledge as 'graced understanding.’
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This in some way gets to the heart of the problem for contemporary practical 
theology. Aquinas and Tillich incorporated secular philosophies into their 
systematic theology. By contrast, the contemporary emphasis is on the 
interdisciplinary assimilation of modern methods, which can have very 
different consequences, as indicated here by Friedrich Schweitzer:
In terms of the relationship between Practical theology and the social sciences, the double focus 
on practical theology as a discipline and on its relationship to contemporary culture appears to 
produce two contradictory demands. On the one hand, the interest in practical theology as a 
unified discipline seems to require a limitation or at least clear subordination of interdisciplinary 
contact. From this perspective, the inclusion of sociological or psychological theories within 
practical theology must lead to the question of whether practical theology is more than just a 
different name for sociology or psychology, and how practical theology may be distinguished 
from the social scientific study of religion. (Schweitzer 1999, 308)
The problems of correlation, assimilation or the interdisciplinary use of 
methods have been further complicated by the theoretical developments of 
the 20*'^  centuiy. It is now no longer possible to explore the possibilities of 
contemporary methods without addressing the theoretical foundations that 
underpin them. Previously normative methods (and our ways of thinking) 
have been challenged by postmodernism. The familiar landmarks can no 
longer be taken for granted.
There is little disagreement about the importance of method. The problem 
is: How do we find a suitable way forward for practical theology that 
avoids its being irreversibly subordinated to the methods it borrows? Can 
practical theology rise to the postmodernist challenge on its own terms?
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1.2 The Importance o f Methodology for Practical Theology
As I have begun to demonstrate, method is important in the pursuit of 
knowledge. It is what we use to shape questions and to arrange data, 
sources, facts and information in an orderly way. A method is a way of 
doing something according to a plan. Method is also an important 
epistemological tool used in the construction and dissemination of 
knowledge. It can potentially enhance the progression of a discipline eager 
to position the boundaries of specialization, as argued for here by Friedrich 
Schweitzer:
My starting point is the question of how practical theology is to be constituted as a discipline. 
The notion of discipline to which I refer in this question clearly means more than the attempt to 
just summarize or combine various areas of work under a single heading or umbrella term. 
Rather, this notion of discipline includes the claim to such a unity which allows us to establish, 
maintain, and even guide practical theology as a discipline of its own within the field of 
theology. Therefore, inner coherence and clear boundaries seem to be the necessary 
implications of this notion. (Schweitzer 1999, 307)
We deploy method to bring order into a discipline, to make it publicly and 
pedagogically viable. Method is about systems, about being systematic — 
outlining in schematic form the principles that guide us in the pursuit of 
knowledge. Method is used for teaching, for exposition, to investigate, to 
inquire. We use method to contribute to existing knowledge, to make our 
findings accountable and open to legitimate critique. Method should also 
enable us to take questions that interest us personally and put them into the 
public domain. Information is analyzed and interpreted according to the 
principles of a particular method in order to inform and increase our 
understanding.
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For contemporary practical theology, method is also the foundation of the 
academic discipline. It is integral to the professional status of practical 
theology. Our method brings us into line with other disciplines and enables 
us to achieve an academic identity.
Because of these considerations, contemporary practical theologians are 
just as likely to be concerned about the professional and intellectual status 
of the discipline within academia as they are with issues of church and 
ministry. Increasingly the identity of the contemporary practical theologian 
is likely to be that of an academic rather than a cleric.
For these reasons, there is an understandable anxiety expressed by some 
practical theologians that their subject remains current and valid. As an 
academic discipline, its concerns emerge from an intellectual environment 
within contemporary higher education. Consequently, practical theologians 
perceive their success is measured according to how well they perform in 
such circumstances:
In many respects, practical theology in Britain seems to be thriving. Paul Ballard's recent survey 
indicated a surprising number of undergraduate programmes in Britain which claim to be 
offering a substantial focus on practical theology. In meeting various tutors and students 
involved in such programmes, I am consistently impressed by the degree of enthusiasm and 
commitment to this discipline. (Lynch 2003, 22)
There is also a desire to escape the confines of clericalism. Paul Ballard 
{emeritus Professor of Practical Theology at Cardiff University) has argued 
that the professional zenith for the clergy was the nineteenth century and 
that they have since experienced a decline in status. In the past the clergy 
were venerated along with law and medicine as part of a learned triad.
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The increasing secularization of knowledge has had the consequence of 
altering the intellectual and cultural standing of the clergy. Ballard suggests 
that, 'the clergy have experienced in a radical way the current collapse of 
the professional mystique,' they had once possessed (Ballard 2004, 48).
The implication being that the practical theologian can no longer rely on a 
privileged and uncontested status but has to maintain credibility the same 
as any other academic discipline. Ballard is concerned with how we define 
this new professional identity, especially in a postmodern context where 
investigations relating to 'metaphysical questions about the nature of good' 
are problematic (Ballard 2004, 51). He seeks to 'compare and contrast' the 
clerical profession with other professional bodies. This is a model that sets 
out to demonstrate proficiency and authority and seeks to construct a 
modern discipline with an ever-increasing tendency toward specialization. 
Accordingly, practical theologians seek to define these contours with the 
use of a rational discourse that promotes the concept of the professional 
'expert':
One of the marks of a profession is that it practices its skills on the basis of the mastery of a 
body of knowledge that is held in trust for the laity that receive the service offered. The quality 
of service is guaranteed in the professional identity. (Ballard 2004, 48)
Paul Ballard and Stephen Pattison have brought together some of these 
issues of concern in their appraisal of the profile of postgraduate studies in 
practical theology in higher education. Ballard and Pattison aspire to 
'methodological cohesion, consolidation of practice and a clear and 
recognizable form' for the discipline' (Ballard & Pattison 2002, 15-23).
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In his joint publication with Ballard, Ambiguity and Opportunity (Ballard & 
Pattison 2004), Pattison (who is presently Professor of Religion and Ethics at 
Birmingham University) expresses concern for pedagogical consistency. 
Ballard's original research was meant to establish the development and 
consolidation of practical theology as a clearly delineated discipline, but he 
is aware of the risk practical theology takes of disappearing in between the 
interdisciplinaiy gaps.
There is therefore an ongoing challenge to prove that there is a discipline here which is at least 
as demanding as other theological disciplines. PT is essentially interdisciplinary, correlating one 
or more social science with theology. It also works at both the theoretical and practical levels. 
The danger is that practical theologians suffer the fate of all those crossing boundaries and 
divides; they are not perceived to have expertise in anything. (Ballard & Pattison 2002, 20)
In pursuing methodological homogeneity, Ballard and Pattison are 
understandably aiming to provide the systematic regularity demanded 
within the institutions of higher education. Practical theologians seek to 
establish and retain a viable discipline through its deployment of methods 
that are part of public discourse and scrutiny.
As method directs the pursuit of (and legitimises) knowledge within the 
academic community, it plays a crucial role in making its findings effective, 
open and accountable. To be credible and respectable has meant investing 
intellectually in the modern university. This also means aspiring to the 
standards of excellence set down as the objectives of such an establisliment, 
even if sometimes this means fitting traditional objectives within the matrix 
of scientific enquiry, as noted by Van der Yen, again in acquiescence to 
these requirements:
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Without a sound and clear methodology, practical theology cannot fulfill its task: reflecting on 
the people's praxis from the viewpoint of God's revelatory praxis in a way that is as scientific as 
possible. This especially refers to developing practical theology within the context o f the 
modern secular university. (Van der Yen 1999, 324)
The establishment of a 'sound and clear' methodology is particularly 
important for those practical theologians who are mindful of the poor status 
of practical theology in the past. On which point Bernard Reymond, a 
contemporary French practical theologian, chooses to focus:
The recent evolution of practical theology, and a better understanding of its identity and its 
importance, have greatly modified the way in which the field defines itself with respect to other 
theological disciplines... I maintain that practical theology must remain a specific discipline 
among others-but a discipline in its own right. First of all, it is simply a necessity, according to 
the way theological studies are organised. In our universities and seminars, practical theology is 
one professorial chair, possibly several, among others, and I see no justification for imposing its 
methods or its point of view; such imperialism would be a bad way of trying to compensate for 
Its subordinate status o f previous years [my italics]. (Reymond 1999, 168)
Implicit in Reymond's article is the notion that practical theology has 
improved through the process of becoming a discrete and authoritative 
subject in its own right. The progression of knowledge, through specialized 
disciplines, is the standard approach in our education system. In higher 
education, this is even more evident. Practical theologians have worked 
hard to make their discipline credible and respectable within this culture of 
expertise. The aim is to provide a consistency and uniformity of 
composition in its teaching methods. Reymond insists that practical 
theology is able to present a recognizable topology within its own 
intellectual landscape:
Any attempt at describing practical theology presupposes therefore that one is conscious of the 
following: (a) the itinerary which led it to constitute itself as a distinct discipline; (b) the precise 
field which it considers as its own; (c) the way it distinguishes itself from other branches of 
theology, and, as is the case for any theological discipline, (d) the confessional (denominational) 
traditions which affect its declarations. (Reymond 1999, 167)
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As I have begun to argue, a crucial part of practical theology's itinerary has 
been its interdisciplinary assimilation of the methods from the social 
sciences. Increasingly, practical theology seeks to strengthen its identity as a 
moral science rather than through a classic religious identity. Major theorists 
(for example: Don Browning at the University of Chicago Divinity School 
and Elaine Graham at Manchester University) work within a Judaeo- 
Chiistian tradition which they seek to open to the insights of contemporaiy 
social theory. However, some practical theologians would take the more 
radical step of ending the restriction of practical theology to specifically 
religious communities. The consensus being that such a location is neither 
favorable nor adequate for a contemporary 'post-religious' culture.
Wlien Paul Ballard suggests that the term 'pastoral' has too many ideological 
implications to be anything other than a hindrance to the progress of 
practical theology he is endorsing a critique that assumes making things 
current requires the shedding of old images and worn-out religious 
references. The idea is that the outmoded language of the pastoral prevents 
any genuine contemporary connection. Therefore, the development of 
practical theology has also been a histoiy of its distancing itself from the 
concept of the pastoral. The distinctive and phonetically crisp practical and 
its association with praxis and a scientific approach are favored over the 
softer pastoral with its religious and clerical overtones.
Gordon Lynch, Professor of Sociology of Religion at Birbeck, University 
of London, makes a case for an alternative 'post-religious' practical 
theology (Lynch 2003, 22-27) and subscribes to this point of view.
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Lynch, whose interests have always been in the relationship between 
religion and contemporary culture, questions the use of a model of practical 
theology (specifically Seward Hiltner's) which relies on the concept of 
pastoral. This, he suggests, has the consequence of alienating practical 
theology from a wide section of society that no longer shares a strong sense 
of religious identity:
The Hiltner model of an ecclesiastical and pastoral approach to practical theology, whilst useful 
for the church, becomes clearly less relevant for the large number of people who live without 
any ecclesiastical point of contact. .. My starting point for this alternative model is the 
recognition that Britain (like much of Western Europe) is an increasingly post-religious society. 
(Lynch 2003, 24)
Lynch is critical of Hiltner, arguably because he has underestimated the 
significance of his methodological reform. Lynch has overlooked the 
strategic element in Hiltner's revisioning of practical theology, which was to 
take the biblical metaphor of shepherding and rework it to make it 
compatible with the increasingly high profile adaptations of psychoanalysis. 
In the work of Carl Rogers (1902-87), founder of the Jungian influenced 
Person Centered Therapy f  Hiltner saw an opportunity to develop a pastoral 
theology that would easily blend with current psychoanalytic literacy of 
North America, a culture already well primed in counseling theoiy.^ Hiltner, 
like Lynch, was motivated by the objective of widening ecclesiastical 
boundaries. That he was successful in so doing is evident in the proliferation
 ^ Carl Rodgers was to make considerable contributions to Hiltner’s Journal for pastoral psychology. Rogers 
believed that in actualizing their potential people created culture, He was best known for his founding of'client 
centered therapy' in which it was the analyst task to enable positive self actualization of the analysand. The 
therapist or analyst was to have three essential qualities: congruence - the capacity for complete honesty; 
empathy - the ability to feel and mirror the emotional reality of the analysand; and, finally, respect - unconditional 
positive regard for the analysand that was non-judgmental. Rogers and Hiltner both believed that this 
psychotherapeutic model was in keeping with Christian practice.
" In this sense, Hiltner was following in the spirit of Paul Tillich who was an advocated for change in the guiding 
principles of theology. Hiltner was not an innovative thinker like Tillich, but he was a consummate apprentice of 
reconfiguration.
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of counseling models within practical theology. Hiltner's approach was never 
simply about what was useful for the church. As he clearly stated:
Pastoral care should be used as we are using the term shepherding, but in that case we should 
have to be careful not to revert to the thinking by way of church offices. (Hiltner 1958, 20)
Unlike Ballard, Pattison or Lynch, Hiltner is not eager to reject religious 
language (with its historical associations) as 'obfuscating'. Hiltner 
maintains enough familiarity through the metaphoric medium of 
shepherding to secure an authoritative lineage between the classical 
meanings of pastoral and his own reform. He then establishes a workable 
distance through an astute mixture of imagery and semantics. In other 
words, he redefines the shepherding metaphor for a different context.
Lynch's dismissal of Hiltner as a typical proponent of the 'ecclesiastical' 
model of practical theology ignores the complexity and significance of 
Hiltner's work. In fact, Hiltner initiated the concern for the educative side of 
practical theology that is now prevalent in contemporary practice. Wliat is 
significant about Hiltner's use of the shepherding metaphor is not that he has 
failed, as Elaine Graham has suggested in Transforming Practice^ to develop 
this as a theological concept. It is used by Hiltner primarily as an organising 
principle of method.
Elaine Graham suggested that Hiltner 'neglected to question the aims and 
ends of shepherding', but this misses the important epistemological 
implication of mobilizing the concept as an aid in dislodging the pastoral 
form  from a clerical mode for methodological purposes.
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With the use of the 'ancient shepherding metaphor', as he refers to it, as the 
organizing principle of his theory, Hiltner set out to 'reclaim' pastoral 
theology for the contemporary purposes of counseling and teaching. The 
pastoral becomes a medium through which the meaning and reconfiguration 
of practical theology are facilitated. The shepherding metaphor is sustained 
as a familiar theological concept which also serves as a henneneutic 
principle in the transference of new ontological and methodological 
positions.
In other words, Hiltner's use of the shepherding/pastoral, as opposed to its 
elimination from the topography, would expand the boundaries of practical 
theology. This is evident in Hiltner's revision of his 'ancient metaphor' to 
incorporate images of twentieth century husbandry. Amalgamating deep- 
rooted imagery with a contemporary application, he creates a working 
analogy to justify his reform;
Today a sheep grower has to help the pasture by fertilizer, by alternative plantings, or by 
irrigation. He adds vitamins and antibiotics to the sheep diet. He does these things not because 
sheep are inherently more complicated than they used to be, but because modern knowledge 
enables him to do more about helping more sheep in more dimensions of their life. The spiritual 
shepherd of today has as much obligation as the literal shepherd to bring his methods up to date, 
in order to meet the peculiar needs and dangers o f  our time [my italics]. (Hiltner 1958, 25)
Hiltner then had a specific use for religious terminology. Religious 
concepts bring with them associations and provide continuity through the 
construction of a shared memory. This is an important element in the 
transference of all intellectual histories:
The unique place occupied by shepherding in Christianity comes from the way in which our 
relationship to God and relationship to our fellow men are regarded as inseparable. (Hiltner 
1958, 17)
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This is in contrast with Ballard's dismissal of the term 'pastoral' (based on 
what he took to be the negative connotations with the word) and his desire 
for the more positive associations of'practical'. Hiltner was more concerned 
with harnessing the associations of'pastoral'. He understood that the familiar 
can provide a sense of continuity, while executing radical change.
Unlike Ballard or Lynch, Hiltner was not eager to move beyond the 
historical traditions of practical theology. Nonetheless he was successful in 
superimposing a powerful biblical image onto the relationship between 
analyst and analysand. The result was a psychotherapeutic model of pastoral 
theology validated within a strong religious tradition. Hiltner also wanted to 
establish pastoral theology as systematic and pedagogical, a suitable vehicle 
for his clinical model. Overall he made good use of transforming the 
pastoral/shepherding metaphor into a pivotal organizing tool of his method.
Ballard's critique ignores the plasticity and semantic slippage of language 
that allows for the adaptation of religious terminology for theoretical as well 
as theological circulation. To dismiss religious terminology because it has 
'outlived' its purpose is a misguided response to the complexity if its history. 
Choice of language, however, is never arbitrary. As I have suggested, within 
the discipline the term 'practical' has now become popular because of its 
proximity to the notion of praxis and the methods of the social sciences. The 
issue is one of lineage. Hiltner, a dedicated modernist, also wanted historical 
connections. Those who struggle to define 'new' models of practical theology 
want this too, but they have a desire to be progressive and the social sciences 
have provided the means of being such.
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There is nothing wrong in this. Equally, there is nothing wrong in Hiltner's 
synthetic reconstruction of the pastoral within a contemporaiy structure. 
What counts is transparency of purpose. The changing taxonomy of practical 
theology is not the real issue. What should be vital is the persistence of 
whatever it is about the human condition that benefits from its function as a 
modern discipline.
What remains of lasting value in Hiltner's reinterpretation of the pastoral 
(contested or not, with or without sheep, resonating and persisting in our 
culture) is his desire to understand and alleviate what Tillich identified as 
humanity's 'pathological' anxiety about existence, Hiltner, with all his 
wealoiesses and flaws, was a modernist who did not attempt to reduce 
practical theology to a 'practical moral wisdom'. He was clear about the 
need to broaden the working space of practical theology beyond the realm of 
church offices — without rejecting its religious heritage.
Gordon Lynch believes that the fact that most people have no formal 
involvement with religious institutions renders Seward Hiltner's approach 
outmoded. Lynch argues for the construction of a 'practical moral wisdom' 
that emerges from a 'post-religious' practical theology for a secular culture. 
The reform of practical theology for Lynch means distancing the discipline 
from its religious associations. Increasingly, then, it is to secular authority 
and pedagogic institutions that practical theology turns for authority and 
legitimation. Practical theologians who move progressively toward the 
sociological understanding of religion in contemporary culture, like Lynch, 
are most likely to get their analytical tools from the social sciences.
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Nonetheless, Lynch still wishes to retain some distinctiveness for practical 
theology:
I would suggest that there is still an important difference between these disciplines, however, in 
that the practical theologian approaches their field of study with the primary goal of asking what 
forms of belief are adequate, healthy or true, and what forms of practice genuinely promote 
lasting well-being. Many scholars involved in cultural studies and sociology would share such 
critical and normative concerns, but in practice they are not always seen as fundamental in 
social scientific study (which may often remain at the level of describing social processes and 
structures) as they are within practical theology. (Lynch 2003, 27).
However, here Lynch seems to ignore the struggle within the social 
sciences to address the problem of overt and covert value judgments. Truth 
has also been an important aspiration for social scientists like Max Weber 
who wrote extensively about our projection of meaning into social 
situations. This is what Weber referred to as 'value considered interest':
It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to us due to the connection 
to our values.. .We cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means of 
'presuppositionless' investigation of empirical data. Rather perception of its meaningfulness to 
us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation. (Weber 1949, 76)
This is at odds with Lynch's notion that social scientists seek a dispassionate 
interest in describing reality. Any claim to be 'presuppositionless' ignores 
prevailing value systems that are inherent in the selection of the object of 
enquiry.^ Moreover, the most enduring social theory has come from those 
who founded their work on value judgments. Notions of injustice, inequality 
and exploitation underpin Das Kapital, yet Marx could still describe his 
work as the scientific study of society because he studied the general 
conditions that gave rise to and peipetuated systems of inequality.
’ Although it should be pointed out that Weber always argued that the ’value conditioned interest' of phenomena 
must be causally explained as a component of a definitive culture to make its significance understandable, this is 
what makes the study social science rather than merely descriptive analysis.
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This is also evident in contemporary social theory, the concept of inequality 
in Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of'cultural capital' being an example/
The absence of an appeal to religious authority makes Lynch's practical 
morality level with all other ethical and social theory. The social sciences 
also have a history of being critically aware of value judgments and include 
this awareness as a necessary prerequisite for any research. In some 
contemporary strands, ethnomethodology for example, it is the organizing 
principle.
Although advocating a 'post-religious' practical theology Lynch still 
acknowledges the debt that his theory owes to Don Browning, one of the 
foremost contemporary scholars of the discipline:
A practical theology for a 'post-religious' society can draw important methodological principles 
from the work of Don Browning... (Lynch 2003, 25)
Don, Browning (just like Hiltner before him) understood the importance of 
religious heritage in providing the underlying authority for practical 
theology. Contemporary intellectual theory was crucial to the development 
of a modern discipline but Browning set out to keep these harmonious using 
an evolved format of Paul Tillich's approach, what he referred to as critical 
correlation theory. In contrast, Lynch (selecting those strands of Browning's 
approach that incorporate a social science perspective) effectively empties 
Browning's methodology of its religious content.
® Cultural capital is a key sociological tool used in Bourdieu's analysis of inequality. Used as a measurement of 
personal status accumulated through cultural inheritance (habitus/family/intellectual), but this 'measurement' 
depends upon the boundaries/precepts of subjective value systems and judgments about high and low culture. 
Political philosophers, Ranciere for example, have been critical about Bourdieu's acceptance of ideologically 
'legitimated' or 'policed' epistemologies.
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In so doing, he makes it hard to differentiate between practical theology and 
social science — something of which he is aware, though he insists that 
practical theology can defend a privileged position in relation to the ethical 
dimension of such studies. However, as we have seen, this fails to stand as a 
substantial differentiator.
Hiltner successfully expanded and altered practical theology without 
having to abandon religion. Paradoxically, in arguing for a post-religious 
practical theology. Lynch makes it difficult to justify the need for practical 
theology in a contemporary culture. In fact he goes so far as to suggest that 
some sociologists and journalists already fulfil the remit of pastoral 
theology:
Indeed, the most stimulating 'practical theology' that I have read over the past couple of years 
would include Zygmunt Bauman's work on post-modern culture, George Ritzer's work on the 
McDonaldization of society, and Michael Moore's journalism on the nature of contemporary 
western politics. (Lynch 2003, 27)
However Lynch is still seeking to find a role for practical theologians in a 
secular culture and it is to some of the more recognizable formulas that he 
constantly returns. He would like to develop practical theology as a 
'practical moral wisdom'. In this he is following firmly in the footsteps of 
Don Browning, who has tenaciously sought to make practical theology a 
working model of moral science -  as I shall discuss below.
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1.3 Don Browning and Practical Wisdom:
Practical Theology as Applied Moral Science
The realization that practical theology can only fulfil its task if it is constituted in relationship to 
contemporary culture, leads to the need for close contact and co-operation between practical 
theology and the social sciences. In this vein it is sometimes argued that the social sciences have 
become the only legitimate access to contemporary culture. Their degree of sophistication has 
set the standards for all today’s understanding of culture...According to this view, the social 
sciences are the only way in which cultural reality may become accessible for theology. 
(Schweitzer 1999, 308)
Perhaps one of the most important perceived contributions that the methods 
of the social sciences have made to practical theology is to provide an 
armoury of intellectual and scientific integrity. The methods of the social 
sciences work on the basic principle that, whatever the object of their 
inquiry, it will be and remain both discernible and measurable in all times 
and in all places. This capacity for delivering an accurate description of the 
world is an aspect of the social sciences that practical theologians have 
long valued.
Don Browning played a crucial role in establishing practical theology as a 
discrete subject area within an institution that provides uniformity in the 
production of knowledge and the maintenance of academic standards 
(Browning 1991). He has been at the forefront of the construction of a 
practical theology that has a pedagogical rather than ecclesiastical remit, 
and in this sense carries on with the modernisation of pastoral theology 
initiated by Seward Hiltner. In contrast to Lynch however. Browning 
elects to retain traditional Judaeo-Christian sources as an essential 
underlying authority.
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However, I think we have to be cautious about the nature of Browning's 
correlation method. For Tillich, correlation meant answering particular 
existential/pathological anxieties within the Christian tradition. A careful 
critique of Browning reveals not a revised continuation of this but an 
inverted application of correlation whereby the Judaeo-Christian narrative 
is ultimately enclosed within a moral science that has been synthetically 
constmcted from prevailing trends in psychology, education and a 
rediscovery of Aristotelian phronesis via Gadamer's hermeneutics.
Browning's contribution to modem theology consisted in providing 
continuity between contemporary theory and established traditions by means 
of a sophisticated hermeneutic exercise. He was working with theorists who 
were proponents of 'practical philosophy'. The implementation of the critical 
theory of Jurgen Habermas (Habermas 1968) and Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(Gadamer 1960) provides the theoretical and hermeneutical tools that, 
together with the resources of sociology and psychology, underpin 
Browning's method.
These philosophical perspectives are the foundations of Browning's Critical 
Correlation Theory of which the fullest representation is demonstrated 
comprehensively in A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and 
Strategic Proposals (1991). Whereas Tillich's response to the increasing 
scepticism about religion in a humanistic culture was both intellectual and 
philosophical, Browning wanted to shift the emphasis from 'the modern 
fascination' with theoretical and teclinical modes of thinlcing.
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. . . ■ .
Browning was also concerned about scepticism but wished to create a 
theology that had a more practical application. Actively pursuing the 'rebirth' 
of practical theology as moral science he advocates the introduction of 
Aristotle's concept of practical wisdom (Browning 1999, 54). This has two 
components: the capacity to make rational choices on which a person acts 
(prohairesis); and the reflective process by which a rational choice is 
ultimately formed. These, coupled with Gadamer's defense of the historical 
nature of understanding, provide Browning with a reflective model for 
contemporary practical theology^:
The rebirth of practical theology is designed to question the dominance o f theoretical and 
technical reason, to secure in the university a stronger role for practical reason, to demonstrate 
that critical reflection about the goals of human action is both possible and necessary, and that, 
as a matter of fact, practical reason does indeed function in much wider areas of human life than 
we realize —  even in fact in the human sciences. (Browning 1999, 54)
Browning's emphasis is on the moral context of understanding revealed in 
the 'conversational model of henneneutics' (Browning 1999, 54). He also 
takes from Gadamer the idea that the events of the past shape our present 
historical consciousness — Gadamer's famous 'fusion of horizons' (Gadamer 
1975). For Browning this translates into a fusion of the classic texts of 
Judaeo-Christian faith and the critical correlation between these traditions 
and the 'fore concepts' that contemporary culture brings to them. With this 
hermeneutic interchange, contemporary issues bring historical text into
Gadamer was critical o f the 'general tendency o f the enlightenment not to accept any authority and to 
decide everything before the judgm ent seat o f reason' (Gadamer 1994, 257). He did not believe in the 
purity o f reason as the 'ultimate source for all authority.' This problem, o f the historical nature o f 
reason, is one that also came to preoccupy Jean Paul Sartre. Ultimately Gadam er argues that ' the 
prejudices o f the individual, far more than his judgm ents, constitute the historical reality o f his being.' 
Like Sartre, Gadamer concludes self-reflection and self-awareness alone cannot give an accurate 
picture o f  history because they render history 'private once more.' In this sense G adamer was much 
more aware o f the historical distortion that human reason had on the construction o f  reality than 
Browning has on his own application o f  morality with its historically biased ideology.
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correlation with our experiences. Present day practical wisdom receives 
authentication through the classical text, with an appeal to the historical 
rather than the metaphysical. The result is a combination of religion and 
morality with a foundational heritage but which nonetheless emerges with a 
contemporary illustration.
Browning was creating a role for practical theology in a world understood 
as a rational ordered domain. Utilizing methods from the social sciences he 
was able to mediate a practical moral wisdom through the contemporary 
movements in developmental psychology. The intention was to understand 
humanity through the 'normative visions' of methodology in the social 
sciences:
Pastoral theology should rediscover itself as a dimension of theological or religious ethics. It is 
the primary task of pastoral theology to bring together the theological ethics and the social 
sciences to articulate a normative vision of the human life cycle and psychodynamic, 
developmental and other social science perspectives that explain how human development 
comes about. (Browning 1983, 187)
There is a prominent strand within contemporary practical theology which 
has been deeply influenced by this approach. We can see examples of 
'cognitive-structural theories of religious development' (Streib 2003) in the 
work of James Fowler, Karl Nipkow and Friedrich Schweitzer (1992). 
Hans Streib has also argued for the deployment of developmental 
psychology in understanding religion as a 'question of style':
The intriguing possibility of classifying different forms of religiosity in terms of developmental 
psychology as inspired by Lawrence Kohlberg played a formative role in the theories of Osei 
and Fowler. Classification in this sense means arranging the different religious orientations 
along the central thread of a sequence of stages that' since Piaget, has been postulated for the 
development of cognitive structures. (Streib 2003, 2)
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Through the social sciences, practical theologians have access to theories 
that understand humanity through the classification of experience into 
economic, social and psychological categories. Each theoretical perspective 
employs methods, which have their own organising principles.
Browning's advocacy of the use of interdisciplinary methods structured his 
practical theology so that it incorporated developmental psychology and 
other key developments in the social sciences. But crucially, 20th century 
developmental psychology sits very well with Browning's redeployment of 
Aristotle's vision of morality and human nature. Browning brings together 
contemporary theory, religious tradition and classical theory:
Some of the social sciences — especially personality theory, developmental psychology, and 
socio-biology — contain empirical information about the central tendencies and central needs of 
human beings. (Browning 1983, 15)
It might be argued that Browning's work is an example of how successful 
practical theologians can be in combining the modern social sciences with 
religious tradition. In this view practical theology need not be bound only to 
the concerns of the church but can relate much more fully to the wider 
community and make a genuine contribution to the social order. Browning is 
confident that religious traditions have a role to play in contemporary culture 
as part of his moral science. Browning has made concessions to the social 
sciences in order to shift into the academic realm, but he has retained major 
theological concepts. He is successful insofar as he takes traditional texts and 
integrates them with aspects of critical theory and developmental 
psychology, both which have methodological currency in the social sciences.
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Browning has managed to satisfy the criteria for the authenticating body of 
academia with its standards of methodological scrutiny, but he has remained 
within religious authority too. From the outset, he followed a pioneering 
agenda with the objective of raising the profile of practical theology as an 
independent academic discipline — combining practical theology with social 
science methods.
As was previously discussed, if practical theology was to be credible as a 
university discipline, it was required to construct and maintain a 
methodological order which would make it open to both public scrutiny and 
professional accountability. To be consistent and pedagogically viable, it 
would be subject to the same empirical principles as other academic 
disciplines. Browning's work therefore opened up a new dimension for 
practical theology. He was himself conscious of this achievement. In the 
preface to A Fundamental Practical Theology, (Browning 1991, xi) he 
records that '...some early readers of this work have said that I have 
established in these pages a new genre of theology.'
This is clearly a value-added aspect of interdisciplinary methodology, 
appreciated by other practical theologians who see a strong link between 
the revival of practical theology and critical correlation. Reymond for 
example states that;
Among those factors which have most contributed to the birth of effectively correlative practical 
theologies, one of the most important has been the input of the methods and results of the 
human sciences. (Reymond 1999, 171)
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There are however some problems with this approach. It is not necessarily 
the case that an increasingly secular society will recognise the authority of 
religious text or tradition. The religious sources that are authoritative for 
Browning are more likely to be explicated in the historical socio-cultural 
terms deployed by the disciplines from which he borrows. Religious 
traditions have no more authoritative claim than secular models of 
morality, they do not have a privileged position in a secular culture no 
matter how tolerant of different faith perspectives that culture may aspire to 
be.
This is not to say that Browning is unaware of the sceptical mood of a 
sophisticated and educated society:
Why given these [religious] communities' failings and ambiguities, their short sightedness and 
weaknesses, their increasing distance from centres of power, and their intellectual unsteadiness, 
should late twentieth century individuals with good educations, concern about the future of the 
human race, and a bit of excess energy use this energy to support religious communities such as 
churches and synagogues? (Browning 1991, 1)
Browning's answer is to suggest that religious communities can provide a 
much needed practical wisdom. He believes that in a pluralistic age practical 
theology has a role or function in being able to offer an authentic moral 
science. This approach forms the basis for Browning's most recent work on 
marriage and the family. In what he terms a 'critical pro-marriage 
philosophy' (Browning 2003, 25), Browning argues for an interdisciplinary 
and international forum on the status of marriage. Practical theological 
reflection is applied to this cultural and social institution with the benefit of 
the 'social sciences in a subordinate way to refine its grasp on empirical facts 
and trends that shape the issues at hand' (Browning 2003, 3).
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From the outset, Browning is using existing models of authority and his 
'cultural work' is driven from 'empirical facts and trends'. These are given 
the full treatment of his revised correlation method, with the 'grand themes' 
of the Christian faith — 'creation, the fall and faith.' Browning's 'cultural 
work' is always reduced to the contained and controlled practical, 'let me 
say this now: the exercise of understanding should be conceived of as 
practical through and through’ (Browning: 2003, p 3). The cultural work 
that he proposes is ambitious and requires a daunting strategic format.
The multiple strategies of this scheme are interdependent and all feed back 
into the core objectives. Browning puts forward the idea that new education 
systems, on a national and international level be set up to 'co-ordinate 
complex patterns of dialogue':
These associations must see the reformation of the ethics of marriage as fundamental to the 
process of reviving the institution of marriage. They would attempt to devise an interrelated 
philosophical, religious, economic, legal educational and psychological strategy to influence 
culture, religious institutions, public life and even the law. They would be based on the best 
research available in these different disciplines, but the overall task would be practical and 
hermeneutic: i.e. a matter of understanding, as Hans Georg Gadamer would say, for the purpose 
of praxis. (Browning 2003, 25)
Apart from the logistics of maintaining such a Kafkaesque campaign, there 
are serious methodological, not to say ethical, questions that are raised by 
research that sets out with the stated aim of assembling a global consensus 
on marriage. The question is never put by Browning as to whether it is 
desirable or even possible. He does not address the underlying patterns of 
change in contemporary family life, and carries value judgments, 
intellectually unattended, into his project.
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Many of the disciplines from which Browning borrows would explain the 
changing trends in marriage using their own sociological, economic, 
political and cultural perspectives. If maniage is primarily a social and 
legal status, his solutions become more identifiable with state policy and 
'good citizenship' public education. Browning could have resolved this 
difficulty by opting for a religious foundation for marriage as sacramental. 
However, it is clear that Browning has a major role for the state in his 
'cultural work' and this is troubling:
Marriage education should begin in secondary schools. This is another reason why the state 
must be a partner in the reformation and revival of marriage. There are new curricula now 
available that help youth navigate the increasingly hazardous years of searching for an 
appropriate mate. These curricula also begin preparing young people for the institution of 
marriage. (Browning 2003, 28)
There are wider ideological implications in Browning's model that seeks to 
harness the existing state apparatus for the application of his practical moral 
philosophy. But for practical theology there are also serious ethical issues 
raised by a model that in effect makes morality a prescriptive science, 
authenticated by its association with religious tradition, and disseminated 
thi'ough external secular authorities.
The most worrying aspect of Browning's theory is that his practical moral 
wisdom, based on the notion of correlative reflection, has evolved into a 
theory of morality that divides moral being from experience. Morality 
becomes a systematic science that has to be disseminated through the 
existing education system.
Browning's theory has a consistent logic to it insofar as his mode of distributing morality is in complete 
harmony with the western model of the divided intellect (as discussed in Chapter 3 ff).
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This is in fact a remix of an old problem. Browning's model of morality is 
problematic in that it portrays morality as an external system. This is 
constructed and justified through religion, only then is it expected to be 
internalised through the educational structures. This is a flawed model from 
the outset because it has not addressed the foundational ideology from 
which it emerges. He has constructed a theory that first promotes morality 
as a socio-religious construct, and then advocates its dispersal and 
application through institutional routes.
Such a theory diminishes the potential for regarding morality as an 
immanent and embodied response to lived experience. In other words, it 
avoids all mention of ethics as existence. In the end, caught between the 
two stances of either using methods from disciplines (the social sciences 
and religion) that would explain the development of the social experience 
of reality and his own default position toward an unconsidered and 
autocratic morality (when faced with the prospect of either a social science 
without his moral strictures or a moral theory without social science), in 
due course he chooses the latter.
Ultimately Browning's revised correlation method has evolved a great 
distance away from Tillich, who advocated an internalisation of morality as 
opposed to its external imposition:
Systems of ethical rules, that is moralisms, are imposed on the masses by authorities: religious 
authorities as the Roman Church, quasi-religious authorities as the totalitarian government, 
secular authorities as the giver of positive laws, conventional, family, and school authorities. 
"Imposing" in a radical sense means forming a conscience. External imposition is not sufficient 
for the creation of a moral system. (Tillich 1975, 138)
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As we will see later, in the discussion of Schleiermacher, the development 
of a theoretical understanding of the relation between ethics and existence 
does not necessarily preclude the role of the spirit and the engagement of 
the individual in infoming principled being.
1.4 Method and Interdisciplinary Approaches
As we have seen for some practical theologians there is a real sense that 
practical theology is able to revivify its subject area through the application 
of the techniques and the development of interdisciplinary methodologies 
from the social sciences. Stephen Pattison specializes in interdisciplinaiy 
research. However, he also acknowledges that this interdisciplinary 
relationship can be problematic.
Pattison has argued that practical theology is in danger of compromising its 
potential for engagement with the world at large by remaining in a self 
imposed religious internment, and that innovative method is key to 
preventing a drift into obscurity. He has accused theologians of being 
'backward looking' and 'tradition bound':
Theology is intellectually, as well as academically, confined. In general theology is an 
uninnovative discipline conservative in its assumptions, structures, methods and findings. 
(Pattison 2000, 59)
Pattison demonstrates a more complex attitude toward interdisciplinary 
methodology than Browning does and he is more sensitive about some of 
the consequences of embracing the social sciences.
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This has always been the case in his work. As a leading British practical 
theologian with a long history in the field, his most recent work has 
emerged from the experience he has of working with interdisciplinary 
approaches. He developed a unique and imiovative combination of 
liberation theology and mental health care, and his groundbreaking 
published work for the last three decades is evidence of this.
Throughout this work, Pattison demonstrates an optimism that practical 
theology could be of relevance in public issues. In Pastoral Care and 
Liberation Theology, this positive and confident mood is evident:
Only twenty years ago, it was widely assumed that religion had lost its previous place in the 
western culture and that this pattern would spread throughout the world. Since then religion has 
become a renewed force, recognised as an important factor in the modern world and all aspects 
o f  life, cultural, economic, and political [my italics]. (Pattison 1994, ix)'*
In applying liberation theology to the socio-political issues of mental health 
treatment, Pattison was doing that for which he is justifiably acclaimed - 
arguing for a critical and public methodology that made good use of the 
theoretical insights of the social sciences. At the same time, in his Critique o f  
Pastoral Care (1988) Pattison was responding to the inadequate self­
perception of the pastoral carer in the real world:
Pattison was in part at least responding to the work o f Eduard Thurneysen. Thurneysen firmly 
advocated that 'pastoral care exists in the church as the communication o f  the word o f God to 
individuals’ (TCP Jolm Knox Press 1963, 11). Pattison, who has always been a proponent o f  public 
theology and keen to be involved in complex social issues this is in direct contrast to the inward and 
contemplative pastoral theology o f  Thurneysen, which lacked the dynamic aspect o f liberation 
theology. However, Pattison was involved in the assimilation o f liberation theology into his domestic 
theology at a time when the Vatican, under Pope John Paul II (Karol W ojyla) had moved considerably 
to the religious right and began to withdraw institutional support for a theology theorised by Marxism. 
Pope John Paul had come to his Papal reign from a Poland that had fought against communism and 
personally he had little sympathy for secular philosophies o f  salvation. This was to have some 
considerable influence for the future status o f liberation theology.
54
The broad underlying contention of this work is that acquiring and maintaining a critical 
perspective about what is or might be done in pastoral practice is valuable, interesting and 
necessary. It prevents boredom, stimulates innovation, impedes unhelpful naivety, and gives a 
sense o f purpose and direction to pastoral care. (Pattison 2000, 57)
Then, as now, Pattison addressed the 'inadequate* public and professional 
persona of the practical theologian. Although still committed to social and 
political awareness Pattison's current stance reflects dissatisfaction within 
practical theology and its reliance on the social sciences for methodological 
tactics. Pattison believes that the volumes of discourse on method have 
more to do with the 'off the shelf borrowings of existing methods from the 
social sciences than with genuine innovative thinking within practical 
theology.
Insofar as theology develops at all intellectually it is usually due to the belated insights and 
methods of non-theological disciplines such as sociology and literary theory. 'New' ideas and 
methods often become widespread and accepted in theology just as they are going out of fashion 
elsewhere in the intellectual world. Seldom does an insight or methodological innovation flow 
outwards from theology into other disciplines. (Pattison 2000, 59)
Pattison Is suggesting that practical theology is a discipline that arrives at the 
methodological smorgasbord just as everyone else is leaving; the late guest 
who gratefully feasts on broken victuals. This indictment puts a great 
distance between Pattison and his earlier confidence in practical theology.
Yet, it is this willingness to address these problems that inspires Pattison to 
continue exploring new outlets for practical theology when it has to resist 
being subsumed by borrowed methods. Although Pattison has become
This 'Johnny-come-lately' image of the practical theologian is a harsh criticism especially if we take note of the 
fact that some social scientists have expressed exactly the same concerns about methods within the social 
sciences that Pattison is expressing here. Graham Button, who is a proponent of ethnomethodology, is critical 
about the methodological fatigue in sociology. He argues that a large part of the profession resists innovations in 
method and that there is a lack of effort to create new types of inquiry. This is indicative of the universal nature of 
the problem of methodology in contemporary theory. (Button, 1999)
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critical of the religious dimension of practical theology, he is equally 
sceptical about its newfound scholarly distinctiveness, and suggests that the 
restraining parameters of the university are as problematic as former 
ecclesiastical constrictions. Practical theology is in danger of creating 
intellectual 'ghettoes' within which theologians exchange discourse with 
each other but have no real communication within the all important public 
domain:
The methods of theology tend to be scholarly and difficult to acquire. There is an emphasis 
upon permanent written text rather than upon ephemeral utterance. Furthermore, there is a 
structural elitism built into the subject that excludes the interests, methods and concerns of non­
theologians. Above all, perhaps, theology has aspired to unified systematic organisation o f  
knowledge —  a place for everything and everything in its place. This militates against taking 
seriously the fragmentary, transient interests and concerns that characterise most contemporary 
people's lives and experience. (Pattison 2000, 62)
Pattison is also critical of what he perceives to be the 'limiting' and 
'obfuscating' terminology of practical theology. However, rather than 
emphasising the particular religious and spiritual concerns of theology, he 
advocates a self-negating dispersal of practical theology into the world.
It must be prepared to disappear into the world to merge with the crowds of discourses and 
people who may occasionally be helped by the wisdom and insight of some of its contributions. 
(Pattison 2000, 74)
This 'theology by stealth' is again a stark contrast to Pattison's earlier 
celebratory call for the public revival of religion. Nonetheless, what he has 
retained is one of the key organising principles to emerge as a 
presupposition within contemporary practical theology, the notion that 
practical theology is still a relevant source for moral wisdom.
For Pattison any direct talk about theology and religion needs to have 
intellectual and professional clarity. Nevertheless, theology is a discipline 
concerned with the fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of
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human existence in relation to God. These are important issues and they 
encapsulate the taxing problem at the heart of the methodological fatigue 
that Pattison believes permeates the discipline. It also emerges as a strong 
theme in his most recent collaborative work.
In Values in Professional Practice (2004), co-edited with medical 
sociologist Roisin Pill, there is little (if any) overt reference to theology or 
religious values. Pattison has left behind the ’obfuscating' language of 
theology that he feels alienates a larger audience. In so doing Pattison creates 
a new link between Christian values and the community. This is intended as 
a text that informs professional ethics in the area of public health care. It has 
been Pattison's aim to expand his target audience beyond the exclusivity of 
Christian communities. This is not a bad objective and it would seem that 
Pattison has achieved this as health professionals are the anticipated group of 
people for whom this work is intended. This is consistent with Pattison’s 
long term commitment to public health issues.
The interdisciplinary participation in this publication is diverse, and Paul 
Ballard is the other theologian included. Ballard's contribution focuses on the 
professional development of the clergy, a strong theme that has evolved in 
the collaborative work of Pattison and Ballard:
Like any other profession, the clergy are there to offer a public service. But the point to be 
underlined here is that in this case this service is referred back to a more fundamental set of 
questions about human meaning and purpose and how the professional activity serves and 
reflects the wider good and human values. (Ballard 2004, 51)
That this kind of discussion should occur in the context of professionalism
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and human values is indicative not only of the importance of professional 
identity for practical theologians, but in the increasing need to rely on 
'human meaning' and 'values'. Paul Ballard does refer to the Christian 
tradition as an indication that there is an 'immense body of literature' in 
which expertise can be sourced — the objective being to render this 
expertise accessible to the wider society.
Pattison is taking a radical step when he advocates distancing himself from 
‘religiosity’. He is, nonetheless, conscious of the importance of method as a 
means of obtaining this credibility. Innovative and professional research 
would stop the 'indeterminate drift' and 'lack of intellectual and practical 
accountability' and he warns that practical theology is facing the prospect 
of exile into the academic wilderness if it ignores this problem. Pattison is 
evidently still sensitive to the history of a discipline that has traditionally 
been concerned with the spiritual and existential experiences of humanity, 
the 'transient' and 'fragmentary' aspects for which current methodology 
seems to provide no concession:
Part of the rationale for academically based theology is that religious practices and beliefs 
should be subject to rational scrutiny. Here is a set of ironies. In the first place, religious 
conviction and practice is not ultimately a rational matter. Secondly, it is arguable that it is the 
symbolic, mythic and a-rational aspects of religion that are perhaps of the most interest to 
non-theologians —  and these elements are mostly ignored by theologians themselves in a quest 
for intellectual respectability. (Pattison 2000, 60)
Pattison is aware of the importance that professional and intellectual 
credibility carries within the discipline but he has not lost sight of the fact 
that some aspects that practical theology has traditionally been concerned 
with can be marginalised within the remit of specialisation. What is really 
important is that Pattison is rigorous in keeping these issues of method at 
the forefront of any theorising.
58
1.5 Conclusion
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with the pursuit of organisational, 
professional and pedagogic skills. It is only problematic when we give up on 
the capacity to embrace other routes that persist at the borders of this 
methodological order, when the object of practical theology is delineated by 
the conceptual and perceptual parameters of one particular method.
For example, I have argued that an understanding of humanity from a 
sociological perspective excludes the spiritual, or at least would attempt to 
explain religious experiences as the manifestation of particular historical 
phenomena. The increasing application of rational and empirical theories of 
knowledge has de-spiritualised the subject. These methods have decreased 
the dimension thi’ough which we understand human experience.
The disillusiomnent with religion, evident in Gordon Lynch's appeal for a 
'post-religious' practical theology, creates a possible weakness in the 
interdisciplinary approach to method:
What I have proposed here as a 'post-religious' practical theology may seem virtually 
indistinguishable from disciplines such as cultural studies and sociology. I would suggest that 
there is still an important difference between these disciplines, however, in that the practical 
theologian approaches their fie ld  o f study with the primary goal o f  asking what forms o f  belief 
are adequate, healthy or true, and what forms ofpractice genuinely promote lasting well being 
[my italics], (Lynch 2003, 27)
Lynch has identified the problem but has not provided a convincing 
solution. It is not clear how the practical theologian's 'field of study' differs 
in its objectives from those of the assimilated methodology. Practical 
theology, in the absence of religious authority, has no obvious claim to be 
able to discern which beliefs are 'adequate, healthy or true', especially when
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using methods, which would assume that the beliefs in question are simply 
cultural products. For the same reason it is also not clear if the practical 
theologian can claim privileged insight into 'forms of practice' that 
'genuinely promote lasting well being'.
It is also not the case that secular public debate does not share the same 
guiding principles or seek an outcome that 'promotes well being'. The recent 
public discussion over school meals, mobilised by celebrity chef Jamie 
Oliver, had no links to religion or sociology but its goals were no less 
authentic than those that Lynch claims for a post-religious practical 
theology. The challenge for practical theology is to demonstrate somehow 
that it will provide an authoritative way of judging what exactly 'healthy and 
true beliefs' are.
The real question should be: Why, in spite of the absence of religion (or even 
a post-religious practical theology), do people still aspire to have 'healthy 
and true beliefs' about what is right or wrong in their culture? Morality is 
not the exclusive property of practical theology and this is only a problem 
for practical theology when it chooses morality as its organising principle. 
People do not need instructions on how to fonnulate moral issues by 
practical theologians, but as Pattison has demonstrated practical theology 
can be involved in the process.
In the case of the school meals, what people needed was infoiination for an 
informed debate, which practical theologians can provide perhaps just as 
well as other professionals but have no exclusive claims on. The authentic 
desire to do the right thing, in this particular instance, emerged from a
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relationship of care and public concern. As Pattison and Ballard have 
demonstrated practical theologians can utilize this universal human capacity 
without having to claim exclusivity. However this is potentially problematic 
for those practical theologians (like Don Browning) who believe that 
practical theology ought to be organised around the provision of moral 
wisdom and that it can justify its presence in contemporary culture by 
providing a moral science.
What Lynch appears to have overlooked is the importance that religious 
tradition has in relation to making practical theology distinct from the 
social sciences. Browning, in his insistence that critical theory is 
compatible with the historical traditions of Judaic and Christian texts, 
maintained an inherent religious authorisation within his method. Lynch 
would appear to distance his work from this identifying feature and has 
therefore opted for a model of practical theology which will be difficult to 
justify other than as an annex of the social sciences.
Pattison has raised important questions: What is there that is significantly 
and authentically distinct about practical theology? What gives practical 
theology its entitlement to a place within the academic community as a 
discrete and viable subject in its own right? How are we to make space 
within such a discipline for the 'fragmentaiy and transient' characteristics of 
experience that are beyond categorising?
With the stakes raised by postmodemity, the question must now surely be: 
What role can there be for practical theology in the future postmodern 
university?
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Chapter 2 
THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE
All in all, postmodemity can be seen as restoring to the world what modernity, presumptuously, 
had taken away; as a re-enchantment of the world that modernity tried hard to dis-enchant. It is 
the modem artifice that has been dismantled; the modem conceit of meaning legislating reason, 
the reason of the artifice, that stands accused in the court of postmodemity...
To win the stakes, to win all of them and to win them for good, the world had to be de­
spiritualised, de-aiiimated: denied the capacity of the subject. (Bauman 1992, x)
In Browning's work, practical theology moves its boundaries and, 
correspondingly, its authoritative legislative body from the clerical to the 
academic. Thi'ough Browning, practical theology would further distance its 
connection with the metaphysical and become an empirical and historically 
based discipline. In this sense, Browning's work bears the hallmark of 
modernity, pursuing the enlightemnent project of understanding the capacity 
for 'good moral choices' as part of a developmental life cycle (Browning 
1983, 187).
Critically, modernity enables the reconfiguration of the cultural and 
historical horizons that provide the basis for Browning's practical wisdom. 
This arguably results in the limiting of practical theology to a moral science. 
His approach accommodates only a limited view of ethical existence, 
resulting in the constraint of new thinking about ethics. Browning's work 
discloses what some would suggest is the restrictive nature of the empirical 
and experiential methodology of social science. Practical theology, like other 
enlightenment disciplines, is experiencing a challenge as new critiques 
emerge from postmodernism.
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The methods of the social sciences are concerned with explanation, 
direction, meaning and purpose. The goal is to reach some kind of consensus 
of empirical and objective truth about the world and provide access to a 
’cultural reality’. Modernity, with its concern for boundaries is a teleocracy. 
By contrast postmodernism is teleophobic in that it resists design and final 
causes. Postmodernism disrupts the order o f ’meaningful history' and many 
theorists have perceived it as a thi*eat to the continuity and reliability of the 
foundations of knowledge. It is nonetheless the case that practical 
theologians can no longer work uncritically with the intellectual currents of 
modernity when such large bodies of contemporary theorists question them. 
As cultural theorists Patrick Fuery and Nick Mansfield argue:
Put simply, many contemporary intellectuals and theorists no longer see themselves fulfilling 
the cultural project that arose in the renaissance, which saw the study and fulfilment of human 
nature as its purpose, and that gave rise to the field of study called the humanities and to the 
foundation of the modern university. (Fuery and Mansfield 1998, 4)
That this is aclcnowledged within practical theology is evident in the 
responses of some theologians to the critical issues raised by 
postmodernism. It is also true, however, that a number of criticisms have 
been levelled at the conceptual foundations of the post-modernist project.
Nonetheless, it will be argued here that it is untimely to talk of a 'post­
religious' or 'post-modern' practical theology without having addressed 
some of the issues regarding the theorising of modernity and 
postmodemity.
13 It is interesting to note that the language used to position a response to postmodernism displays much of the 
intellectual angst of Jurgen Habermas and has become the 'default' position of much contemporary discourse. The 
semantic fall out is pervasive and rarely challenged. The 'crisis ideology' is reinforced in language that associates 
postmodernism with 'fragmentation', 'age of anxiety', and 'anatomy of uncertainty'. These particular examples are 
taken from Elaine Graham's Transforming Practice which is subtitled Pastoral Theology in an age o f Uncertainty 
(Graham 1996).
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2.1 The Postmodern Project
There are three important elements to the theoretical critique offered by
postmodernism which are key to subsequent debates in practical theology.
The first is the assertion that the traditional structures of modern industrial
society (with its systems of mass production) have been superseded by a
postmodern world, with a new focus on consumption and desire. The
strong cultural positioning of the modem world has therefore been replaced
by a more individualist society in which consumers live in a sea of images
from which their own identities are constructed. Put simply, the world in
which industrial workers in cloth caps were positioned by overreaching
.stmctures of class no longer exists. Instead there are considerably more
.flexible units of work and leisure from which individual identities can be 
assembled.
The second dimension to the postmodern approach is a radical 
phenomenology in which the individual subject is seen to constmct meaning 
in the world. The focus here is on discourse and text as language that does 
not merely represent 'reality' but, in effect, constitutes it. The assumption is 
that the 'real' can only be appropriated through language and because this is a 
system of symbolic meanings, which are negotiated between people and 
over time, then 'reality’, is essentially negotiated and cannot be seen as fixed 
and essential. The roots of this approach are found in the radical 
hermeneutics of theorists such as Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida.
''' What is considered 'real' is therefoi'e radically different from the 'access to cultural reality' that practical 
theologians believe some of the empirical methods of the social sciences provide.
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As Barthes suggests here, while truth had been seen to lie 'behind' the text, it 
was increasingly seen as dissolving into the process by which the text was 
generated:
Text means Tissue', but whereas hitherto we have always taken this tissue as a product, a ready 
made veil, behind which lies, more or less hidden meaning (truth), we are now emphasising, in 
the tissue, the generative idea that the text is made, is worked out in a perpetual interweaving; 
lost in the tissue-this texture-the subject unmakes himself, like a spider dissolving in the 
constructive secretions of its web. (Barthes 1975, 18)
From this it follows that postmodernism questions whether there could be 
any claim to discern what is 'true' and what is 'false' which could have 
universal validity. Practical theology is a tradition that has the notion of 
'truth value' at the heart of its search for consistency in moral communities. 
Theologian and philosopher Peter Vardy summarises the consequences of 
the 'radical relativism' of postmodernism for moral theory:
In the face of a culture in which truth is seen increasingly as a dirty word, there seem to be no 
firm landmarks, no points that can hold sure and unchanged in a sea of relativity. One person's 
view seems as good as any other, leaving the door open for people to believe in anything. 
(Vardy 2003, 4)
As well as rendering objective truth problematic postmodernism questions 
the status of the subject. Practical theology is a discipline that has relied on 
traditional notions of agency and identity for the grounding and application 
of its moral theory. However the third key feature of postmodernism, the 
concept of the decentred subject, makes this difficult to sustain. This is an 
element of the postmodern project that has its origins in French 
structuralism and is also loiown as poststructuralism. The central 
proposition of this perspective is that the identity of the human subject is 
constituted by discourse.
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Structuralism has a long history with many variations, but the essence of 
the argument for our purpose can be seen in the works of philosophers 
Louis Althusser (1918-90) and Michael Foucault (1926-84)^^, who argued 
that what could be thought or understood is effectively organised by the 
social or discursive structures within which the individual is positioned. As 
Judith Butler writes, agency is therefore subjected and subordinated by 
power:
Subjection consists precisely in this fundamental dependency on a discourse we never choose but 
that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency. "Subjection" signifies the process of 
becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject. Whether by 
interpellation, in Althusser's sense, or by discursive productivity, in Foucault's, the subject is 
initiated tluough the primaiy submission to power. (Butler 1997c, 2)
Neither Althusser nor Foucault could strictly be termed postmodernist but 
their work does illustrate the central features of structuralism and what 
became poststructuralist. Althusser used the concept of the 'problematic' 
effectively as a conceptual field within which some questions could be posed 
while others were excluded. The field is imposed on the subject and 
organises (structures) both what can be thought about and what can be 
understood. For Althusser bourgeois ideological apparatuses, in which 
would be included educational institutions, produced the essential 
structures.
13
16
J7
Aithusser reinterpreted traditional Marxism, with its emphasis on economic determinism, and focused more on 
the overdetermining social structures that gave rise to ideologies that allowed people think they were making free 
choices. These ideologies were disseminated through Myth, Art, Education and Politics, His most famous text 
For Marx (1965) was a popular introduction to Marxist philosophy. His work was very influential although not 
always popular as he was criticised for being elitist. He influenced the writings of Michael Foucault who 
deployed Althusser's anti-humanist perspective to reject common sense assumptions about the nature of humanity 
but more importantly how we study humanity. Foucault became interested in the relationship between language 
and power. His major works demonstrated the relationship between language and the construction and control of 
deviation.
Althusser and Foucault are not themselves postmodernist, but it is significant that key elements of postmodernist 
thought are found in their strand of theory. For example, Althusser's concept of interpellation has been significant 
in theories of subjection.
This is a significant consideration in the dispersal of knowledge in society. This is an area to which Browning 
gives little theoretical consideration when he advocates the use of the school curriculum for the dispersal of
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In post-structuralism the overreaching traditional structures are no longer 
seen to be relevant and the human subject can 'migrate' from one structured 
position to another/^ The important point is that wherever the subject exists, 
thought and action are effectively bounded and discourses are seen as 
'speaking through' the subject.
Foucault saw such imposition as the central axis through which power 
relationships were established in society. He discussed (1976), for example, 
how homosexuality was defined as mental illness through a panoply of 
medical and technical speech. Human identities are therefore seen as an 
effect of discourse.
As cultural theorist, len Ang notes, each individual becomes the location of 
subject positions projected by the discourses with which they are confronted:
Subjectivity is not the essence or the source from which the individual acts, thinks and feels; on 
the contrary... it is through the meaning systems or discourses circulating in society and culture 
that discourse is constituted and individual identities are formed. Each individual is the site o f a 
multiplicity of subject positions proposed to her by the discourse with which she is confronted; 
her identity is the precarious and contradictory result of the specific set of subject positions she 
inhabits at any moment in history. (Ang 1996, 93)
This element of postmodern theory appears highly deterministic while, at the 
same time, other strands of post-modern thought tend to stress the elective 
nature of identity of the subject. Terry Eagleton points to the possible 
contradiction between these different elements of postmodernism. As he puts 
it, the human subject is 'set free from constraint, gliding from one position to
morality and 'cultural work'.
Althusser is not post-structuralist; his work stands in the tradition of Marxist structuralism. While Foucault work 
on discourse formation is often linked to post-structuralist positions it also contains strong elements that deal with 
the actual material structures of containment, for example the physical shapes of schools and prisons.
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another' and yet simultaneously 'is the mere effect of forces which constitute 
it through and thi'ough'(Eagleton 1996, 28-29).
However, the crucial point, which needs to be stressed here, is that the 
position of the subject in postmodernism is based on a theoretical 
perspective that is radically different from that of the Cartesian sovereignty 
of consciousness. As Raymond Tallis notes:
The frozen, totalising image of structuralist thought was unattractive to those who believed in 
history both as a force for change and as a way of relativising (and so undermining) absolutes of 
morality, rationalised hierarchies that were merely self-perpetuating power structures, etc. ... 
Post-structuralist thought retained the decentred self and a preference for concepts over 
consciousness. It, too, regarded the Caitesian-phenomenological-existentialist sovereignty of 
consciousness with contempt. The polycentric post-modern universe does not count the 
conscious individual as one of its centres -  even less as its definitive centre. Even the idea of 
self-presence is an illusion based upon the accident of hearing oneself speak. (Tallis 1997, 336)
There are, then, three central questions at the core of the postmodern 
project for practical theology to answer:
1) Is there a new post-modern society?
2) Does a radical phenomenology render the concept of truth inadequate?
3) Does the theory of the decentred subject make moral choice obsolete?
Practical theologians have addressed these issues in different ways. Some, 
such as Friedrich Schweitzer and Elaine Graham, have used Habermas's 
notion of modernity as an unfinished project, to argue over when post­
modernism 'begins' as a period.
Theorists like Judith Butler have put forward much more complex arguments about the construction of identity> 
In The Psychic Life o f Power Butler examines the intricacy of subjection and the complicity of the individual's 
role in the process. Sartre also addressed this issue by subordinating existentialism to Marxism in order to come 
to an understanding of the commitment an individual makes to a particular fate. Human freedom is always 
difficult to reconcile with actual circumstances but what Sartre and Butler sought to understand was the 
complicity of the subject within given circumstances. Post-structuralist and postmodern variations of this are not 
merely about an untethered subject. Hence Butler's attempt at understanding how the 'inner' subject is also 
constructed by power and is not merely the recipient that somehow internalises power. The subject is a product 
rather than a facilitator. In thinking this, Butler goes beyond Sartre's notion of'commitment' to explain why the 
subject is compliant with subjection.
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Practical theology has always sought to have a sense of historical 
progression between periods. This has resulted in Schweitzer and Graham 
electing to cite theorists who perceive post-modernism as a progression 
from modernity or use notions of'high modernity' (Giddens 1994).
The concepts of 'reconstruction' and 'transition' fit in with a discipline 
which has a sense of historically 'evolving' into its present state. Thus 
reviewers of practical theology present it as a consistently recognisable 
discipline with a traceable, albeit changing, topography. The various 
transformations contribute to the manageability of the discipline because it 
can be demonstrated as a progression of correctives from its origins or 
previous states.
For example, Seward Hiltner's work on Pastoral Counselling was seen as 
extending pastoral theology beyond the boundaries of nineteenth century 
clericalism (1958). Don Browning sought to raise the profile by 
progressing into academia (1991). There is a sense that practical theology 
is continuing to develop and improve through its historical changes.
But though postmodernism renders the 'axioms of modernity problematic', 
it has been approached as yet another period of transition that practical 
theology has to be steered though to remain contemporaneous (Graham 
1996). The demarcation and identity of postmodernism in opposition to 
modernity has certainly taken up a great deal of intellectual space. This 
intellectual angst is mirrored in contemporary practical theology and can 
also be seen in the work of Schweitzer and Graham.
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The crucial question is whether this approach will be effective in dealing 
with the theoretical issues raised by postmodernism.
Or, in other words, can postmodernism be neatly incorporated into an 
evolving modernity when its epistemological and ontological assumptions 
represent such a rupture with prevalent theory? This has long been an 
ongoing issue in the debate about the formation of both modernity and 
postmodemity:
I went to Constantine in 1950. Did this mark the end of something or the beginning of 
something else? The question is a central, classical issue for narratology. In the ‘ Querelle de 
Pindare, ’ which was part of the ‘ Querrele des Anciens et des Modernes, ’ it happened that as 
a zealous a supporter of ‘les Anciens’ as Boileau defended the beautiful disorder permitted 
by the ‘ rule of no rules ’ that the poetics of the Pindaric ode implied. Against such textual 
fuzziness, the main advocate for the ‘ moderns, ’ Charles Perrault, made the following claim: 
With such disorder there would be neither beginning, nor middle, nor end in a work, though the 
author might think that this text was all the more sublime for being less reasonable. ’ Perrault, 
in the name of the modern, is obviously for order and definite beginnings, middles, and ends. 
(Peregrinations Law Form Event 1998)^''
The point being made here by Lyotard is that the anxiety for order and 
origins is always relative to some agenda. I will now examine how this 
need to retain order has influenced the way in which both Schweitzer and 
Graham have tackled the challenges of postmodernism.
Original quotation in Pérégrinations fi'om Charles Perrault, Discourse Sur La Poesie et L ’ode en 
Particulier. (E.I.G. Gallet 1719) Like Bauman Lyotard chooses to focus on the space created by 
arguments of transition, in this case between the ancient and the modern. The point being reinforced is 
that the intellectual arguments arising from such anxiety are irreconcilable because the two positions 
represent different formats, opposing systems of logic and recognition.
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2.2 Friedrich Schweitzer and the Search for a New Paradigm
Friedrich Schweitzer's claim is that he wishes to explore the possibility of a 
'new paradigm' for practical theology. Fie believes that practical theology is 
a product of modernity. Consequently, if modernity turns out to be flawed, 
then practical theology is implicated also:
If it is true, as it is often stated in textbooks, that practical theology as an academic discipline is 
a child of modernity, then one must wonder if the advent of postmodemity implies that there is 
no more need for this kind of endeavour. Does the advent of postmodemity, i f  it exists, mark the 
end of practical theology? Or, if not, does it call for a new paradigm for practical theology? And 
if so, how can this child of modernity come of age in postmodern times?
(Schweitzer 2001, 170)
For Schweitzer the methods of modernity have had a twofold influence. 
They have provided the analytical categories for our understanding of 
humanity and formed the basis of practical theology as an independent 
discipline. He makes a direct link between the two.
The most important principle of modernity for Schweitzer's practical 
theology (strongly influenced by Jean Piaget's theoiy of cognitive 
development^^ ), is the notion of a 'life cycle'. This postulates a series of 
chronological developmental stages that individuals have to progress 
thi'ough, in the right order, to reach rational maturity. This rational maturity 
is taken as the hindamental characteristic of a moral community.
Jean Piaget (1886-1980) was famous for his developmental theoiy or 'Stages of Cognitive Development' which 
had four major components that were accumulative and progressive. Sensori-motor (birth-2), Pre-operational (2- 
7), Concrete-operational (7-11), Formal-operational (11+).
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Crucially, Schweitzer uses this template of progressive stages as the basis for 
advancement and moral maturity. The definitive characteristics of adulthood 
{autonomy, independence and rational maturity) also represent the 
teleological objectives of enlightemnent philosophy.
To make the life cycle a central topic of practical theology along the stages 
or to develop a practical theology along the stages of the life cycle may be 
considered a typically modern approach. In this view, the life of the 
autonomous individual determines the horizon which modern practical 
theology must presuppose. Consequently, considering the relationships 
between the changes in the life cyele and practical theology may help us in 
gaining a better understanding of the current situation of practical theology 
(Schweitzer 2001, 171).
Schweitzer's proposal is that if we can understand precisely what the 
changes are that postmodernism makes to the modern life cycle, practical 
theology will be in a better position to respond to a new postmodern life 
cycle. He therefore takes each of the key stages of a life cycle {childhood, 
adolescence and adulthood) and tries to ascertain how these have been 
altered by postmodernism. His argument being, that previously these stages 
had been considered stable and enduring. Under postmodernism however, 
the constancy of each is no longer dependable as the consolidated period 
upon which the next stage depends:
This was a fundamental principle of the philosophy of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81), in which he 
expressed the enlightenment ideal of progression through education. Lessing's teleological theory of improvement 
through progressive stages was also influential on Karl Marx who went on to hypothesise a teleological theory of 
economic and social change though progressive changes in the modes of production i.e. from feudalism to 
capitalism to socialism and ultimately to communism. The inherent assumption being that each progressive stage 
is relatively more just than the previous.
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Childhood no longer is the relatively quiet time of stability to be experienced and enjoyed in a 
stable family. Rather, the changes of the family have made childhood a time with many 
transitions and with ever-new pressures arising from early on. Literally as well as 
metaphorically speaking, being a child no longer means living in the safe haven of a home to 
which one will always look back as the true anchor of one's personal identity.
(Schweitzer 2001, 172)
Schweitzer concedes that these stages are modernist constructs. What he 
fails to demonstrate is that, as highly conceptualised stages, they have also 
been criticised within modernity's own remit.
The French historian, Philippe Aries, published his demographic study, 
Centuries o f Childhood in 1960. He demonstrated how our historical idea of 
childhood had emerged alongside corresponding notions of family and for 
that matter the historically changing ideas of morality. Aries' work does not 
have the theoretical hallmark of Marxism that is evident in Foucault’s work. 
He does, however, trace the development of the historical ideology of 
childhood though ait, education, mortality, clothes, morality and children's 
games.
By comparison, Schweitzer's sentimental and privileged portrayal of an ideal 
childhood is flawed and under-theorised and, as such, is representative of the 
ideology of childhood that Aries' study set out to expose. But he does 
concede that the 'modern' conceptions of adulthood and rational maturity 
have been challenged. Moreover, postmodernism may bring 'potentials 
which are healthy’ in so far as 'they provide a new openness' at the different 
points where 'the modern life cycle become suffocating' (Schweitzer 2001, 
175).
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Furthermore, he believes it is the role of practical theology to act as a 
mediator between modernity and postmodernity. His aim is to integrate 
those aspects of postmodernism that may be beneficial for contemporary 
theory. This is based on the belief that certain aspects of modernity and 
postmodernity can be isolated from each approach and then amalgamated 
into one new paradigm.
Three dimensions to his work are important to us here: Firstly, Schweitzer 
is not sure if a postmodern world has arrived — he oscillates in his 
descriptions of postmodernity between questioning whether it exists or 
simply assuming that it does in his descriptions of contemporary life. 
Secondly, when he suggests using the conceptual assumptions of 
postmodernism, he ignores how they undermine the modernist 
epistemology that he actually favours. Thirdly, whereas he embraces the 
'advantages' of the postmodern world, he fails to fully consider the radical 
structuralism inherent within the postmodern project, more specifically, its 
implications that fundamentally alter the basis upon which the subject has 
the capacity for making moral choices.
Let us look first at his approach to the question of whether the concept of 
postmodernity helps in the diagnosis of culture. From the outset, he 
theorises ambiguity into its status and argues that this uncertainty is the 
reason why practical theologians have not adequately addressed 
postmodernism as a theoretical category:
It seems fair to say that, on the whole, practical theology has not fully dealt with the issue of 
postmodernity. In part, especially in Germany and possibly most of Western Europe, this is due 
to the second thoughts which have been raised with the idea of postmodernity. Does 
postmodernity really exist? Will the concept of postmodernity help us in diagnosing culture or 
is it actually misleading and at best a shaky category? (Schweitzer 2001, 169)
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What Schweitzer then goes on to suggest is that, if there is some 
phenomenon which can be discerned as postmodern, it is for practical 
theologians to find a way of using the new epistemological and ontological 
categories to help us understand the changes in our culture which it implies.
However, Schweitzer is firmly committed to the development of an 
interdisciplinary relationship between practical theology and the social 
sciences. This has the effect of making him defend modernity, or at least 
those aspects of it that would provide continuity with a new paradigm.
The problem facing Schweitzer in particular (and practical theology in 
general) is the obligation to remain contemporaneous. Therefore, ignoring 
postmodernism is not an option. Schweitzer responds to this predicament, 
but is reluctant to give up the benefits he believes practical theology has 
gained from the empirical methods of the social sciences it has deployed in 
the past^^:
In general, practical theologians tend to be hesitant to base their understanding and their models 
of praxis on theoretical and philosophical concepts which have not been established on 
empirical grounds. And given the fact that some social scientists still consider it unlikely that a 
postmodern self has actually replaced the modern self, there are good reasons for practical 
theology to take a more guarded position on the issue of postmodernity. In any case, a more 
empirical and inductive approach is needed if practical theology is to address the demands of 
postmodern life. (Schweitzer 2001 p, 170)
23 See Friedrich Schweitzer/’racf/ca/ Theology, Contemporary Culture and the Social Sciences - Interdisciplinaiy 
Relationships and the Unity o f Practical Theology as a Discipline in Practical Theology International 
Perspectives (Lang 1999 pp. 307-321) In this paper Schweitzer argues that the social sciences are the only way 
'contemporary cultural reality' can be mediated. He outlines a brief history of the development of the correlation 
between practical theology and the different 'metatheoretical methods' taken from social science and deployed by 
practical theology. These vary from social science as being ancillary to practical theology to models of 
'intentional co-operation' between theology and social science. The main thrust of Schweitzer's argument is that 
the empirical methods of the social sciences enable practical theology to become efficient and analytical.
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It is therefore to the social sciences that he turns to resolve the particular 
problems of contemporary theory. He focuses on those proponents of 
theoretical perspectives that attempt to retain some of the epistemological 
foundations of modernity, notably the second modernity hypothesis of 
sociologists Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash and Ulrich Beck (Beck et al,
1994):
According to them, we should speak of a second modernity — a modernity which may also be 
called reflexive modernity in that it includes, even in calling itself modernity, the critical 
awareness of the shortcomings and the dark side of modernity. As opposed to some of the 
postmodern worldviews, the critical awareness of reflexive modernity is to prevent any kind of 
nostalgia for the allegedly better times of modernity or even premodernity. Rather, the concept of 
'reflexive modernization' is to serve as a basis for the continued attempt of counteracting and 
overcoming the flaws of modernity while still holding on to what is worth preserving o f  modernity 
[my italics], (Schweitzer 2001, 174)
Hence (from a modernist perspective) while Schweitzer is attempting to 
provide the topography of his 'new’ paradigm, he is experimenting with 
postmodern concepts that utterly reject the modernist epistemology he is 
using. He selects and privileges those aspects of modernity he wishes to 
retain and rejects what he perceives to be the more radical and 'destructive' 
elements of postmodernism. He is approaching postmodernism as 
problematic and a threat to continuity; believing that if it is not properly 
theorised it will lead to the fragmentation of society and the destabilizing of 
the moral theory.
Schweitzer has theorised loss into his own attempt at reconstructing a 'post­
modern life style'. This is parallel to his anxiety about those aspects of 
postmodernism which threaten the stability of modernity:
It is true that there are far reaching changes in the human life cycle and since these are changes 
which are clearly different from the modern idea of this life cycle, there are indeed good reasons 
for speaking of a postmodern life cycle. But in making this statement, the objections against
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some understandings of postmodernity may also not be overlooked. One of the main objections 
concerns the identification of postmodernity by what is lost in the transition from modernity 
[my italics], (Schweitzer 2001, 173)
Schweitzer is making a fundamental theoretical mistake in that he takes the 
'loss' of the 'modern life cycle' to be caused by the arrival of a new 
postmodern life cycle, when in fact postmodernism is a critique of the way 
we understand the individual and seeks to disclose the discursive processes 
that construct subjectivity/'^
The error is compounded by his comparison of the characteristics of a 
modern life cycle with those of a postmodern one. Resulting in an 
ambiguous description of what he considers the benefits of this so-called 
postmodern life cyele.
Schweitzer stresses the 'elective' and 'constructive' elements of the 
postmodern approach, avoiding the essential determinism of its post­
structuralist ontology. The individual, according to this scenario, simply 
has more choice:
Postmodernity also entails new chances and new potentials for human life which may be 
liberated from the narrow visions of rational autonomy and of progressive achievement. 
(Schweitzer 2001, 173)
Schweitzer's 'theology of the postmodern life cycle', which includes the 
'experience of a plural self, has its roots in theories of 'high' or 'second 
modernity' and 'post-traditional' theory that presents the individual as 
someone with a kaleidoscope of choice and an absence of certainty.
This in part follows from a contradiction in the postmodern project itself. It is not always clear whether its 
proponents are suggesting that a new type of society has arrived in which subjective identities may be constructed 
differently, or whether its radical phenomenology and post-structural determination of the subject is a feature of 
human life.
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However, according to Anthony Giddens:
The plurality of choices which confronts individuals in situations of high modernity derive from 
several influences. First, there is the fact of living in a post-traditional order. To act in, to engage 
with, a world of plural choices is to opt for alternatives, given that the signposts established by 
tradition now are blank. (Giddens in Beck 1994, 82)^^
Furthermore, Schweitzer is assuming that it is modernity that retains 
authority as the conjectural default position, with postmodernism being 
relegated to those characteristics that work with aspects of modernity 
'worth preserving':
Taking the caveats against premature assumptions of a postmodern life cycle seriously it seems 
appropriate to approach the problem inductively, by contrasting the ideal type description of the 
modern life cycle (which from a postmodern perspective, has to be considered the traditional life 
cycle) with the changes and challenges of the contemporain — possibly post modern — situation. 
This kind of comparison will at least give us an idea of the empirical aspects of postmodern life. 
(Schweitzer 2001, 172)
Many of the characteristics of modernity become more desirable when 
what is on offer is the perceived nihilism of post-phenomenology. 
Schweitzer's original quest, to explore the potential of a 'new postmodern 
paradigm' is ultimately rejected in favour of a theoretical perspective that 
seeks to extend modernity. The task that practical theology is required to 
perform is no longer the smooth transition between modernity and 
postmodernity but rather to facilitate a revised or 'second' modernity:
But it has also become clear that we cannot accept, let alone uncritically praise, whatever calls 
itself postmodern. Rather, we need a careful and critical examination of the diverse changes 
between modernity and postmodernity in order to identify what may really be called a potential 
and what may rather be seen as detrimental. To put it into one sentence: Support for helpful 
postmodern developments but also critical resistance to what cannot be accepted of
Giddens treats self-identity as 'reflexivity understood by the individual in terms of his or her biography’ without 
any critical analysis of the concept of biography and its history in the humanities from Dilthey to the present. 
Including such concepts uncritically at a theoretical level result in an accumulative error, for example Giddens 
develops the notion of'self-identity' as a 'process whereby self- identity is constituted by the reflexive ordering of 
self-narratives' (auto-biographies). (Giddens 1991) This is also a good example of the semantic slippage deployed 
in the theory of'high modernity'. Much of the language of'second modernity' mimics the analytical categories of 
postmodernity.
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postmodernity-is the substantial work of practical theology as mediator between first and second 
modernity. (Schweitzer 2002,176)
Schweitzer tries to compensate for some of the ambiguity his particular 
approach creates. He does this by conceding the need for some changes in 
the concept of a 'life cycle'. The individual of the 'modern life cycle' simply 
becomes the individual of the 'postmodern life cycle'. So, for example, 
childhood is no longer a time when the 'anchor of one's personality' is 
formed. It is now full of constant changes. Adolescence changes from 
being 'the time for clear cut identity' and 'life long commitment' to a 
condition of'inescapable plurality'. Perhaps most importantly, the criteria 
for adulthood (which are also the basis of the moral community) no longer 
apply:
Neither autonomy nor rationality or progressive achievements are accepted as the true 
descriptions of adulthood anymore. (Schweitzer 2001, 173)
Schweitzer's attempt to modify the concept of a life cycle in such a way 
means that he emerges with a workable model for his 'new' paradigm but 
fails to address the issue of subjectivity, which is the real problematic 
identified by postmodernism. Judith Butler has argued that this sort of 
problem is due to a misunderstanding of analytical principles:
"The subject" is sometimes bandied about as if it were interchangeable with "the person" or "the 
individual." The genealogy of the subject, rather than be identified strictly with the individual, 
ought to be designated as a linguistic category, a placeholder, a structure in formation. 
Individuals come to occupy the site of the subject (the subject simultaneously emerges as a 
"site"), and they enjoy intelligibility only to the extent that they are, as it were, first established 
in language. The subject is the linguistic occasion for the individual to achieve and reproduce 
intelligibility, the linguistic conditions of its existence and agency. (Butler 1997c, 10-11)
Because of this conceptual error at the core of Schweitzer's theorising of 
postmodernity, he fails to engage with questions at the heart of human
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experience. For example, Sartre's question as to why we commit to a 
particular existence.
Postmodernism (and Butler in particular) explores the process whereby we 
'harbour and preserve' the 'beings that we are' (Butler 1997c, 2). Doing so 
means exploring the acquiescence of the subject to prevailing conditions, 
which means a radical departure beyond the somewhat artificial 
problematic of a supposed proliferation of choice. The essence of this 
difficulty underpinned Sartre's quest to reconcile freedom within constraint. 
He sought to understand it as the freedom to make the ultimate 
commitment to the life we have.
Butler puts this question another way, but also struggles with the issues 
identified by Sartre. The contradiction between the subject being either (on 
the one hand) set free from constraints and faced with what might seem like 
a proliferation of choice, or (on the other hand) rendered the 'mere effect of 
forces which constitute it through and through':
How can it be that the subject, taken to be the condition for and instrument of agency, is at the 
same time the effect of subordination, understood as the deprivation of agency?
(Butler 1997c, 10)
Schweitzer is evidently committed to the notion that practical theology is 
going through a period of uncertainty and change, but the categories that he 
deploys are confused and under-theorised. His scepticism about 
postmodernism and his defence of modernity, based on an uneasy 
concession to some of the more acceptable features of postmodernism ('if it 
exists at all'), leave many issues about human identity and agency 
unresolved. Seemingly, without any sense of incongruity, Schweitzer can
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simultaneously talk about the 'transitional process from first to second 
modernity' and a 'theology of the postmodern life cycle,' For those 
theorists less ambiguous about the status of postmodernism, the case for a 
continuous or second modernity is presented with more conviction.
2.3 Elaine Graham and Extended Modernity
Schweitzer lacks consistency, regarding the status of postmodernity. Such 
is not the case in the work of practical theologian Elaine Graham. Unlike 
Schweitzer, Graham is not ambiguous about the actuality of 
postmodernism. Her work represents a more comprehensive theorising of 
postmodernism within practical theology. That this is the exception in the 
discipline is demonstrated by the cautious introduction of her work by 
Woodward and Pattison in their Reader, Pastoral and Practical Theology 
(Woodward & Pattison 2000). They warn that Graham's Transforming 
Practice (1996) is 'abstract' and not related to 'classic Christian theological 
tradition'. This begs the question: What is 'classic' practical theology? It is 
also misleading to describe Graham's work as abstract when it is her stated 
aim to work within the realm of Christian experience and practice:
By focusing on Christian pastoral practices as the creators and bearers of the fundamental truth 
claims of the Christian community, therefore, I wish to move toward a model of pastoral theology 
as the interpretation of purposeful practices through which symbolic and material reality is both 
mediated and reconstituted. Rather as Bourdieu envisaged practice as the embodied and enacted 
habitus of cultural norms and values, I wonder whether Christian pastoral practices might be 
imagined as the bearers of living principles of hope and obligation. (Graham 1996, 111)
The point Woodward and Pattison seem to be making is that Graham's 
work is on the more complex end of their sampler. They are also indicating 
that Transforming Practice is located outside the usual clerical/counselling
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neighbourhood of pastoral and practical theology. In this sense, 'classic' 
denotes a familiar topography that Graham is challenging.
Pastoral and practical theologians may emerge as proponents of different 
approaches, but they are working within the same epistemological frame. 
Woodward and Pattison review a selection of these for didactic purposes. 
What necessitates their cautious introduction to Graham’s work is that she 
is tackling complex issues of methodology within the discipline. Graham is 
not only a proponent for a particular method, she is addressing the problem 
of method per se. Describing Graham's work as 'abstract' is an indication of 
how under-theorised methodology is within practical theology. Woodward 
and Pattison include Graham's work as part of the overall variety of 
different approaches within the discipline; when, in fact, what Graham has 
done is to bring methodology into a more central position.
Graham has understood that the crisis in practical theology is about the 
disclosure of method as the scaffolding supporting the 'classic' domain and 
that, as such, it is central to the future of practical theology as a discipline. 
The problem she has identified is the difficulty of continuation for this 
discipline in its transition from modernism to postmodernism.
Transforming Practice is a work that attempts to steer practical theology 
through the crisis of change to emerge with a working process that is both 
meaningful and applicable. Like Browning, Graham shifts the emphasis 
from metaphysical explanations of existence towards an historical and 
experiential understanding of relationships. She shares the aim to 'construct 
a relevant but authentic practical wisdom' (Graham 1996, 3).
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Unlike Browning, however, Graham is addressing issues of identity for 
practical theology in a postmodern age. Graham engages with 
contemporary problems from the perspective of historical materialism and 
critical phenomenology. Her concept of 'purposeful practices' which are the 
'implicit bearers of truth claims' (Graham 1996, 97) is derived, in part, from 
the interpretative methodology of Max Weber:
Perhaps the most important theorist of social action was Max Weber, whose interpretive 
methods drew attention to the influence of human interpretation and agency to the maintenance 
of social order and the creation of social relations. (Graham 1996, 97)
Contemporary social theory is deployed by Graham to avoid falling into the 
'metaphysical extra-cultural realm' (Graham 1996, 97). She works within 
the socio-cultural dimensions of real historical practice that allows 
'purposeful practice' to inform her theory of knowledge and understanding. 
Contemporary theories of situated Imowledge have also influenced her 
theoretical position.^^
However, Graham still seeks to provide a basis for truth and practical moral 
wisdom within the selection of contemporary theory she elects to use. 
Within the landscape of what Woodward and Pattison consider 'classic' 
practical theology the individual autonomous agent is taken as given, she 
acknowledges that this position is rendered problematic by postmodernism:
The philosophical mood of postmodernism is one of scepticism towards any notion of an 
eternal, metaphysical human nature. The individual is always a cultural subject, inscribed in 
linguistic, historical and social contexts. (Graham 1996, 1)
Practical theology has traditionally been concerned with issues of morality.
In particular, the work of Donna Haraway, who has written a feminist philosophy of science. Haraway has 
written extensively about the nature of the knowing subject. Haraway has argued that our historical experiences, 
especially gender, play a greater role in our perception than the natural sciences have previously allowed for. (See 
Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention o f Nature Free Association Books 1991)
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Method is therefore a crucial medium through which we construct our 
image of the subject as a moral being. With contemporary method, the 
emphasis is on how we live out a moral existence. Graham argues that we 
can still provide the basis for a 'reconstructed practical wisdom' (Graham 
1996, 9) through the communal experience of Christian morality:
Thus, the moral discourse of the community aims at ordering the community of faith in such a 
way as to nurture the sensibilities and habits of faith. (Graham 1996, 208)
Graham is still hoping to align practical theology within the prescriptive 
remit of a Christian value system. This makes her work closer to the 
'classic' topography than is suggested by Woodward and Pattison. It also 
creates a tension between the postmodernism she seeks to accommodate 
and her reconstructed practical wisdom. When Graham raises the question 
of the future development of practical theology, she also identifies the 
elements of a contemporary problematic.
Practical theology is concerned with moral issues, such as: How do we 
make the right choices and conduct our own living in harmony with what is 
good for others as well as ourselves? Postmodernism seems to threaten the 
very notion of a stable moral relationship because it resists privileging any 
one perspective over another. It exposes the lack of any overriding 
foundation that authorises any one set of beliefs. Graham's concern is to 
find a way that Christian communities can respond to this problem.
Transforming Practice is introduced with the declaration that, 'we live in an 
age of uncertainty' (Graham 1996, 2). The notion of uncertainty has 
become thematic amongst practical theologians who believe that
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postmodernism has eradicated any consensus that underpins moral theory. 
For example, Graham argues that postmodernism has destabilised many 
enlightenment concepts. Notions of truth, human nature and knowledge are 
scrutinised as postmodernism is sceptical about identity and 'erases 
humanist concepts of shared value' (Graham 1996, 2).
Graham, like Browning, is trying to envisage a way for Christian 
communities to 'respond to changing values and competing world views.' 
(Graham 1996, 2) The focus of Graham's work is therefore the 'profound 
fragmentation of values,' that has afflicted Christian theology' (Graham 
1996, 3)7’
In Transforming Practice Graham seeks to find a way through the 'crisis' 
that is brought about by postmodernism. If we can no longer rely on a 
concept of human nature that has the Kantian/enlightenment individual 
with the capacity for making good moral decisions at its core will it still be 
possible to build a shared community of values?
More significant is the fact that Graham wants to reconstruct practical 
theology in such a way that 'we have a model of pastoral theology for a 
postmodern age' (Graham 1996, 3). This would involve the construction of 
an 'authentic practical wisdom' that would successfully 'regulate' the 
relationship between theory and practice.
Graham believes that it is only by taking on the challenges of
Graham, although addressing the conceptual issues of postmodernism is also inclined to default to negative 
semantics. For example, the deployment of the terms 'uncertainty', 'fragmentation', 'destabilising', and 'afflicted' is 
never acknowledged as stemming from an elective perspective. Like Schweitzer, Graham presumes that 
postmodernism is a disruptive influence.
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postmodernism that a feasible practical theology will emerge. She suggests 
that an 'adequate post-modern' practical knowledge would require a 
stronger notion of alterity (otherness), and believes that a postmodern 
perspective provides an opportunity for a 'gender-sensitive practical 
wisdom'^^ (Graham 1996, 8).
Therefore, although Graham would argue that postmodernism 'renders the 
axioms of modernity problematic,' she is optimistic about the potential for a 
postmodern practical wisdom that will resolve some of the issues that 
critical theory has failed to resolve, such as 'the binary divisions of public 
and private, of inclusion and exclusion, self and other' (Graham 1996, 8). 
She is willing to embrace the opportunity to rethinlc the image of the 
subject and does not perceive a de-centred subject as being a threat to 
identity, as Schweitzer does, but as offering a chance to explore it.
However she does feel that although feminist critiques have exposed some 
of the limitations of modernity there are still issues that remain to make 
feminism and postmodernism an uncomfortable partnership:
One major tension between the two movements rests upon postmodernisms supposed 
abandonment of - or at best agnosticism towards - the foundational ethical and political projects of 
human rights, equality and justice upon which so many of the moral and strategic demands of the 
second wave women's movement were founded. (Graham 1996, 14)
28
29
Gender sensitive moral studies have received attention ever since the American feminist and ethicist Carol 
Gilligan formulated her hypothesis that men are more likely to consider morality in terms of justice and 
individual rights whilst women are eoncerned with care and relationships. However her work {In a Different 
Voice 1982) has been criticised for being 'gender essentialist.' Giliigan's methods were also challenged by 
C.H. Sommers {The War Against Boys) Giliigan's work is based on acknowledging/privileging difference on the 
basis of gender which is problematic if read as biologically determining.
Evidently, Graham too feels nervous about the loss of the enlightenment view of the intrinsic worth of the 
individual which is also the basis of Christian moral theory. Postmodernism's 'death of the subject’ is a threat to 
some of the feminist philosophy that has emerged. However, this makes her position nearer to Schweitzer's, in 
wishing to retain some of those 'worthy' aspects of modernity. Ar guably, this prevents the re-imaging of 
subjectivity as dispersed and with a new corresponding concept of universal justice.
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Graham's vision for practical theology will be achieved through critical 
reflection on 'cultural experience and social trends' (Graham 1996, 3) this 
're-evaluation' and 'reconstruction' of practical theology, for Graham, takes 
place within a specifically historical perspective.
There is a twofold implication to Graham's historical perspective: Firstly, 
she is referring to the progression of practical theology from clerical and 
therapeutic paradigms. Secondly, and importantly, Graham draws on a 
revised historical materialism as a method for understanding the 
methodological, ideological and epistemological changes in the transition 
from modernity to postmodernity. This distinction is not always clear, but it 
is a crucial difference.
Postmodernism is a critique of the notion of history as a linear progression 
of comprehensive narratives. Distinct and collective themes could only 
ever be claimed to exist by the exclusion of alternatives. History as the 
teleological progression of ideas is arguably a modernist construction.
This is an important distinction because Graham treats the critical 
differences between modernity and postmodernity as two distinct historical 
epochs, while the clerical and therapeutic paradigms are part of practical 
theology's historical progression. Graham is working within the authorial 
and developmental contours of modernity when she places her own work in 
this historical/patriarchal line.In opting for the historical/ linear model 
Graham is seeking to 'reconstruct' a practical theology for a postmodern 
era, which is nonetheless forged and authorised with the tools of modernity.
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Graham is working within the theoretical matrix of historical materialism 
to understand postmodernism. Karl Marx gave us the classic approach, 
providing explanations of society (through its particular relations of 
production) which also provide the basis for contemporary variations of 
historical materialism. This influence is evident in Graham's delineation of 
postmodernity:
I believe that postmodernity, and the crisis of values it delineates and represents, is more than a set 
of ideas. It concerns visions of ideal communities and human relationships in concrete terms. I 
shall refer to 'postmodernity' as the contemporary stylisation of society as reflecting certain 
economic, cultural, political and intellectual ti'ends [my italics]. (Graham 1996, 13)
Graham presents modernity and postmodernity as two separate 'social and 
economic' orders. This enables her to locate the conditions of the transition 
of one order to another within an economic, political and cultural matrix —
■fa modernist brief that postmodernism critiques.
-Graham is therefore using the very tools of modernity to understand a 
postmodernity that renders them problematic. For Graham, the emergence 
of postmodernity is the result of the 'transition of one social and economic 
order to another' (Graham 1996, 15). In treating postmodernism as the 
manifestation of particular economic, sociological and historical 
circumstances she is arguing that it too is the result of a transition from one 
order to another. In so doing, Graham is effectively arguing that 
postmodernism is part of a totalising historical narrative, part of the 
ongoing teleology of historical progress. Postmodernism is contained 
within the fold of a modernist narrative, a linear structure that makes 
everything comprehensive according to its logic/model.
However, she retains elements of the enlightenment construct of humanity.
as is evident in her retention of the morally competent and reflective 
individual around whom she builds her theory of praxis — by utilizing 
aspects of contemporary social science and the philosophy of natural 
science to construct a theory of embodied practice.
One of the key theorists to influence Graham’s work is the sociologist 
Anthony Giddens. It is notable that he considers the legitimate remit for 
postmodernism has more to do with art and architecture than social theoiy. 
Giddens is responsible for a finely-tuned version of historical materialism 
(Giddens 1995), from the perspective of which Graham hopes to provide an 
explanation of human experience that is reduced to either ‘the laws of 
history or the forces of nature' (Graham 1996, 97).
According to Giddens, the 'laws of history' are not the highly deterministic 
prescriptions associated with Marxism. He argued (Giddens 1995) for a 
theory of historical materialism that rejects the notion that it is the 
'progressive augmentation of the forces of production,' or the history of 
class struggle. Historical materialism 'remains the necessary core of any 
attempt to come to terms with the massive transformations that have swept 
through the world since the eighteenth century' (Giddens 1995).
Nevertheless, he rejects as deterministic a Marxist evolutionary 
explanation of the transition of societies from tribal/primitive to feudal, 
from feudal to capitalist, from capitalist to socialist and finally to 
communist. Giddens also seeks to find a theoretical stance that will 
manoeuvre modernity though the pitfalls of a postmodern critique.
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Graham expresses the same need to steer practical theology through such a 
transition and emerges with a recognisable formula grounded in the revised 
historical materialism of Giddens’ neo-traditional sociological theory. This, 
coupled with a 'critical phenomenology' in which she believes 'purposeful 
practices are the bearers of ultimate truth claims' (Graham 1996, 97), 
provides the organising principles of Graham's theory of praxis. However, 
it is the status of these phenomena as ultimate truth bearers that 
postmodernism renders problematic.
Elaine Graham and Friedrich Schweitzer have assimilated some of the 
theoretical perspectives of contemporary social science that seek to retain 
and extend the epistemological framework of modernity. This includes 
(most notably) the 'reflexive modernisation' found in the work of Giddens, 
Lash and Beck (Beck et, a l 1994) and which concurs with Habermas's 
theory of modernity as an unfinished project.
There are problems with theories that regard postmodernism as arising 
from a historically linear progression, while ignoring the fact that it exists 
simultaneously as a contradiction of modernity. In other words, theorising 
postmodernism from the stance of a continued modernity fails to disclose 
the process by which postmodernism is mis-recognised within modernity's 
logic.
This interpretative phenomenology has its origins in the methodological individualism of sociologist Max 
Weber. It was Weber's contention that the rational explanation of events could only be understood through the 
intentions of the individual. Weber was influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey who based his theory on the work of 
Friedrich Schleiermacher. This link and the rational gloss that Dilthey gave to Schleiermacher's work will be 
examined in chapter five when Schleiermacher's influence on the social sciences, via Dilthey, will be considered.
31 This is why Sartre's concept of reason as the bespoke tool of a particular ideology is more useful than simply 
thinking in terms of Kuhn's paradigm shifts. Sartre's approach emphasises the construction of the thinking that 
enables recognition and compels conformity.
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It doesn't help to clarify this problem when, like Habermas, we argue about 
the origins of the term modern. Habermas was (of course) quite right when 
he suggested that the historical nomenclature of modernity has competitive 
moments regarding the precision of its origins (in Passerin D ’Entreves & 
Benhabib 1996). Nonetheless, this cannot detract from the critical, 
epistemological and foundational issues raised by postmodernism. It is 
unlikely that we will get any real insight by trying to locate a chi'onological 
starting post for modernity or postmodernity, or the notion of modernity as 
an 'unfinished project'.
More recently Graham has written about the ‘posthuman’ in her 
Representations o f the Post/Human (2002). In this study Graham is 
exploring the anxiety created by issues of ‘ontological hygiene’ in relation 
to technology. This work is concerned with the identity of the subject and 
although Graham concedes that the notion of what it means to be human is 
highly constructed she nonetheless explores this issue from a much more 
radical position. This indicates that Graham has moved toward a more 
original engagement with postmodernism and although some anxiety still 
exists, she is critically engaged with the issues. In Representations Graham 
is thus addressing the fundamental assertions of postmodernism and the 
status of the subject. As such her work represents one of the most radical 
engagements with postmodernism within contemporary practical theology.
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2.4 A Shared Dilemma: Zygmunt Bauman
and Crisis Theory in Contemporary Sociology
We have seen that there is considerable consensus that practical theology, 
as a product of the Enlightenment, is experiencing a challenging period of 
transition. The empirical and experiential methods it has deployed as the 
foundation for much of its structure have come largely from the social 
sciences, which are also enlightenment disciplines. As Zygmunt Bauman, a 
prominent social theorist stated, 'from its birth, sociology was an adjunct of 
modernity' (Bauman 1992, 54). Postmodernism is currently perceived as a 
threat to the continuity and constancy of the foundations of loiowledge.
However, Bauman addresses the problems that sociology is beset with from 
a very different perspective. Bauman takes a very similar stance to Sartre 
when it comes to the role reason plays within particular epistemological 
regimes. Bauman starts from examining the way reason is mobilised within 
modernity as a 'legislative tool'. Reason, once it has been employed to serve 
the ideological authorization of one regime, in this instance modernity, is a 
difficult analytical tool to reform. It was in recognition of this problem that 
Sartre was to observe that reason was a 'double-edged sword.'
For Bauman, reason acts as a 'regulative idea' and it creates an intellectual 
'blind spot' influencing how any new emerging philosophy is perceived.
The consequence is that the new is assimilated into an existing ideological 
framework. When contemporary theorists draw categorical markers around 
postmodernism, they are already in effect distorting what they see.
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Theorists may then believe that they are contributing to a 'progressive' 
transition of one tradition to another, when in fact they are extending and 
protecting existing conditions. The threat to disturb the self-perpetuating 
unity of everything loiown under modernity's schemata is temporarily held 
off. However, this creates a persistent tension between order and the threat 
of disorder.
Bauman is aware that postmodernism means many things to many people, 
this might account for some of the confusion within contemporary theory.
There are a list of possible contenders — architecture, genre and cultural 
styles. His theory moves beyond trying to find a localised identity for 
postmodernism and introduces a conceptual perspective that might prove
:more useful in understanding the present dilemma. He acknowledges that 
postmodernism, 'is all these things and many others,' but more than this it is 
a 'state o f  mind ' (Bauman 1992, vii). He tackles the identity of 
postmodernism from a perceptual perspective. His argument sets out to 
demonstrate that postmodernism is frequently theorised from within a 
traditional sociological framework as being problematic.
Bauman has argued that the 'crisis' theory within the contours of modernity 
is symptomatic of a wary response to change, especially when it is the 
nature of that change to conceal itself within the old legitimating regime 
only to be picked up as an intermittent fault in the system. This is then 
addressed as and when it presents itself as interference or a threat within 
the prevalent order.
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111 Bauman's case, he argues that the old integrative system is based on the capitalist relations of production and 
the new is a society that has its legitimating ideology shaped by desire and consumption. Like Sartre Bauman 
wants to transcend the cultural effects on ideology and simultaneously incorporate them into his understanding of 
the new.
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Theorists try to respond to this infringement of the existing order by 
accommodating it within the existing intellectual apparatus; when, in fact, 
what is emerging is a new integrative system that cannot be recognised 
within the 'productive functioning' perspective of the old (Bauman 1992,
48).
Habermas is one such theorist, and he responds to postmodernism within 
the existing strictures of prevailing theory:
Habermas's Legitimating Crisis was written on the eve of the radical shift in the management 
philosophy of the capitalist system, a shift which revealed the orthodox method of serving the 
capitalist economy as an, arguably, belated effort to respond to new economic realities with 
concerns generated by an earlier stage in capitalist history. It has been because of this unfortunate 
timing that Habermas failed to consider the possibility that the evident weakening of systemic 
legitimation could be a symptom of the falling significance o f legitimation in integrating the 
systems, rather than the manifestation of crisis. (Bauman 1992, 46)
,î,
Bauman is suggesting that Habermas has translated the epistemological 
collapse of modernity's hegemony as a crisis of legitimation and a threat to 
foundations, when it may have been more appropriate to question the 
reasons that former ideological strongholds are no longer authoritative.
Bauman argues that Habermas follows the defining contours already 
legitimate within orthodox method. This becomes a question of'seeing', a 
'state of mind' and it is from an orthodox perspective that:
Inclines one to see the various phenomena collectively named 'postmodernity' as symptoms of 
disease, rather than the manifestations of new normality (Bauman 1992, 48)
It is possible that a failure to make the conceptual shift has more to
contribute towards Habermas's theorising of postmodernity than bad 
timing. Bauman's concept of postmodernity being a 'state of mind' (more 
than anything else) relates to a conceptual and ideological shift that is 
incomprehensible in a philosophy that opts for the either/or 
conceptualisation of both. The response of some sociologists has been 
similar to the 'crisis' thinking found at the core of contemporary theory in 
practical theology when postmodernism is seen as a threat to truth and 
theories of social reality.
Whereas Graham sees contemporary theory as a project that will steer 
practical theology through a transition Bauman examines the ideology of 
anxiety. In contrast to both Schweitzer and Graham, Bauman takes the 
periods of change between epistemological epochs and makes comparisons 
between them. That is, instead of comparing the different characteristics of 
modernity and postmodernity he examines the intellectual discomfort in the 
conceptual alterations from the classical tradition of Scholasticism to 
Modernity and from Modernity to Postmodernity.
In both instances, the urgency for a new order is at the root of anxiety. 
Bauman is particularly concerned with the periods of epistemological 
anxiety between regimes rather than in isolating the defining features of 
each. What is significant in both scenarios is the distress at the apparent 
moral vacuum. It is this distress that results in the giving of priority to order 
and moral absolutes in the attempt to ward off chaos and avoid amoral 
relativism:
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The tlu-eats related to postmodernity are highly familiar: they are, one might say, thoroughly 
modern in nature. Now as before they stem from that horror vacui that modernity made into the 
principle of social organisation and personality formation. Modernity was the continuous and 
uncompromising effort to fill or to cover up the void; the modern mentality held a stern belief that 
the job can be done... (Bauman 1992, xviii)
Bauman presents the spectre of an intellectual culture haunted and 
possessed by old fears in new contexts. The dream of modernity had been 
for an ’eternal peace brought about by the universality of human 
reason'(Bauman 1992, viii). This would avoid the collapse into disorder of 
a world bereft of a preordained fate and its divine author.
However, where modernity offered a replacement, postmodernity seems to 
offer no such comfort: 'postmodernism has done next to nothing to support 
its defiance of past pretence with a new practical antidote for old 
pois on'(Bauman 1992, viii).
This is problematic for those contemporary theorists who want to remain 
with a working concept of modernity. Giddens, for example, argues that:
Modernity is a post-traditional order, but not one in which the sureties of tradition and habit have 
been replaced by the certitude of rationale knowledge. (Giddens 1991, 2)
Bauman wishes to consider the independent viability of postmodernism. He 
is not pursuing a definition of postmodernism in quite the same way as 
Giddens and Graham. He does not try to understand it through the rational 
methodological order of modernity.
Schweitzer and Graham have both treated postmodernism as a potential 
dysfunction within the parameters of modernity. This means that they have
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deployed mechanisms and methods that start from the position that 
postmodernism is symptomatic of an ailing modernity. Their main 
objective is to interrupt the decline by repairing modernity with whatever 
aspects of postmodernity they find acceptable and compatible with what 
they consider postmodern practical theology should be.
Bauman however, recognises the flaws of such an approach in a subject 
that is experiencing the same difficulties. For Bauman postmodernism is 
not a dysfunctional diagnosis:
The phenomena described collectively as 'postmodernity' are not symptoms of systematic 
deficiency or disease; neither are they temporaiy aberrations with a life span limited by the time 
required to rebuild the structure of cultural authority. I suggest instead that postmodernity (or 
whatever other name will be eventually chosen to take hold of the phenomena it denotes) is an 
aspect of fully fledged, viable social system which has come to replace the 'classical' modern, 
capitalist society and this needs to be theorised according to its own logic [my italics]. (Bauman 
1992, 52)
Bauman is making it clear that postmodernism is to be understood under its 
own terms and not merely as a malfunctioning phase of modernity. The 
difference between Bauman's analysis of postmodernity and Graham's is 
that he seeks new conceptual tools whereas Graham is happy to use the 
modified historical materialism of Giddens' 'third way.' It is not that 
historical materialism itself is a flawed tool, but it is unequal to the task 
because it is the wrong analytical method for postmodernity.
Theorised from within a modernist perspective we arrive at the concept of a 
postmodern sociology, or (in the case of Schweitzer) a postmodern 
practical theology. This, as Bauman has argued, results in a particular 
understanding of modernity that emerges from trying to make them 
communicable (Bauman 1992). Modernity impersonates postmodernity in
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order to maintain its own legislative processes and its own stability as an 
analytical tool. Bauman argues that postmodernism requires its own 
conceptual apparatus to avoid its being absorbed into modernity's remit:
I propose to consider whether postmodernism is a fully fledged, comprehensive and viable type 
of social system; and whether —  in consequence —  the treatment of postmodern phenomena as 
dysfunctional, degenerative or otherwise threatening to the survival of society, is justified by 
anything but the pressure of historical memory, or an unwillingness to part with a theoretical 
model which served its purpose so well in the past. (Bauman 1992, 49)
Therefore (for example) Giddens notion of structuration is an attempt at a 
new 'theoretical synthesis' with which he endeavours to accommodate a 
more critical and reflective agent at the core of his theory of how society 
operates. This is an example of what Bauman refers to as the 'mimetic 
representation' of postmodernity. Bauman is alerting us to the possibility 
that the concepts of critical phenomenology/reflexive modernity provide a 
semantic gloss for a misshapen discipline called postmodern sociology 
(practical theology) but that they contain no genuine concept of 
postmodernism:
One may say that postmodern sociology does not have the concept of postmodernity. One 
suspects that it would find it difficult to generate and legitimate such a concept without radically 
transforming itself. (Bauman 1992, 41)
It is precisely this threat of having to radically transform themselves that 
presents enlightenment disciplines with their conceptual crisis.
The problem for contemporary practical theologians, like Graham and 
Schweitzer, is that they still want a recognisable model of modernity. This 
means settling for a faux postmodernism. Schweitzer's reconstruction of 
modernity's life cycle into a postmodern life cycle demonstrates this 
mimetic inclination. (Schweitzer 2001, 170-173) Here Schweitzer accepts
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that the notion of a 'life cycle' is a 'typically modern approach' and 
furthermore he needs the 'coneepts and categories' of modernity in order to 
construct a 'postmodern life cycle'. Only then does he return this to the 
equation, as though having discerned what the problem is:
The experience of postmodern life is ambivalent. It holds promises and perils alike. Therefore 
critical practical discernment is needed. (Schweitzer 2001, 171)
Bauman argues that sociology also seeks a method by which it can pursue a 
'continuous modernity' (Bauman 1992, 43). Traditional theorists see 
postmodernity as 'society in crisis.' One of the implications of Bauman's 
theory is that the concept of 'crisis' (and the intellectual angst it invokes 
amongst those who treat postmodernism as the fragmentation of the 
traditional society) are part of an ideological resistance to any actual 
change in method^^ :
Description of a society as in crisis implies therefore that a society so described retains its 
identity and struggles to perpetuate it. By the same token, the appearance of phenomena 
resisting accommodation within known regularity can only be perceived as a case of 
malfunctioning: of a society diseased and in danger. (Bauman 1992, 43)
As Stephen Pattison has noted (Pattison 2000, 59), the consequences are an 
endless proliferation of 'mend and make do' reconfigurations of methods 
that have served the discipline in the past.
Furthermore, even when there is a desire to seek a 'new paradigm', as 
Schweitzer does, we do not adequately understand postmodernism within 
the philosophy of methodology in practical theology. However, this is not
Bauman's approach departs significantly from Giddens, insofar as he is using as a different focus of the 'life 
world' of the individual as a consumer (as opposed to producer) the intensity around which society functions.
This interesting development puts desire into the equation as a driving force of contemporary culture.
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only a problem within practical theology, as Bauman's arguments 
demonstrate; sociology has been wrestling with similar issues of 
diminishing innovation and creativity in its methods.
Graham Button, a sociologist and proponent of ethnomethodology has 
made parallel observations in sociology^" ;^
Sociologists eagerly latch onto what appear to be new bodies of thought; they toy with them for 
awhile (organising symposiums to discuss their significance for the discipline, giving over 
special editions of the discipline's journals to them, and proliferating texts that debate their 
merits), but then, often as not, sociology moves on. (Button 1991, 1)
Button insists this is not an indictment of alternative theories that challenge 
orthodox method within sociology, but it represents a greater problem of 
mis-recognition. His specific argument is that sociology has had difficulty 
with ethnomethodology in the past because it fails to recognise anything 
that cannot be categorised within the classical matrix of its own theory of 
(what he refers to as) the 'staple foundations of sociology':
The critiques and the proliferation of new ideas are organised in accordance with the properties of 
the 'staple foundations of sociology'. Theories such as 'feminist social theoiy', or theories about the 
cultural transformation of society, may challenge existing bodies of thought, but they do not 
challenge the VQ\y foundational act o f  theorising. Findings may be challenged but the 
methodological foundation through which those findings are generated remains intact [my italics]. 
(Button 1991, 4)
This parallels the problem of method within contemporary practical
34 Button was influenced by American ethnomethodolegist Harold Garfinkel who believed that social order is 
constructed in the minds of social actors. Individuals take part in a process o f  indexicality' in which new facts 
and experiences are interpreted within the framework of a pre-established order. This 'documentary' method 
allows the individual to experience coherency of life experiences. Garfinkel famously set up experiments to 
demonstrate how individuals would make sense of random responses from people they believed had 'authority'.
He believed that indexing was necessary for day to day survival but that it also led to an inability to 'see' things 
clearly/critically because they were so familiar. (A philosophical precursor for Garfinkel's 'indexicallity' can be 
found in Hume's observation that the mind itself makes the causal connection between parataetic displays.) The 
psychiatrist R.D.Laing was impressed with Garfinkel's experiments and applied his theory to the understanding of 
patient/doctor relationships.
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theology. Graham and Schweitzer have theorised postmodernism as being 
either a new body of thought or a socio-historical extension of modernity 
by dismissing it as a dysfunction that requires 'practical critical 
discernment' (Schweitzer 2001, 171).
Button argues that the 'new' is often absorbed into the 'comforting 
conceptual, epistemological, and methodological,' foundations of the old by 
way of resolving any 'bewilderment' and tension (Button 1991, I) and 
Graham expresses this same need to steer practical theology through such a 
transition and emerge with a recognisable formula grounded in the revised 
historical materialism of Giddens ' neo-traditional sociological theory.
However, Bauman illustrates that the most crucial wealoiess in modernity's 
theorisation of postmodernity lies in its mimetic translation of 
postmodernity within its own remit. In this sense, the term 'postmodernism' 
is a working tool of the ideology of crisis. Bauman, for the time being, is 
not so much concerned with the nomenclature of classical theory as he is 
with the disclosure of a 'new normality'. What we have come to theorise as 
postmodernism has existed (unauthorised and concealed) within the 
epistemological matrix of modernity. It has its own momentum, it breaks 
through as interference and once 'seen' cannot regain anonymity.
Bauman and Button are addressing a specific problem of perception within 
the methodological sphere of sociology. The 'spectator', the theorist, who 
makes what is observed comprehensive, always prejudges what is capable 
of being known — that which is considered epistemonical. What informs
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our 'looking' is therefore key to understanding the limitations of our trying 
to overcome our theoretical 'blind spots.' The 'new' is constantly 
reconfigured to fit in with the prevailing orthodoxy.
This process of assimilation fails to address the 'foundational act of 
theorising' and prevents genuine new ways of 'seeing' in practical theology. 
The practice of collecting, recording and forming a received opinion 
becomes interchangeable with what is conventional as loiowledge.
2.5 Conclusion
What we are able to explore in the work of Bauman and Button is 
postmodernism theorised under the orthodoxy of modernity. This is the 
very legitimating discourse that fails to do justice to postmodernism 
because what it constructs is a faux  postmodernism. This is because 
modernity can only mimic postmodernism in translation.^^
Postmodernism remains conceptually concealed within the legitimating 
sphere of modernity. The prevailing ideology will (of course) attempt to 
absorb postmodernism, or its assimilated image of postmodernism, into an 
existing frame of reference.
In practical theology neither Graham nor Schweitzer, represent a radical 
departure from the orthodoxy of modernity. In adopting a troubleshooting 
stance towards postmodernism (and in treating it as a transition from one
Elaine Graham's deployment of'performativlty' is an example of mimesis to which Bauman refers, (see Graham 
1996,209) Often theorists use the terminology which is taken as shorthand for characteristics of postmodernism; 
this semantic slippage is often another means of incorporating the new into old configurations.
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epistemological paradigm to another), they are committed to incorporating
it into the teleological trajectory of modernity. The question therefore needs
to be reformulated. Instead of asking:
How should we make the transition from modernity to postmodernity?
Should we not ask:
Is it possible to ascertain what the benefits are from allowing postmodernism 
its own court?
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Chapter 3
LOST IN TRANSITION: REASON AS 
AN ARTEFACT OF LIVING SYSTEMS
We are inheritors of categorized knowledge; therefore, we inherit also a world view that 
consists of parts strung together, rather than of wholes regarded through different sets of filters.
.. .It is a world view that in which real systems are annihilated in trying to understand them, in 
which relations are lost because they are not categorized, in which synthesis is relegated to 
poetry and mysticism, in which identity is a political inference. We may inspect the result in the 
structure and organisation of the contemporary university. (Maturana & Varela 1980,63)
Every moment of the human quest for truth is an attempt to contribute to the invention of this 
huge common subject. As we learn, analyse and discover, each of us is partaking of this massive 
collective enterprise, with the goal of total knowledge as its imaginary end. The subject of 
absolute knowing is the ideal thinker, the hypothetical essence of human endeavour, 
simultaneously gaining greater and greater knowledge of the world and of itself. In the same 
way that our intellectual and cultural work assumes a knowable world it also assumes a 
structure larger than each and all of us, that is capable of grasping the knowledge human work is 
garnering in one massive superhuman act of god-like intuition. (Mansfield 2000, 138)
In chapter two, it was argued that although practical theologians have 
recognised the need to address the problems raised by postmodernism they 
have done so in a manner that creates a different set of problems. They 
accept that practical theology cannot ignore the ontological and 
epistemological issues that arise but remain unsure about the actual 
contribution it should make to the discipline. The anxiety and uncertainty 
created in this response to postmodernism also features in some intellectual 
angst as to whether or not there is such a thing as the 'postmodern condition'.
Much of the theorising in practical theology has been pre-occupied with the 
need to discern between the beginning of one epoch and the ending of 
another, with the provision of a manageable 'transition' between the two; as 
observed in the work of Elaine Graham and Friedrich Schweitzer.
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The problem with the transitional operation both Graham and Schweitzer 
choose to execute is that it leaves much of authentic postmodernism 'losf in 
the adaptation. They take partially theorised aspects of postmodernism and 
incorporate them into a modernist frame. Graham's idea ofperformativity 
imbues her theory with the semantic references of postmodernism but is not 
similar to Judith Butler's radical study of subjection.
This is also true of Schweitzer's concept of a 'post-modern life cycle', 
which is problematic in that the notion of a 'life cycle' is irreconcilable with 
the decentred/dispersed subject of postmodernism as shown above. The 
result is a faux  postmodernism that mimics some aspects of a new ontology 
— but does not grasp the radical departure from the enlightenment 
conceptualisation of laiowledge, truth, morality and identity. A misguided 
problematic has been pursued and the deployment of theories of 'extended' 
or 'high' modernity do not adequately resolve the problem of subjectivity. 
Graham and Schweitzer have adopted an intellectual mood, found 
primarily in the work of Jurgen Habermas, which seeks to retain the more 
'stable' characteristics of modernity.
Habermas is renowned for his resistance to the notion that modernity is a 
'spent epoch'. His position has its intellectual roots in the Frankfurt School, 
which focused originally on the attempt to synthesise Marx and Freud. 
Other attempts to revive modernity have emerged in the sociological theory 
of 'reflexive modernity' or 'high modernity' of which Anthony Giddens, 
Scott Lash and Ulrich Beck are co-foundational proponents. (Beck et. a l 
1994) This theoretical position has had a significant influence on the 
practical theology of both Graham and Schweitzer.
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From this perspective modernity remains associated with certainty, whilst 
postmodernism is tantamount to opting for ambiguity, especially in the 
moral realm. This has had the effect of compelling practical theologians 
into an either/or position on the issue of morality. This division is stressed 
by Maurizio Passerin D'Entreves in the introduction to Habermas and the 
Unfinished Project o f Modernity:
A fruitful way of addressing the contrast between Habermas and the postmodernists on these 
issues is by distinguishing two fundamental ethical orientations operating behind their 
respective positions. These are centi ed around two different senses o f responsibility to act vs. a 
responsibility to otherness. While Habermas privileges the responsibility to act in the world in a 
normative justified way, the postmodernists celebrate the responsibility to otherness, namely the 
openness to difference, dissonance and ambiguity. (Passerin D'entreves & Benhabib 1996, 2)
A central problem with these approaches is that the attempted polarisation 
of the discrete features of modernity and postmodernity detracts from our 
capacity to engage properly with postmodernism. A great deal of 
intellectual energy has been spent trying to rescue an image of humanity 
compatible with 'normative' systems of morality. This hinders our capacity 
to question the assumption that practical theology's contemporary role 
should be inextricably linked with the provision of moral theory for 
society. The professional and intellectual identity of practical theology is 
somewhat reduced to the practical application of moral theory.
One of the key assertions of this thesis is that practical theology has a role to 
play in understanding wider aspects of experience without having to be 
prescriptive about morality. Practical theologians have traditionally worked 
with the supposition that moral theory is paramount to its engagement with 
the world. Its status and presence as an academic discipline is to some extent 
justified by the claim that it can contribute to society by providing a good
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and useful tool installed as practical wisdom.
Stephen Pattison is an example of the professional practical theologian who 
advocates putting less emphasis on theology in order to pursue a role in 
contemporary culture as a professional moral consultant. This has some 
questionable implications for the future of practical theology. In its 
attempts to be contemporaneous, practical theology is in danger of leaving 
out the spiritual aspects of experience. Morality rather than religion would 
seem to be the default position for contemporary practical theology.
Don Browning is an obvious exception to this as he consistently theorises 
religious tradition as the foundation for his work. Nonetheless, he too 
believes that practical theology has a role to play in a secular society 
through the supervision and application of moral theory. If postmodernism 
is the breakdown of moral theory, as it is often perceived to be, its 
investiture removes the rational foundation of this strategy.
Yet, the notion that postmodernism leaves us unable to address questions of 
truth, morality and identity itself stems from a theoretical predisposition of 
modernity. Occupied in building a reputation as the purveyor of 
contemporary morality, practical theology has failed to ask whether it 
should be so doing. Michel Foucault has argued that the Christian faith has 
nurtured a notion of a self-identity that is inextricably bound to its founding 
truths:
The duty to accept a set of obligations, to hold certain books as permanent truth, to accept 
authoritarian decisions in matters of truth, not only to believe certain things but to show that one 
believes, and to accept institutional authority are all characteristic of Christianity.
(Foucault 1988, 40)
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It is understandable, therefore, that practical theology should wish to retain 
some features of modernity, but it is not the case that it is essential to its 
continued existence that it does so. Schweitzer has the identity of practical 
theology locked into a modernity that results in his having to accommodate 
postmodernity as an awkward secondary feature. For example in a 
comparative study on religious education Schweitzer and co-author 
Richard Osmer provide an explanation of their methodological approach;
We will be using modernization and globalization as our two primary frameworks, and 
postmodernism as a third framework that is a subspecies of globalization.
(Osmer & Schweitzer 2003 29)
Postmodernism requires theorising on its own terms. The reason for this is 
that postmodernism cannot be located in any specific phenomena. It cannot 
for example be seen as an architectural movement or an artistic movement. It 
may be manifest in these areas; just as it may be manifest in sociology, 
literature and even practical theology. But it is not the defining property of 
any individual or discrete discipline.
This ontological and epistemological shift resists comprehension from an 
onto-epistemology that retains the enlightenment concept of the laiowing 
subject. The relationship between ontology and epistemology is at the heart 
of contemporary struggles for new thinlcing. The enlightemnent individual 
presides over loiowledge and yet is a concealed aspect of this aspiration. 
From a postmodern perspective the subject, as the containment of 
intellectual histories, is constructed and indelibly marked for them.
There is therefore, a tension between ontology and epistemology. Hence we 
need to explain how the discipline becomes immersed in ideological
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positions that are not always the best possible options; then reconcile this 
explanation with the belief that history can be transcended. In other words, 
there is a need to reconcile the radical structuralism of postmodernism with 
freedom.
36 For Heidegger that 'man is' is freedom. The concept of freedom is subject to cultural beliefs; the Enlightenment 
was synonymous with intellectual emancipation/freedom. Postmodern theorists, like Butler and Deleuze seek to 
explain an acquiescence that conceals the absence of what would be the traditional notion of freedom, "Why are 
people so deeply irrational? Why are they proud of their own enslavement? Why do they fight 'for' their bondage 
as if it were their freedom? Why is it diffieult not only to win but to bear freedom?" (Deleuze 1970, 9-10 
Spinoza: A Practical Philosophy) The difficulty is perhaps not in answering these problems but in asking how it 
is that we arrive at a concept of freedom, is it something that we aspire to? Does it exist in some form? Can we 
have a definitive explication of what it would be to be free? For Fleidegger freedom was simply to exist, for 
Hegel social existence meant the immediate expulsion of freedom in his alternating master/slave scenario. For 
Karl Marx freedom came for individuals through their emancipation from economic modes of production 
founded on the appropriation of their labour. The notion of freedom is often eontained in systems of thought 
without the eoncept being adequately theorised. It is the leitmotif of the Old Testament, which is based on the 
notion of liberation from bondage. At a common sense level we may believe that something called 'freedom' 
exists and is therefore a justifiable desire. In the .ludaeo-Christian tradition freedom to choose is the source for 
humanity's fail from grace, making it part of the defining rational for culpability.
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Postmodernism provides the opportunity for practical theology to expand 
and explore new approaches. The traditional involvement of practical 
theologians have with moral theory is only one route which it might take.
A postmodern ontology could help practical theology to investigate 
alternatives. An understanding of postmodern ontology as something other 
than a secondaiy (subspecies) feature of prevailing trends might open new 
spaces for practical theology to explore.
In addition, postmodernism has profound implications for our 
understanding of intellectual history. We cannot examine the identity of the 
subject without also asking crucial questions about the characteristics of 
knowledge and its transmission. This has pedagogical implications for a 
discipline that uses encyclopaedist and rationalist enlightenment ideology 
as the bedrock of its curriculum structure.
For practical theology, there are also pastoral, spiritual and methodological 
concerns. What we believe about how knowledge is transferred will have 
some bearing on research and teaching methods — and perhaps shed some 
light on the pedagogical organisation of practical theology. This becomes 
particularly obvious in the light of some of the recent contributions made 
by practical theologians like Browning and Schweitzer who are 
increasingly advocating the deployment of the cuniculum to provide an 
'identity shaping moral ethos' (2003, xvii).
How should such new epistemologies be constructed and disseminated? 
This chapter focuses on some of the theorists who have generated new 
traditions. Specifically, it looks at the work of Don Ihde, Donna Haraway, 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela to show how radical the 
epistemological break is -  and what new world now comes into view.
3.1 Don Ihde's Postphenomenology: Living Authors Only Please
The tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And 
just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something 
that has never existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure 
up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from their names, battle cries and costumes 
in order to present the new science of world history in this time honoured disguise and this 
borrowed language.
(Karl Marx: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte -  in Marx & Engels 1977, 97)
Renowned for being one of the first philosophers of technoscience, Don 
Ihde (Professor of Science and Technology at Stony Brook, New York) 
describes himself as a post-phenomenologist.
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As well as scrutinising the nature of the knowing subject, Ihde questions 
the ideas we have about intellectual histories. He examines the cognitive 
aspect of perception and the transference of loiowledge. In this, although he 
is influenced by the existentialism of Martin Heidegger he is also critical of 
the process that facilitates the handing down of intellectual heritage within 
scientific disciplines. He has developed a post-foundational reading of 
Heidegger's contribution to the philosophy of science. His most radical 
challenge is to the notion that we progress 'on the shoulders of intellectual 
giants.' Ihde's aim is to work with an alternative theoiy of the production of 
knowledge through his 'living authors only' principle, which will be explored 
here.^^ Ihde's philosophy, in particular his Postphenomenology, has 
implications beyond the philosophy of science and has much to contribute 
to the exchange of ideas within practical theology.
One of the paradoxes of contemporary practical theology lies in the tension 
between the need to be seen to be moving beyond the historical limitations 
of its clericalism and its dependency on long term memory for the 
justification of its contemporary presence in academia. Browning's work is 
a good example of this paradox. He keeps within the Judaic-Christian 
tradition and co-opts contemporary socio-psychological theory.
37 Ihde acknowledges the iniportance of Heidegger's philosophy of technology but is critical of Heidegger's 
romanticism about the west's debt to Greek heritage. However Heidegger's position is very complex in relation to 
the nature of the philosophy of science. He was critical of the Sophists because of their concern for 'first 
principles' and causes, he had no sympathy with Aristotelian 'speculative knowledge', Platonic Idealism or the 
Cartesian mission for certitude, "The tuning of doubt is the positive acquiescence in certainty," (What is 
Philosophy 1956) Heidegger's theoretical position was close to Ihde's in that he believed it was necessary to have 
a pre-disposition (Als ge-stimmtes und be-stimmtes ist das Entsprechens wesenhaft in einer Stimmung) to a 
thought in order to understand it, that philosophy could not be understood through a series of historical definitions 
(intellectual heritage), however Heidegger did believe that we had to 'correspond' with what had been handed 
down to us and in this Ihde is removed from Heidegger's belief about the status of past knowledge. However, 
Ihde's latest approach to Heidegger's work is to take what was innovative about his theory of knowledge and 
empty it of its archaic remnants.
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Whether it will eventually reject or retain a particular academic history, 
practical theology has invested much intellectual energy in reconstructing 
an intellectual past. The rationale for such reworking has always been 
about moving forward, progressing and expanding boundaries. 
Contemporary practical theologian Duncan Forrester sums up this 
juxtaposition of contemporaneousness and tradition:
Practical theology as a distinct theological tradition is comparatively young, but the idea that 
theology as such is a practical science has been there fi'om the beginnings of Christian 
theological reflection. In the gospels, there are repeated reminders that disciples are to be 'doers' 
as well as 'hearers', that Christianity is far more than theory or speculation —  it is a way of life. 
(Forrester 1999,16)
This retrospective link with the scriptural origins of practical theology is 
taken as a given and treated as part of its accepted history. For practical 
theology, it is also crucial to the notion of authority. The problem for 
practical theology is precisely this, that its history and its legitimation are 
conceptually inseparable; any attempts to disconnect them are problematic. 
Therefore, practical theologians have a tendency to present this discipline as 
a historical process of progressive evolving and reforming. Such is the 
conceptualisation of practical theology found in the work of Edward Farley, 
which James Fowler sums up in The Emerging New Shape o f Practical 
Theology:
He (Farley) identified four major phases in the evolution of theology as a central activity and 
concern of the church and later, the university [my italics]. (Fowler 1999, 76)
There is a need for practical theology to present this history and all the 
various transitions before practical theologians discuss their own 
contributions. This is one of the core characteristics of an academic 
community. New research has to locate itself on the historical map of the
112
discipline to which it wishes to contribute. For Ihde this approach raises 
certain epistemological problems. He has made a clear division between 
epistemology and scholarly history within his subject area — the 
philosophy of technology. He is critical of traditionalists within the 
philosophy of science who are concerned with 'citing only European giants, 
interpreting and criticising texts and reconstructing intellectual histories' 
(Ihde 1993, 1).
Ihde's argument demonstrates the undisclosed restrictions that origin 
narratives have on the identity of scholarly disciplines. Again, whether it 
will ultimately retain or reject its intellectual history or not, practical 
theology continues to invest much scholarly energy in reconstmcting its 
past. The question he puts is do we need this particular approach to 
authorize contemporary theory?
Ihde is not against history per se. He is insistent that, 'you've got to do your 
Husserl and you've got to do your Heidegger' (Ihde 2000). This suggests 
that he considers that while the classical history of the philosophy of 
science is important in the general landscape, it should not be the driving 
force of current research engines. Contemporary theory breaks off into its 
own space, what Ihde describes as a 'proliferation of new perspectives.'
What Ihde opposes is the idea of progress having a cumulative/linear relation 
with historical theory. He genuinely seeks a medium for innovation that 
respects, but does not depend upon, historically situated epistemologies. He 
advocates clarity and demarcation between the history of philosophy and 
present-day research, in large part because his argument includes alteration
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in the status of the knowing subject.
For this reason Ihde advocates the use of only 'living authors' in his 
seminars on the philosophy of science:
I have from time to time thought about doing a book entitled, Against the History o f  Philosophy 
that would maybe raise a few eyebrows. It has to do with the fact that I don't think that 
philosophers should rely on the history of philosophy. I think that what philosophers do is read 
historical texts and pretend in some respects that they are contemporary. I don't think they are 
contemporary and I don't like the pretence. (Ihde, 2000)
The dominant analytical schools, he argues, are 'largely ahistorical or non- 
historical. In fact, if you go to English universities, many of them assign all 
of the historical figures like Plato or Kant to the classics, not philosophy 
department.' Ihde approves of this demarcation as he opts for the 'living 
authors only' against the 'heavy weight of history.' (Ihde 2000) The past has 
to be mediated through contemporary elements, what he refers to as 
'reading history through living authors.' (Ihde 2000)
This is about more than just an absence of history in Ihde's work; it is a 
resistance to heritage within contemporary methodology. Ihde talks about 
'epistemological engines', which are interpretative devices:
All epistemological engine is a technology or a set of technologies that through use frequently 
become explicit models for describing how knowledge is produced. (Ihde 2000)
Ihde also argues that contemporary knowledge is 'considerably superior to its older forms’, but not because of a 
cumulative effect. Efficiency has more to do with innovations in perception. Nonetheless given his arguments 
about knowledge transference between cultures this might be seen to present a flaw in his philosophy. Ihde would 
have no problem, however, with a bias for current epistemology.
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New instruments of interpretation are not necessarily representational. Each 
set of technologies provides a perspective. For Ihde this means that science 
must change its approach and that a traditional inductive method is 
superseded in some instances with convergence theory.
The 'interpretation and criticizing text' approach and reconstructing 
intellectual histories does not add anything to the authenticity of present 
theory. What Ihde advocates is the expanding of hermeneutics through a 
'material hermeneutics' or a 'visual hermeneutics, as outlined here in a 
quote from a paper entitled "Material Hermeneutics":
A material hermeneutics is a hermeneutics which "gives things voices where there had been 
silence, and brings to sight that which is invisible." Such a hermeneutics in natural science can 
best be illustrated by its imaging practices. The objects of this visual hermeneutics were not 
texts nor linguistic phenomena, but things which came into vision through instrumental 
magnifications, allowing perception to go where it had not gone before. One could also say that 
a visual hermeneutics is a perceptual hermeneutics with a perception which while including 
texts, goes beyond texts. (Ihde, 2003)
Hide's argument is that science no longer has any claim to a theory of 
absolutes and that Plato's contemplative telos is no longer adequate in a 
community that has become conscious of the role of embodied experience. 
We no longer hold to the ideal notion of knowledge as a disembodied 
actuality and the disclosure of this fallacy means that we have to think 
more creatively about the construction of multiple epistemologies.
Ihde argues that long periods of inductive experimentation may not add anything significant to the Icnowledge 
that can be gained from an event and in fact, because of the nature of contemporary science, experiments cannot 
be repeated (whether for financial, historical or ethical reasons). What is required is the greatest possible 
access/convergence of interdisciplinary interest.
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In the seventeenth century, the philosopher and natural scientist Francis 
Bacon introduced the concept of a passive natural world ordered and 
understood by a rational mind. Ihde makes a distinction between science- 
as-knowledge and science-as-practice and argues that 'theory families' have 
replaced the one-dimensional pursuit of science-as-lmowledge.
Furthermore, the concept of a 'pure' disembodied science becomes itself 
only one among the proliferating perspectives in the philosophy of science. 
Ihde's 'theory family' is a combination of 'theory, critical perspective and 
interpretative context' (Ihde 2000). This particular approach has emerged 
from feminist evaluations in the philosophy of science.
Feminist scientists, such as Evelyn Fox Keller {Reflections on Gender and 
Science 1985) highlight how science attaches to theoretical metaphors that 
have a powerful influence:
Again, in a succinct and interesting way. Fox Keller shows the emergence of the dominance of 
the mechanical metaphors which also retain their power in contemporary science. The correlate 
of a neutral, disembodied, personal language is a mechanical, unalive, passive nature. The 
victories of this crucial period are of the mechanists over the hermetic traditions, and of the 
scientific suppression of'female excess,' presumably embodied in witchcraft. (Ihde 1993, 123
Fox Keller's work is significant because it highlights what functions are 
provided by the use of metaphors in scientific theory. Ihde is careful, 
however to point out that emptying science of historical rhetoric and sifting 
through cultural residue is not enough in itself to generate new 
epistemologies (Ihde, 2000).
40 Today this excess emerges in contemporary science fiction scenarios of artificial intelligence (A.I., I Robot). The 
human aspect of'hard science' is projected onto the actual product of human practice. Disconnecting/alienating 
human activity from science produces dystopian fantasy. Ihde is always very matter of fact about 'har d' 
technology, for him this has something to do with fact that if you have children they are more likely to find its use 
positive rather than threatening. He uses the example of his own teenage sons' comfortable relationship with 
technology to emphasise this. If you are a 'user' and potential innovator, you may be less susceptible to dystopian 
nightmares about technology because you are extending, and not reifying, your own experience.
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Ihde approached the question of postmodernism from a very different 
standpoint and uses the terms postphenomenal and non-foundational 
interchangeably. (Ihde 1993, 1) Conscious of his reputation as the 'first 
postmodern philosopher of technology', he concedes this with reservations. 
This is because he, like many, is reluctant to try to pin down the exact 
meaning of postmodern and does not define his work in terms of such 
arguments.
In an interview, Ihde expressed some uncertainties about the possibility of 
a definitive taxonomy of postmodernism, but was vei*y assured about the 
consequences it had for new epistemologies:
I also have misgivings about certain aspects of postmodernism. But if by modernism you mean 
the attachment to modernist epistemologies such as those that came out of Galileo, Descartes, 
and that particular period, which hold that knowledge is the true representation of the external 
world, then I am clearly not a modernist. I have no sympathy with that. I am clearly 
postmodernist in the sense that techniques mostly from phenomenology, but also from 
deconstruction and variants on multiperspectives are where I would stand epistemologically. 
(Ihde, 2000)
Ihde is here considering the effect that 'new thinking' has on living teclino- 
cultures. In this sense, he gives us a format for recognising new thinking. In 
pursuit of working examples of innovative thinlcing, he avoids the trap of 
'crisis ideology.' He acknowledges the difficulty in establishing the genesis 
of modernity and postmodernity but does not let this impinge on his 
attempt to understand emerging epistemologies. In contrast to Habermas, 
Ihde has no anxiety or sense of'loss' over modernity'^^ :
41 Although to be fair it should be acknowledged that the posthumanist philosophies that emerge from Ihde and 
Haraway are ethically complex. New technologies will bring about new definitions of humanity but they also 
raise new ethical issues. It should be remembered that Habermas defends critical theory against philosophical 
posthumanists like Peter Sloterdijk (1947-) who has argued that culture and civilisation are 'anthropogenic 
hothouses' and is a proponent of genetic technology as a means to regulate the 'bio-culture'. Sloterdijk uses such 
terms as Zuchung (cultivation/breeding) and Selektion (selection of genetic material for regulation of'disease') 
these are historically loaded terms, and no matter how much Sloterdijk defends their use in what he sees as a 
different context, we should (like Habermas) be suspicious of them.
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The proliferations of definitions of the postmodern do not often mesh, yet what is common to 
the sense of the postmodern that, somehow, we are aware that an era is ending, modernity.
(Ihde, 2000)
He is taking steps toward understanding the 'omnipresent technological 
texture' of a new approach to knowledge without feeling compelled to 
make it compatible with modernity, or to make provision for the 
transformation between the two. He rejects arguments that seek to establish 
a clear historical lineage between postmodernism and modernism. 
Understanding postmodernism, for Ihde, is about entering into a far- 
reaching altered perception:
My approach to this radically fluid postmodern context is to look at our life world, which I 
contend today has a deep technological texture. For unlike the false but widely claimed and 
believed aspects of science, which takes itself still in a kind of modernist guise as universal, 
atemporal, acultural in its results, there has never been any doubt that technologies are more 
closely linked to both practicality and cultures. (Ihde 2000)
The focus is the relationship between humanity and technology. Ihde is in 
agreement with the Foucauldian concept of humanity as a social 
construction (Foucault 1980), and argues that what it is to become human is 
transformed through our perception and our use of technology. Our 
aptitude for altering how we think is finely tuned to our relationship with 
the world.
Furthermore, it is through the interconnectedness of perception and life 
worlds that radical transformations and 'new thinking' are made possible. 
Ihde demonstrates this relationship by the historical example of Leonardo 
Da Vinei, and the effect his work had on renaissance culture. Leonardo's 
technology was not successful in engineering terms. His flying machines 
never flew and his artillery/war machines were only ever conceptual.
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Nonetheless, Leonardo's transformation of perception was to become the 
basis for radical new thought processes. This was art (visual thinking) 
pushing concepts beyond philosophy:
This visualist thinking, the very thinking which would become the style of thinking in both 
modern science and, even much more particularly, in modern engineering. It is the exploded 
diagram which makes the workings o f such inventions as diesel engines, as hydraulic pumps, 
as the instrumentation of science itself understandable. (Ihde 1993, 19)
Ihde's argument is that in the 'technological texture' of the life-world, the 
imagination and creative thinking can revolutionise culture. Styles of 
thinking emerge that bring about social and cultural shifts', indicating that 
perception does have a plasticity. Leonardo Da Vinci introduced a radical 
gestalt in his anatomical and technological drawings.
For Ihde this is a significant demonstration of Heidegger's theoiy that 
technology is more than a 'collection of artifacts' but a 'way of seeing'. 
(Ihde 1993, 20) There is an 'intimate synthesis of a way of seeing which 
was the birthplace of the modern'. Leonardo's imagined technologies are 
more important to the impact of thought than the artifacts of technology.
In this sense Ihde's exploration in perception, his 'visual hermeneutic', and 
its relationship to the 'technological texture' of a culture has more to do 
with empiricism of the imagination. He goes on to suggest that it is the 
anatomical, more exactly than the technological, drawings that have the 
greatest impact on radical new thought processes — with the emphasis 
being more on visual thinking rather than on technology.
In an essay titled 'The Origin of the Work of Alt' (Harper and Row 1975) Heidegger uses the term 
equipmentality to describe our relationship with the world through our equipment/technologies. He also talks 
about the 'memorialising' of technological cultures through the visual arts, arguing that art remains a 'soulless 
disembodied thing' unless we can respond to this capacity it has to memorialise.
In this case, Ihde is referring to the altered perception required for the 'modern' not a historical time line.
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Ihde is in no sense making any claims for a renaissance technology in the 
historical location of modernity. The example is deployed to keep us 
focused on the ability to transform culture through a radically altered 
gestalt. He is careful to avoid the reduction of Leonardo da Vinci's work to 
some happenstance of the renaissance and technology. He is not making 
some adroit statement about early technologies. His concern is with the 
process of thinking, perception and the importance of the relationship of 
the two in the 'exploded diagram' in Leonardo's work."^ "^  The work of the 
artists, the aesthetic product, is crucial. This becomes the basis for Ihde's 
material hermeneutics and his theory of transference.
In his theoiy of technological transfers Ihde argues that 'techno-artifacts' are 
like works of art, they are not natural objects but are purposeful and 
contextual. This, however, does not mean they are functionally or culturally 
fixed. Ihde's own example of the multifunction of technological artifacts is 
an instance of how technology may be adapted into different cultures that 
have not shared the thinlcing processes that have produced them. The act of 
adaptation will not necessarily radically alter the gestalt of the host culture. 
He describes how technology that is strange is 'accommodated within a 
persistent familiarity':
In a transfer, an artefact is transferred. But in its original setting the artefact is paired with a 
human praxis, a technology is a human technology relation. What is perceived as useful, in the 
typical transfer, must therefore make contact with a recognisable praxis, the familiar. (Ihde, 
1993, 40)
The technology of Leonardo is every so often viewed from our own cultural perspective as 'futuristic' or the 
insight of a genius. Television programmes have been produced in which attempts have been made to make his 
designs operational. This kind of curiosity about the work misses the point that Ihde is trying to make. It is the 
leap of imagination that is crucial not the efficaciousness,
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It is therefore wrong to think of technology as having an independent or 
'Frankenstein's monster' scenario. Technology does not have the ability to 
impose a logic outwith its application and use. Ihde's interest is in 
understanding technology embodied in the 'life praxis' but his approach also 
reveals the complexity of perception, thinking and comprehension. His 
examples are demonstrations of different models of recognition, and he 
makes the point that a host culture will accommodate strangeness within its 
own logic of sense perception. The example Ihde uses is of the clash of 
cultures between gold prospectors and New Guinean Highlanders early in 
the 20^ *^  century:
The colonists carried tinned goods, for example those old elliptical sardine cans. These they 
discarded along the way as 'jiink.' But the lids were immediately picked up and incorporated 
into elaborate headdresses by the highlanders. Again, there is a pattern of a new artefact being 
incorporated into a familiar praxis, a fashion praxis if you will. (Ihde 1993, 6)
This theory of technological transfer illustrates the cognitive resistance that 
arises when two very different models of recognition come into contact. A 
host culture, on receiving something strange will try to place it with the 
familiar. It will be assimilated into an existing genus, isolating those 
attributes of the artifact that are recognisable and can be accommodated 
within the perceptual and conceptual matrix of the host's own praxis.
This does not necessarily change or alter the thinking of the host culture just 
because it has classified the 'strange'. A medium can be provided for the 
'new' without making any difference to the mindset of the host culture.
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This is the point at which Ihde's theory takes us beyond the claims that Heidegger made about the possibility of 
an artefact portraying 'a happening of truth' or the reproduction of a thing's essence, multiple points of recognition 
prevents such stability in an object.
This is a foundational principle of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology.
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.It is above all a question of comprehension, suggesting that it is not an
objective change in the enviromnent. If real change is to take place, it is
within the subjective status of the subject. The cultural differences that are
evident in the knowing subject are demonstrated through the mis-recognition
and reallocation or assimilation of objects. Therefore, intention of use or 
.interpretation of purpose cannot give rise to 'truth claims' in any 
conventional sense. Artifacts from one culture become the votive objects of 
another. They will retain the same meaning only in the epistemological 
milieu for which they have been constructed. The knowing subject of one 
culture has a constructed sense-perception for the recognition of culturally 
specific references.
Practices viewed as purposeful strategies are, therefore, not universal 
statements of truth. This would obviously raise some difficulties when 
particular interpretations of 'puiposeful practice' are believed to be the 
foundation for statements of truth.
Elaine Graham, for example, wants to retain a notion of 'creative human 
agency' (Graham 1996, 97), but the nature of this agency is questionable 
within an ontology that suggests the construction of a subject for a particular 
epistemological regime. The experience of an individual might be perceived 
as private, but nonetheless identity is there as the bestowal of a communal 
privilege. The individual has sanctuary within a culture; they belong as part 
of a public franchise. The sovereign power that grants such a privilege is 
often not disclosed, it nonetheless leaves them indelibly marked.
122
If this is explored, as it has been in Butler's work on gender (Butler 1999), 
we have to challenge the analytical categories that Graham deploys in 
Transforming Practice:
To regard all theological discourse as grounded in human agency is resonant with perspectives 
on human identity and agency as constituted through practice, and therefore as enacted, 
contextual and provisional. Theology now becomes not an abstract series of philosophical 
propositions, but a performative discipline, where knowledge and truth are only realizable in the 
pursuit of practical strategies and social relations.
The unity of theology, therefore, is located in the study of the practices of intentional faith 
communities. The praxis of the faith community constitutes the character and wisdom of 
theology it is the means by which Christians purposefully inhabit the world, and the vehicle 
through which the community itself is formed and ordered. (Graham 1996, 204)
This begs the question, what is it about a faith community and 'purposeful' or 
intentional action that endorses this praxis as 'truth' and 'knowledge'? This 
statement also presupposes that the pursuit of 'knowledge and truth' as 
objective reality is not only 'good' but also realizable. Graham's 
interpretation of performativity does not question the status of experience in 
terms of ownership. It is an affirmation of'ordinary' life. Graham takes 
ownership of experience as given. But, more than this, she accepts that each 
individual has the capacity for 'good will thinking'. This capacity is not in 
doubt for Graham who opts for a model of rationalised morality.
This position is scrutinised under postmodernism. The status of reason as an 
objective measure and a working tool is critically assessed and replaced by 
the notion of reason as a product of living systems. That is to say, those 
subjects may 'puiposefully' inhabit the world, but this 'purpose' is confined to 
a self-referring order. This tends to go against our instinctive feelings of'self 
possession or agency.
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3.2 Donna Haraway: Self Possession, Biographical Continuity 
and Dispersed Subjectivity
A person with a reasonably stable sense o f self-identity has a feeling of biographical continuity 
which she is able to grasp reflexively and, to a greater or lesser degree, communicate to other 
people. That person also, through early trust relations, has established a protective cocoon 
which 'filters out', in the practical conduct of day to day life, many of the dangers which in 
principle threaten the integrity of the self. Finally, the individual is able to accept that integrity 
as worthwhile. There is sufficient self-regard to sustain a sense of the self as 'alive' — within the 
scope o f reflexive control, rather than having the inert quality of things in the object-world. 
(Giddens 1991, 54)
The proper state for a Western person is to have ownership of the self, to have and to hold a 
core identity as if it were a possession. Not to have property in the self is not to be a subject, and 
so not to have agency. (Haraway 1991, 135)
Like Ihde, Dorma Haraway has no sentimental attachment or sense of loss in 
regard to pre-technological societies. Her feminist critique emerges from her 
own working environment within the scientific community. This in turn has 
resulted in a rethinking of traditional feminism with its emphasis on gender 
identity. Instead, she focuses on our relationship with technology and the 
impact this has on our notion of what it is to be human. Like Ihde she 
believes that to thinlc radically about identity we have to thinlc differently 
about the sort of boundaries that we believe exist between human and 
machine, natural and unnatural.
This has made her one the leading philosophers of the new 'posthuman' 
theory that seeks to understand the influence that technology has on our 
consciousness. The result is a philosophy of techno-science that breaks away 
from depth/essence models of human nature and gender dualism. She 
questions traditional origin myths and seeks to replace them with 
contemporary affinity stories.
As we increase the use of technology in our lives, it has become important to rethink our concept of what it 
means to be human. Haraway's philosophy has extended the boundaries by trying to eliminate the dualism 
between nature and technology.
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Haraway compares the coherent 'regulatory fiction' of gender structure in 
the west with the concept of transient gender identity found in Marilyn 
Strathern's study of gender among Melanesians (Strathern 1988). This 
study was used to demonstrate the fluidity of gender identity in contrast to 
the permanent biographical trajectory of western culture.
Strathern's work was an important indicator of a dispersed subjectivity that 
is unintelligible within the framework that Giddens refers to, in which 
identity is an accumulative biographical progression that results in a 
permanent stable condition. What Haraway's work reveals is the similar 
construction of biographical intellectual histories within academic and 
scientific disciplines.
Haraway has been crucial in our understanding of how the constructions of 
shared and authoritative stories imbue a discipline with status and 
authority. For her, it is important to emphasise that the history of a discrete 
discipline has been the result of a 'collective historical production' (1991, 
83).
As such, her work is an insight into the ascendancy of 'winning narratives' 
in the history of science. It is also a study of the initiation passages of 
individuals into the discipline:
The language itself is charged with questions of independence and indebtedness, of individual 
achievement and ascribed identities. Part of women's struggles against patriarchy has been to 
insist on being independently named. (Haraway 1991, 86)
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This reform of primatology took place because of the ability of women
48scientists to contribute to the narratology from a differing perspective.
Yet, those who contributed still had to become 'experts' through the 
legitimate routes. Only when safely established could the default position
Adrienne Zihlman spoke of range and behaviour; she would do her doctorate on bipedulism 
within the framework of the hunting hypothesis. Later she would be a central figure in 
challenging this explanatory framework and in proposing a major synthetic perspective. 
(Haraway 1991, 91)
Academic disciplines construct and in turn are defined by their intellectual 
legacies. Haraway's approach is to ask questions about the social 
mechanisms that act as vehicles that enable the passage of particular 
naiTatives:
Like any family name, the academic patronymic is a social fiction. The language of the patriline 
does not tell the natural history of an academic family; it names the lineage of struggles, mutual 
concerns, and inheritance of tools and public social identities. (Haraway 1991, 91)
The continuation and propagation of stories, through the medium of 
academic research, publication and public speaking is all part of the 
apparatus that retains the authority of the narrative. This is the process of 
producing public knowledge.
48 This reformation is also evident in other disciplines. In Anthropology for example, the work of Adam Kuper 
{Anthropology and anthropologists Roiitledge 1996[I972]) provides an interesting insight into the response of a 
professional body when the canonised origin myths are ehallenged. Kuper introduced the 1996 edition of this 
work with a reflective parable. A story told with hindsight because he eould not have anticipated the reaction to 
the original. It is a tale of a 'generation' gap. Until then, there had been an unacknowledged tension between the 
'elders' of anthropology and its emerging disciples. Kuper would challenge the 'origin myths' of British (colonial) 
Anthropology. This angered many who read the work (and in the case of Lucy Mair, even those who had not). 
One positive critic had suggested that Kuper was guilty of'desacralising the founding fathers of our discipline 
and presenting them as human beings, warts and all.' Kuper's work had a stormy reception but it went on to 
become a 'staple' text for undergraduates. It was finally conceded that he had made an important contribution to 
the discipline by exposing the documentary fiction, so closely tied into Malinowski's personal biography, at the 
heart of its intellectual history.. Kuper's work is an enlightening read for anyone interested in understanding the 
heritage of their own discipline.
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of what would be considered normative perspectives be challenged;
Haraway takes into account the particular 'processes and production and 
reproduction of human life' into her account of her particular discipline. In 
this sense, she takes a specifically Marxist view of how knowledge is 
assimilated and disseminated:
Through labour, we make ourselves individually and collectively in constant interaction with all 
that has not yet been humanized. Neither our bodies nor our social bodies may be seen as 
natural, in the sense of existing outside the self creating process called human labour. What we 
experience and theorize as culture are transformed by our work. All we touch and therefore 
know, including our organic and our social bodies, is made possible for us through labour. 
(Haraway 1991, 10)
Haraway challenges the usual starting place for the production of scientific 
Imowledge, arguing that the essence of science does not belong in an abstract 
domain of'testable propositions' (Haraway 1991, 82) but on the contrary, 
'Stories are a core aspect of the constitution o f an object of scientific 
knowledge' [my italics] (1991, 82). What becomes a key stage in the 
development of a scientific discipline is the process whereby some narratives 
become dominant. In Daughters o f Man-The Hunter (1991), Haraway starts 
with Linnaeus being the 'second Adam' with the privilege of bestowing the 
'correct names for things'. This is the very essence of the creation of stories 
that ultimately become the accepted public definition of meaning.
In examining the intellectual history of primatology, Haraway's challenge 
is for feminism to confront the prevailing narratology and search for new 
stories. Her analysis is a crucial contribution to our understanding of how 
disciplines establish their orthodoxy. Haraway has focused on how women 
scientists have had to go through a classical patriline before having the 
freedom to do their own authentic research. This force exerts its influence 
by becoming the established origin myth of a discipline:
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And even in our time, when such giants and fathers are dead, scientific debate is a contest for 
the language to announce what will count as public knowledge. (Haraway 1991, 81)
Haraway's work provides insight and understanding as to how the intellect 
of the subject is constructed, how identities are formed and how the 
deification of godlike founding fathers creates powerful origin myths. The 
apprenticeship served within any academic discipline becomes a rite of 
passage and reinforces the orthodoxies, supposedly pioneered by 
individuals, which have in fact emerged from social, cultural and political 
relationships. Ironically, the much-coveted 'originality' of academic 
discourse is subordinate to the orthodoxy of prevailing associations. The 
emergence of pedagogic heritage is reflected in the reproductions of its 
properties as the intellectual assets of the individual. This illusion is 
cultivated by the egoism it serves, as illustrated by an observation made by 
Sir Stafford Beer (1926-2002) in his preface to Autopoiesis (also Icnown as 
the Santiago Thesis)"^ :^
A man who can lay claim to knowledge about some categorised bit of the world, however tiny, 
which is greater than anyone else's knowledge of that bit, is safe for life: reputation grows, 
paranoia deepens. The number of papers increases exponentially, knowledge grows by 
infinitesimals, but understanding of the world actually recedes, because the world really is an 
interacting system... There has been recognition of this, and interdisciplinary studies are by now 
commonplace in every university. But will this deal with the problem? Unfortunately, it will 
not. We will say that a graduate must have his 'basic discipline', and this he is solemnly taught 
—  as if such a thing had a precise environmental correlate, and as if we know that God knows 
the difference between physics and chemistry. He learns the academic mores, catches the 
institutional paranoia, and proceeds to propagate the whole business. Thus it is that an 
'interdisciplinary study' often consists of a group of disciplinarians holding hands in a ring for 
mutual comfort. The ostensible topic has slipped down the hole in the middle.
(Beer in Maturana & Varela 1980, 64)
Professor Beer was famous for his research Into operational systems or 'the science of effective organisation'. He 
developed many of his ideas during the Second World War but went on to make their application successful in 
peacetime. His work on cybernetics and management was carried out in the 70's and he used the term 'data 
highway' some thirty years before we come across the term 'information highway.' He worked on projects in 
Chile, which at the time was under the leadership of President Allende. He came to know about the work of 
Maturana and Varella. The Pinochet regime brought his work in Chile to a halt. As well as his scientific work he 
wrote poetry and painted. One of his most important contributions to working methods was the concept of'Team 
Syntegrity', long before Ihde or Haraway's 'theory families'. Maturana and Varella's concept of structural 
coupling was to have a strong influence on his work. This concept is also found in Deleuze and Guattari.
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Haraway's work is of great importance for practical theology as it can help 
open up the debate about authority and lineage in a subject that is 
dependent upon both. How can we interpolate our own origin myths with 
authenticity and question the imposing status of our own 'dead giants'? It 
also raises issues about the relationship between academic initiation 
processes and the construction of working methodologies and I now wish 
to consider alternative theories of knowledge and the potential for different 
working relationships.
3.3 Autopoiesis: Between our Dreams and Actions Lies the World
If we are to understand a newer and still evolving world; if we are to educate people to live in 
that world; if we are to abandon categories and institutions that belong to a vanished world, as it 
is well nigh desperate that we should; then knowledge must be rewritten. Autopoiesis belongs to 
the new library. (Beer in Maturana & Varela 1980, 65)
The basic claim of science is objectivity; it attempts, through the application of well-defined 
methodology, to make statements about the universe. At the very root of this claim, however, 
lies its weakness: the apriori assumption that objective knowledge constitutes a description of 
that which is known. Such assumption begs the questions 'what is it to know?' and 'how do we 
know?' (Maturana & Varela, 5)
The empirical methods of science aim to provide us with loiowledge 
statements about objective reality. This rationalist perspective has been the 
predominant model for the epistemology of the natural sciences and much 
of the humanities throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Along with his colleague Francisco Varela, Humberto Maturana explores 
the suppositions implicit in the 'external reality' theory of laiowledge.
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These assumptions are expressed in the language of science and in the 
expectation that experiments are repeatable and independently verifiable. 
This model of 'science as knowledge' relies on the existence of a clearly 
defined objective and absolute reality that is external to the observer. 
Moreover there is also the supposition of teleonomy, the belief that there is 
order in the world being obseiwed:
It is usually maintained that the most remarkable feature of living systems is a purposeful 
organisation, or what is the same, the possession of an internal project or program represented 
and realized in and through their structural organisation. (Maturana & Varela 1980, 85)
For Maturana documentary or objectivist models of knowledge are 
problematic and ultimately are responsible for the marginalisation of 
knowledge into fragmented 'specialist' disciplines.In this model the 
observer, who is neutral and independent of the environment being observed, 
has the rational powers to discern reality. Thereafter, this discerned reality is 
informationally processed and subsequently modifies pedagogical conduct.
It is from this model that the idea of'independent and objective truths' 
emerges and, ultimately, it is believed that truth itself is both independent 
and capable of being sought and discovered.
There is a tautology concealed in these statements. Implicit to this model is 
the assumption that we are in control of a clearly defined situation; the 
knowing subject is an independent spectator with the capacity to gather 
information dispassionately.
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Maturana and Varela's position suggests that the opposite is the case, that 
'perception should not be viewed as a grasping of external reality, but rather 
as the specification of one.'(Maturana & Varela 1980, xv) The external 
world would have a 'triggering' effect on the observing subject, but that 
effect would always be a fragment of the world, drawn into the immediate 
priority of what was required for the integrity of the subject.
This is not to suggest that the status of an external world is doubted, but that 
we can have access to it only through the prisms of our dependency. Beer 
noted the intellectual irony of this in his preface to Autopoiesis:
I note with some glee that this means that Bishop Berkley got the precisely right argument 
precisely wrong. He contended that something not being observed goes out of existence. 
Autopoiesis says that something that exists may turn out to be unrecognisable when you next 
observe it. (Maturana & Varela 1980, 67)
Observations are not steadfast because the world, and our perceptions of it, 
is not stable. Reality is not an independent and consistent phenomenon and 
this particular 'reality' has no objective existence beyond its immanent 
functions. What is real is intimate with the embodied experience of 
individuals and this identity can expand or retract according to its 
relationship with the world in which endurance and survival are crucial.
When, on the other hand, we operate as observers we are inclined to divide 
our enviromnent into self and object. This, of course, ignores the fact that we 
are structurally coupled to the environmental conditions that we objectify 
and as such are instrumental participants in it.
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Autopoiesis and Cognition is a thesis that resulted from years of research on 
frog vision. This was a complex biological study that made an important 
contribution, not only to the philosophy of science, but also to the theory of 
knowledge. It is also uncompromisingly imaginative in that it resists being 
relevant to only biological science and has been described as sociology of 
biology.
This is demonstrated in the imiovative use of new terms, Maturana was 
conscious of the role that language had to play in scientific theory, 'one can 
only say with a given language what the language permits.' (Maturana & 
Varela 1980, xiii) Autopoiesis is a portmanteau word assembled by Maturana 
to encapsulate the autonomy and self-referencing/ creative potentiality of the 
individual. But it also widened his explorations beyond the traditional 
ground already mapped out in his own field. This was effective as a working 
tool because it broke with traditional semantics and the subtext they bring:
Curiously, but not surprisingly, the invention of this word proved o f great value. It simplified 
enormously the task of talking about the organisation of the living without falling into the 
always-gaping trap of not saying anything new because the language does not permit. We could 
not escape being immersed in a tradition, but with an adequate language, we could orient 
ourselves differently and perhaps from the new perspective generate a new tradition. (1980 xvii)
The term Autopoiesis brings into focus the creative activity of existence, 
balancing this with our concern for the phenomenal. This is a significant 
alteration of perspective from the empirical and objective model of 
knowledge and a move toward understanding the world from the perception 
of an autonomous individual engaged in its cultural enviromnent or milieu. It 
is a move away from asking the question: 'How does the organism obtain
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information about the environment?' — To asking; 'How does it happen that 
the organism has the structure that permits it to operate adequately in the 
medium in which it exists?' (Maturana & Varela 1980, xvi)
In other words, this is the biologists' version of the same quest pursued by 
Sartre and Butler: How do we explain the subjection of an apparently 
autonomous individual within the confines of experience in the world and 
why is this made with such acquiescence?
This notion of autonomy is important to understanding what Maturana has to 
say about the transference of knowledge. He is concerned with the capacity 
for knowledge to be generated rather than the existence of objective 
knowledge. Why is this significant? It is very different h'om the discerning 
enlightemnent subject who deploys reason to explain the world. It is contrary 
to the belief that individuals have been on some voyage of discovery from 
which they return with spoils to be stored and categorised:
Objective knowledge seems possible and tlirough objective hiowledge the universe appears 
systematic and predictable. Yet knowledge as an experience is something personal and private that 
cannot be transferred, and that which one believes to be transferable, objective knowledge, must 
always be created by the listener: the listener understands, and objective knowledge appears 
transferred, only if he is prepared to understand.(M aturana & Varela 1980, 5)
This is in contrast to what we have traditionally believed about the 
exchange of knowledge. In our western culture, we have a pedagogical 
tradition that operates on the 'banking' system of knowledge. That 
knowledge is deposited, via the teacher pupil relationship, with individuals. 
This model assumes the separation of intellect and body suggesting also 
that knowledge is something external that needs to be absorbed.
50 This is specifically preparation in the sense that the individual has pre-conceptual propensity, not in the sense of 
consent. Although it is also significant that this preparedness is an explanation for the individual's apparent 
willingness to participate in the process.
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Maturana's concept of the knowing subject is in many ways Spinozean; he 
links systems of knowledge to nature/biology. Spinoza did not conceive a 
world divided into two separate spheres, the physical and the mental. 
Crucially he believed that everything strove to maintain its own particular 
finite existence, "Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to 
persevere in its being"(Spinoza 1994, 171) This is Spinoza's principle of 
conatus, which is the effort, impulse or striving force that forms the 
essence of an existence.
In Autopoiesis, it is not so much the essence of a thing as the generation 
and maintenance of a supporting environment that gives existence an 
identity. This is also quite close to Haraway's concept of affinity and 
connectedness to the world. Ultimately it is not human reason that brings 
order to the world but the need to participate in the world that creates a 
particular manifestation of the artefact or faculty of reason. The plastic 
capacity for knowledge enables the individual to extend its identity and 
endure within a given environment.
Furthermore, the manifestation of a particular epistemology depends on its 
particular situation and does not have an independent status. Any 
description of the external world that we have is intrinsic to this very 
specific relationship. This relationship between subject and environment 
means neither can be understood independently. Identification with 
particular environments becomes a series of engaging and disengaging:
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To grow as a member of a society consists in becoming structurally coupled to it; to be 
structurally coupled to a society consists in having the structures that lead to the behavioral 
confirmation of that society. The spontaneous course of historical transformation of a society as a 
unity is towards its structural coupling to the medium in which it exists, and, therefore, toward the 
stabilization of the mechanisms that generate its defining relations through the stabilization of 
human conduct. But, the stabilization o f human conduct always entails a restriction o f creativity 
through the restrictions o f the individual human beings outside those prescribed by the society 
that they integrate [my italics]. (Maturana & Varela 1980, xxvii)
This synthesis of biology and epistemology, however, does not mean that 
Maturana reduces knowledge to a form of biological determinism. 
Maturana is a biologist and works in a field of science that is inescapably 
concerned with ontogenesis. Paradoxieally, he rejects the notions of 
puiposefulness and teleonomy. The existence of an organism and its 
ontogeny are not determinants in the same way as some essential final 
destination was a necessary final cause for Aristotle. Again he is more in 
agreement with Spinoza's assertion that existence precedes essence but can 
never determine what that will be, 'Substance is prior in nature to its 
affections' (Spinoza 1994, 76).
What this means, for Maturana, is that all kinds of societies are biologically 
viable without any being either necessary or desirable. The scientific search 
for the 'element of purpose' is concealed in the process of its descriptive 
narrative:
The notion of development arises, like the notion of purpose, in context of observation, and thus 
belongs to a different domain other than the autopoietic organisation of the living system. 
(Maturana & Varela 1980, 87)
Knowledge emerges from the individual's striving to become and maintain 
an integrity/integration. A particular epistemology, with a valid currency for 
that particular system, results from this endeavour.
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However, subjection to a social order is not about being trapped. It is a 
complex relationship between the individual and what is sacrificed in order 
to gain inclusion and status as a participant.^^
Therefore, it is an irony (as Judith Butler has argued) that in order to 'persist 
as oneself the subject consents to being subordinated. This sacrifice or 
indeed the process of subjection is not necessarily a condition of which the 
subject is aware, as Butler has asserted:
No subject can emerge without this attachment, formed in dependency, but no subject, in the 
course of its formation, can ever fully afford to fully 'see' it. (Butler 1997c, 8)
A self-creating subject acquires a psychobiological unity through its 
embodiment in a concrete situation. This makes it possible to retain 
individuality so long as it is integrated to a system that confers a legitimate 
identity.
In other words, what we have is the arrangement of natural and acquired 
features, with the latter made possible because of the non-detennining 
aspects of the former. This plasticity makes change possible, but only from 
a position outside of the system. Maturana insists on the necessary 
ontological/biological status of autopoiesis and its inseparability from the 
intellect. This is very different from Butler's suggestion:
That the body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from various acts 
which constitute its reality. This also suggests that reality fabricated as an interior essence, 
that very interiority is an effect and function of a decidedly public and social discourse.(Butler 
1997b, 173)
This argument can be applied to the nature of exclusion too. Those who are marginalized from specific cultures, 
or regarded as anti -  social are not 'invisible' 'voiceless' or lacking identity. The very existence of these 
categories/ terminologies confers an anti status that confirms the legitimacy of the regime from which they are 
rendered exiled. This problem was explored in the work of educationalist, Paulo Freire.
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Butler has made a distinction between the body surface and interiority, 
Maturana makes no such distinction and he resists the notion that the body is 
a malappropriated object for history. Everything is inscribed on the surface, 
and as the surface changes there is no lingering 'interiority'. There has been 
no distortion, no loss^ :^
This is why creativity, as the generation of novel social relations, always entails interactions 
operationally outside society, and necessarily leads to the generation, by the creative 
individuals, of models of conduct that either change the defining relations o f society as a 
particular social system, or separate from it. Social creativity is necessarily antisocial in the 
social domain in which it takes place. (Maturana & Varela 1980, xxvii)
The processes by which an individual is able to shape an identity within the 
system are the same processes that allow a break from it. The interaction 
with a particular system does not operate on an accumulative basis. The 
immediacy of ongoing comiections sustains what we are. This can just as 
easily disintegrate if not part of ritual and regular repletion. New rituals and 
new ceremonies throw open old enclosures and extend the original 
boundaries.
52 ■ludith Butler argues that gender does not emanate from human biology. This is in contrast to the latest genetic 
theories that attempt to ascribe all of humanity's traits to the genome. The separation of nature and culture in 
social science is important; this is not always true for natural science. Whereas Butler tries to explain 'nature' in 
terms of cultural influences, natural science explains human characteristics in physiological theories. Maturana 
insists that the biological and the cultural cannot be separated; life worlds that emerge are a product of the 
physical imagination. Although not determined by a non-teleological ontogeny. However, nature is still 
problematic for Butler in the sense that she wants to argue that the cultural and symbolic are somehow 
'naturalised' through the body. History disappears as the subject internalises the social order. The socialized body 
has no ontological status beyond a series of performances. The socialized or gendered body might not have a 
necessary ontological existence, but it does take on an ineffaceable form for the duration of its particular 
existence. Why is this important? Butler's theory fails to take into account the very real flesh sacrifice in the 
socialisation process. In her preface to the latest edition of Gender Trouble, [1999] she concedes that there is a 
problem between performativity and subjectivity. She tentatively puts forward the suggestion that this might be 
an area to be explored through the concept of psychic performativity [Butler 1999] I think this is an interesting 
issue not least because there is an important feature of Butler’s theory that gets in the way of understanding the 
complexity of sacrifice. The body, in both Foucault and Butler's theories is subjugated to the social order. This is 
a pessimistic view of the body as a malappropriated object. The internalisation of the cultural realm becomes a 
psychic extension of performativity, in effect also theorising a malappropriation of the psyche. The body 
naturalises the historical realm and removes it from the field of vision. The subject so 'naturalised' fails to be 
perceptive in the environment that provides sustenance for continuity.
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Autopoiesis is a theory that attempts to close the gap between the physical 
and the intellectual. Maturana and Varella have explored the subject from a 
biological perspective in a way that social and cultural theorist have often 
ignored, perhaps because of the academic separation of boundaries. What I 
will consider now is the effect this has on our understanding of the 
intellect.
3.4 Masters o f Morality: Jacques Ranciere and Intellectual Emancipation
Here then is the extent of that vaunted strength; its limits are veiy confined; and therefore, in 
games of combination no man after having trained himself with great application and long 
practice, will get beyond that degree of perfection allotted to him: this is the goal of his intellect. It 
is absolutely necessary that it should be so otherwise we should gradually go on to infinity. 
{Voltaire: The Ignorant Philosopher 1767)
We can thus dream of a society of the emancipated that would be a society of artists. Such a 
society would repudiate the division between those who know and those who don't between those 
who posses or don't posses the propeity of intelligence. {Ranciere: The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster 1991)
In his essay The Ignorant Philosopher, Voltaire was arguing that the 
intellect, just like the body, grew in maturity. The increment of knowledge 
was finite and there were no innate ideas, and what's more, it seemed to be 
self-limiting. He believed knowledge came from experience and was 
critical of scripture and religion. The work encapsulates the mood of 
enlightenment thinking. We are all born ignorant of ideas and intellectual 
progression is comparable with physical growth. There is no dualism 
between the intellect and the body. The idea of progress through education 
is a key to the enlightenment notion of emancipation.
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However, Voltaire and others like him presumed the intellect to be the 
natural property of the individual and limited within the private sphere of 
its own particular experience:
I imagined, that nature had given to every being a portion that is proper for him; and I thought 
those things which we could not attain, did not belong to us. (Voltaire 1767, 14)
This essay is the one of the earliest developmental philosophies in relation 
to intelligence. In it, Voltaire treats the intellect as a natural capacity for 
learning, with which people reach their natural limit. He argues that the 
’ordinary' individual, his example was a farm labourer, had not the 
inclination to ask perplexing questions about whether or not reason was a 
separate immortal substance. This proved that each person was adequately 
equipped with a 'proper portion.'
What Voltaire failed to do was to make any comparison between himself 
(the ignorant philosopher with an abundance of time) and the farm worker 
(consumed by his labour) .The absence of intellectual interest in the 
philosopher's quest, on behalf of the farmer, seemed evidence of a 'natural' 
condition in keeping with his requirements.
One of the effects of such thinking is the creation of a pedagogical illusion 
— the division of the intellect into the loiowledgeable and the ignorant. 
Any discipline that seeks to be genuinely innovative has to address this 
issue of intellectual identity.
Voltaire rejects the Platonic/Cartesian dualism of mind/body but retains Plato's notion that the good society is 
one in which everyone 'knows thyself. This is often mistaken to mean an inward journey of revelation and 
wisdom when in fact Plato was referring to the requirement for every individual to know their place in society to 
maintain order and to make it harmonious.
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Karl Marx was one of the earliest political and economic commentators on 
this conceptual flaw. Unlike Voltaire, Marx did recognise the predicament 
of the labourer so consumed with his daily commitments that the pursuit of 
'abstract' philosophical questions was not possible. But not because of what 
Voltaire had seen to be a limitation in the distribution of the intellect.
Rather it was due to the restriction on circumstances and time available for 
intellectual activity. However it was not simply that Marx believed that 
material conditions had to be altered in order to rectify this error:
The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, 
therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forget that 
it is men that change circumstances and that the educator himself needs educating (Marx &
Engels 1977, 28)
:
In other words Voltaire was just as uninformed and limited due to his 
circumstances as was his peasant farmer. This presents a more complex 
problem than merely creating the conditions for the intellectual 
emancipation for the unenlightened masses, what do we do about the 
unenlightened masters?
The political theorist Jacques Ranciere maintained that the transference of 
knowledge in western tradition has always been mobilised within a 
traditional hierarchy. What Voltaire presumed to be a natural distribution of 
intelligence, Ranciere argued, was in reality a highly-policed distribution of 
the intellect/sensibility. In an environment that demands the strict division 
of'specialist' areas through the classification of their constituent parts,
Ranciere sought to disclose the production of knowledge emerging from a 
less ordered terrain:
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Ranciere wrote books that eluded classification —  books that gave voice to the wild journals of 
artisans, to the daydreams of anonymous thinkers, to the worker poets and philosophers who 
devised emancipatory systems alone, in the semi real space/time of the scattered late night 
moments their work schedules allowed them. (Kirsten Ross in Ranciere 1991, viii)
By this practice, Ranciere liberated a realm that in turn becomes the basis 
for his politics of aesthetics. Karl Marx had argued that, 'the exclusive 
concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals, and its suppression 
in the broad mass which is bound up with this, is a consequence of the 
division of labour' (Marx & Engels 1977, 430).
In The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Ranciere argues that the appropriation of 
intelligence results from the division of the intellect into loiowledge and 
ignorance. Knowledge and ignorance are not natural but cultural 
conditions. However Ranciere goes beyond a strictly materialist 
understanding and focuses on 'anonymous thinkers'.
For Marx, 'the nature of individuals depends on the material conditions 
determining their production' (Marx & Engels 1977, 42). Individual 
consciousness being a consequence of life experience, 'life is not 
determined by, but consciousness by life' (1977, 47), which consciousness 
(in turn) is mis-recognised 'solely as their consciousness' (1977, 47). This 
was the core of Marx's critique of Hegelian idealism.
Nevertheless, Ranciere's archive of 'worker poets' is a testimony to life 
grasped beyond the immediate experience of material circumstances.
Even if, ultimately, those circumstance provide the substance for a 
transcendent aesthetic. A worker might, for example, write poetry about his 
work experience in time salvaged between work and rest.
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Marx focused on the division between mental and manual labour. Hence, 
his was a critique of the exclusivity of the artistic/intellectual realm, which 
was to provide the basic formulation of research questions within classical 
social theory. Ranciere, on the other hand, sought to disclose the division of 
the intellect into Icnowing and ignorant as the pedagogical myth at the heart 
of education.
Ranciere explored the egalitarianism of the intellect in a very practical way. 
Equality was his starting position not a hypo-theoretical aim. Although not 
directly challenging the 'new' sociology he nonetheless presented an 
interesting counter-perspective. His was a voice that offset modern 
sociology. Ranciere took the contemporary credo of sociology, inequality, 
and questioned its status as an analytical concept and future aspiration. 
Ranci ere's doctrine was one of intellectual emancipation, rising from the 
desecrated epitaph on the tomb of his protagonist Joseph Jacotot; "/ believe 
that God created the human soul capable o f leading itself by itself and 
without a master. " Genuine reform can only take place when we examine 
what it is to know as well as what it means to be ignorant.
Ranciere's basic hypothesis is that, if unrecognised, any given system will 
continually effect its own reproduction and, furthermore, through this very 
reproduction the system will itself create and structure mis-recognition. 
These conditions are the basis for the classical pedagogical myth — that it 
is the task of the teacher to transmit knowledge. Giving authority to a 
pedagogical system that rests on the absolute condition of an inequality 
between the possessors of knowledge and the ignorance of those who do 
not posses it.
142
I
Ranciere constructed a parallel body of knowledge in the form of an 
archive of the aesthetic creativity of marginalized manual workers. 
Although he never formalised a critique of contemporary sociology his 
observations and attention to these margins were a critical departure from 
the more formalised theories within social science that were, Ranciere 
believed, committed to the endless rediscovery of inequality;
Ranciere's critique of the educational theories of Bourdieu, Althusser and Milner shows them to 
have at least one thing in common: a lesson in inequality. Each, that is, by beginning with 
inequality, proves it, and by proving it, in the end, is obliged to rediscover it again and again. 
Whether school is seen as the reproduction of inequality (Bourdieu) or as the potential 
instrument for the reduction of inequality (Savary) the effect is the same: that of erecting and 
maintaining the distance separating a future reconciliation from a present inequality, a 
knowledge in the offing from today's intellectual impoverishment — a distance discursively 
invented and renewed so that it may never be abolished. The poor stay in their place.
(Ranciere 1991, xix)
If equality is always theorised as an objective it has a tendency to become 
conceptualised within a utopian frame, in which it then historically and 
psychologically becomes an aspiration. Those social theorists who 
demonstrate the existence of inequality and try to demonstrate the means 
for its elimination are caught in a cycle of objectifying inequality. There 
exists a methodological blind spot and they cannot perceive that their 
efforts are part of the process that erodes what is being sought.
Ranciere works from the assumption that equality is the reality and that 
inequality is created within particular cultural circumstances in which the 
intellect is policed.
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Ranciere refers to this process as the 'Distribution of the Sensible' an 
important concept of how divisions and boundaries that define the visible 
and audible of a particular politico-aesthetic regime. This is the basis for 
Ranciere's claim for the universal status of political equality. Crucial to the 
'distribution of the sensible' is the aesthetic realm of work and/or art. Here 
is Ranciere responding to a question about the 'factory of the sensible' and 
whether universal human activity is inclusive of artistic practices:
The first possible meaning of the notion of a 'factory of the sensible' is the formation of a shared 
sensible world, a common habitat, by the weaving together of a plurality o f human activities. 
However, the idea of a 'distribution of the sensible' implies something more. A 'common' world 
is never simply an ethos, a shared abode that results from the sedimentation of a certain number 
of intertwined acts. It is always a polemical distribution of modes of being and 'occupations' in a 
space of possibilities. It is from this perspective that it is possible to raise the question of the 
relationship between the 'ordinariness' of work and artistic 'exceptionality'. (Ranciere 2004, 42)
Therefore, crucially, the distribution of the sensible is not merely an 
aggregate of separate skills. It is the division and limitation of available 
space. The limitation comes from the absence of time to do otherwise and 
not some predestined order. This was similar to the Platonic principle of a
Police or Police Order, a specific concept of Ranciere's in relation to a system of co-ordinates that defines the 
'borders between the visible and the invisible' as the 'law that determines the distribution of parts and roles in a 
community as well as its forms of exclusion.' (Ranciere The Politics o f Aesthetics Continuum2004, 89)
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This would seem to suggest that Ranciere is more practical or 'hands-on' 
but, in fact, he takes the need for theorising the problems of perception as a 
priority and he does so by deploying a political matrix of aesthetics. His 
assimilation of intellectual history has meant that he has included what 
traditional and legitimate schools of philosophy and sociology has left out 
— the almost imperceptible, inaudible and invisible aesthetic, 'policed'^"  ^at 
the political margins.
,:ï
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well-organised community; in that each person only does the one thing that 
they were destined to do by their nature (Ranciere 2004, 42).
What happens to the potential for creativity when appropriated in such a 
manner? Ranciere implies, and his archive demonstrates, that individuals 
have the capacity to create space beyond the formal boundaries of 
knowledge, deploying imagination/creativity not formally allocated to them 
through the normal channels of'intellectual distribution'.
Critical of philosophy that has attempted to 'speak for others', Ranciere 
developed a methodology of inclusion, as opposed to the patronage of 
being 'spoken up for'. This is very different in nature and concept from 
Browning's vision of global morality disseminated through educational 
institutions. Ranciere opts for the truly democratic vision of the intellect, 
one that does not presume the need to 'instruct' and is more inclined toward 
availability of information and the power of example. This concept of the 
intellect is very much like Schleiermacher's concept of religion, in that it is 
the capacity to 'become' who we are in the world. However, although 
Ranciere is making a case for the existence of intellectual activity beyond 
the controlled channels of existing regimes of loiowledge, he nonetheless 
still incoiporates a notion of human striving that is compatible with 
enlightenment optimism.
In some ways Ranciere's position is close to that of Voltaire who 
recognised the tension between policed regiments of truth (religious and 
ecclesiastical bodies) and those who explored the dangerous/alternative 
realms beyond the jurisdiction of the church:
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Whoever seeks after truth will run the risk of being persecuted. Must we remain idle in 
darkness? Or must we light a flambeau, at which envy and calumny will rekindle their torches? 
For my part, I think the truth should abstain from taking nourishment, lest we should be 
poisoned. (Voltaire 1767, 122)
3.5 Conclusion: The Paradox o f Cultural Work
Browning worked with a concept of'cultural work' as a means for 
restructuring the ethics of modern-day family life. Like many 
educationalists, he has a belief that the schooling system can provide the 
basis for the dissemination of the kind of citizenship that would make our 
societies a better place. The question is: Can we bring about change in the 
quality of life in our societies by using educational institutions as a means 
for creating morally responsible citizens, if it really is the case that these 
institutions are contributing to the alienation of individuals from any real 
sense of being valued?
We live in a society which believes that tlirough education everyone has 
the opportunity to improve his or her circumstances through a meritorious 
education system. While sociologists like Bourdieu have produced volumes 
on the notion of'cultural capital', there remains some disagreement as to 
whether education really functions as a route to an egalitarian culture and a 
means of integration, or functions as a barrier that isolates and excludes a 
large section of the population:
There is no such thing as a neutral educational process. Education either functions as an 
instrument that is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the 
present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes ’the practice of the freedom.' The 
means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to 
participate in the transformation of their world. The development of an educational 
methodology that facilitates this process will inevitably lead to tension and conflict within our 
society. (Friere 1993, 16)
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In his Pedagogy o f the Oppressed, Paulo Freire starts with the premise that 
the teacher/pupil relationship erodes the integrity of those designated 
ignorant; 'people educate each other through the mediation of the world.' 
The teacher/student relationship is a narrative one and the teacher is always 
the narrator. Education, as a result is suffering from 'narration sickness'.
The teacher talks about reality as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalized, and 
predictable. Or else he expounds on a topic completely alien to the existential experience of his 
students. His task is to 'fill' the students with the contents of his narration — contents that^are 
detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them 
significance. (Freire 1993, 52)
This reduces education to a system whereby knowledge is deposited into 
receptacles or containers, the pupils who come to the teacher empty and 
waiting to be filled through (what Freire criticised as) the 'banking' system 
of education in which pupils are passive receivers of knowledge instead of 
co-creators.
In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider 
themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider know nothing. Projecting an 
absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education 
and knowledge as a process of enquiry. The teacher presents himself to his students as their 
necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence. 
(Freire 1993, 53)
Freire argued that the liberation of education from the banlcing system must 
begin with the confrontation of this pedagogical relationship.
The more a person works at storing a deposit of facts and infoimation that 
has no direct relationship to the existential experiences of their own lives 
the less they become capable of using their own inherent thinking skills.
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What is clear from the arguments put forward by all of the theorists in this 
chapter is that knowledge is not something external, abstract and capable of 
being acquired and disseminated by the few. The significance of this is that 
morality, the loiowledge of good and bad, is not external to lived 
experience. Ihde and Haraway wrote about technologies of subjectivity and 
how epistemologies and ethics emerge from work and experience. The 
production of this subjectivity involves complex techniques and strategies. 
The development of character is tied to response to environment, rather 
than to obedience to external rules. On the other hand, Ranciere 
demonstrated through his work that the practice and production of art can 
create alternative subjectivities and sensibilities within the division of the 
intellect.
What is common to these theorists is the sense that knowledge does not 
necessarily follow from a logical process of reason gathering and 
accumulating external facts, as in a modernist perspective. In their works 
they raise very clearly the relationship between ontology and epistemology. 
In the next chapter, I develop the argument that the methodological 
assumptions of modernity are incompatible with those of postmodernity -  
and that the best way forward for practical theology is to develop a 
methodological approach which examines the image of the knowing 
subject. It will then be possible to examine more fully the relationship 
between technology, perception, immediate needs and experience.
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Part Two
NEW SKIN FOR NEW CEREMONIES
Once one steps out what's been thought before, once one ventures outside what is familiar and 
reassuring, once one has to invent new concepts for unknown lands, then methods and moral 
systems break down and thinking becomes, as Foucault puts it, a 'perilous act', a violence whose 
first victim is oneself. (Deleuze 1995, 103)
This thesis began by questioning the intellectual discomfort at the core of 
practical theology's response to postmodernism's new epistemologies and 
corresponding ontology. Contemporary practical theology is a discipline 
that has emerged in its present form from the enlightenment tradition. As 
part of its growth it has assimilated the methods of contemporaiy social 
science.
This has resulted in the incorporation of a particular concept of humanity 
and corresponding theories of laiowledge. Having relied substantially on 
the social sciences, practical theology has been keen to defend the 
principles that have lent it credibility as a discrete academic discipline. The 
empirical methods of the social sciences have been valued because of the 
professional status that accompanies them.
In contrast, I have argued that this has resulted in the increasing 
secularisation of practical theology as some of its practitioners become 
increasingly self-conscious and apologetic about the use of religious and 
theological terminology.
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Having developed and maintained its academic standing on a diet of such 
methods, practical theology has relinquished some of its more traditional 
criteria, ie\ theological terminology, scripture and religion. This makes it 
difficult for practical theology to distinguish its own rationale from those of 
the disciplines it depends upon.
As a result, practical theology may be in danger of marginalizing a concept 
of the Divine and replacing this with an increasingly secular remit that 
narrows its activity to the construction and subsequent application of moral 
theory. Examples of this are found in the work of Don Browning (2003) 
One of the consequences of pursuing moral science as the legitimating 
principle for practical theology as a discipline is that it relies on social 
science as the means for distinguishing between truth and moral certainty.
That practical theology continues to distance its organising principles from 
religious concepts such as spirit is evident in the work of Gordon Lynch. 
He has specialized in the sociology of religion and popular culture. Studies 
such as Understanding Theology and Popular Culture (Lynch 2005) 
increasingly lean toward the legitimating framework of the modern 
academy. This can result in a reluctance to leave the safe scaffolding of 
modernity and authentically explore postmodernism.
151
In other words by assimilating the methods of the social sciences, practical 
theology inherits the same problems concerning value judgments and truth 
statements — without the default position of religious authority. Having 
distanced itself from the more traditional realms, practical theology 
struggles to indemnify its losses.
I have explored some of practical theology's response to postmodernism, 
primarily through the work of Elaine Graham and Friedrich Schweitzer. 
Practical theology has tried to maintain continuity in what has been 
theorised as a 'transition' between modernity and postmodernity. Graham 
and Schweitzer represent a particular theoretical approach that seeks to 
sustain elements of a modern ontology and theory of knowledge, while 
attempting to make this compatible with selective aspects of 
postmodernism.
The working principle of these approaches seems to be to treat the present 
stage as an intermediary crisis in which the solution is to seek, retain and 
assimilate the most desired features of modernity and postmodernity. 
Theories of'high modernity' or 'extended modernity' it was argued, have 
led to a 'mend and make do' reconfiguration of modernity and a mis- 
recognition of postmodernity which is then deemed to be the cause of 
dysfunction within modernity. This diverts intellectual resources away 
from what should be practical theology's fundamental act of theorising.
In its response to postmodernism practical theology has limited its potential 
for developing new approaches and pedagogical strategies.
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Practical theologians, like Don Browning, seek to find the correct moral 
temperament and application for contemporary culture. They do so as 
means of making practical theology itself contemporaneous, but this can 
have the undesired effect of reducing practical theology to a 'moral
science'.
I have also explored the nature of reason and our belief about intellectual 
systems. The search for a 'practical wisdom' is based on a particular mode 
of intellectualism, the master/pupil dichotomy of teacher/learner, 
characteristic of the modern university.
This problem is disclosed by the work of theorists who resist the 
intellectual angst of tiying to reconcile modernity with postmodernity. 
Instead, they explore alternative ontological theories and epistemological 
methods. Don Ihde, for example, rejects the origin myths of the 
enlightenment that privilege the notion of foundational and progressive 
intellectual histories (as typified in the work of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing 
1729-81).
The Santiago Thesis, Autopoiesis, explored an alternative relationship 
between ontology and epistemology. Maturana and Varella's theory renders 
problematic the concept of knowledge as a linear and progressive, or 
unfolding, historical movement. In such theories, intellectual heritage 
emanates from established and documented sources with an authentic 
origin or foundation.
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In such a model of knowledge, in which the established 'roots' provide a 
core principle, the source of truth is external. Knowledge is objective, 
enabling intellectual histories to be established as the authoritative route for 
co-opted membership into academic disciplines. Haraway, Ihde, Maturana, 
and Varella all demonstrated alternatives in their theories of embodied 
knowledge. Ihde, who rejects the concept of intellectual heritage, provided 
insight into the effect of technology on perception. Haraway's studies went 
some way to explaining how some intellectual strands are constructed and 
how individuals become initiated into intellectual cultures. Maturana and 
Varella provided a biological basis for the construction of loiowledge 
without reducing it to a biologically determined teleology. Autopoiesis 
makes a substantial contribution to the case for embodied knowledge that 
avoids reducing culturally generated inequalities to biological 
determinants.
Accepting the limits of a foundational model of knowledge leaves us with 
the difficulty of explaining how it is that we have the perception of 
loiowledge as a universal and objective realm that we somehow 'acquire' as 
individuals. Knowledge as a publicly available entity absorbed by the 
private individual is the rationale that undeipins a meritorious education 
system. French philosopher Jacques Ranciere argued that the division of 
the intellect into the loiower and the ignorant is a flawed model of 
knowledge, which is nonetheless prevalent in western culture.^^
This is a crucial issue for Ranciere who believes that contemporary sociology is obsessive about 
exposing inequality but fails to recognise that equality is not a thing to be achieved tlirough the 
widening of access to knowledge. We first have to understand that there are conceptual problems in 
the ideological distribution of the intellect. Policies of inclusion are not in themselves going to resolve 
this problem. Ranciere demonstrated this in his eclectic selection of diaries h orn workers who 
otherwise had no connection to the formal production of knowledge.
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If laiowledge is not the result of reason gathering and accumulating 
external facts, how do we explain the persistence of the belief that it is? 
How do we account for the perception that laiowledge is a private 
achievement?^^
This relationship between ontology and epistemology is critical to an 
understanding of the problems of methodology in practical theology. The 
incompatibility of two conceptual systems, modernity and postmodernity, 
can produce inconsistency and inlierent wealaiesses in method if the 
approach we take is either to try and correlate the two, or to try and work 
with a model of postmodernism as the 'extended' stage of modernity. If 
modernity is the persistent 'default position' then postmodernism remains 
concealed within an unsympathetic conceptual regime.
I will suggest here that the best way of resolving these issues in relation to 
practical theology is to examine the image of the knowing subject, 
constructed from a postmodernist perspective which demonstrates the 
relationship between technology, perceptions, immediate needs and 
experience. This approach provides an alternative theory of being and 
knowing. However, it is crucial to understand that this is not the same as 
saying that knowledge is merely the internal fiction of subjective 
experience.
This is certainly evident in our pedagogical methods. In schools and universities, we teach modules, 
in spite of attempts to introduce 'creative learning' and we teach according to a banking system of 
knowledge.
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A key criticism of post-modern philosophy is that it fails to replace the 
certainty of truth — i.e. ; the prevailing modern concept of truth being an 
objective reality/^ Truth as an objective reality is arguably a philosophical 
creation. Reason as the tool, which we deploy to discern these truths, is a 
cultural artefact built upon the craft and skill of recognition.^^
In the second part of this thesis, I will explore different approaches to 
morality and 'truth'. It will be argued that people and their direct life 
experiences are responsible for a constitutive ethics that is part of the 
process of individuation. In exploring the case for a creative postmodern 
practical theology, I will suggest an understanding of ethics as a living 
system. One that is inclusive and not prescriptive.
Friedrich Schweitzer expressed one of the doubts within contemporary 
theory, which is that practical theology will somehow disband if it cannot 
justify its existence within an increasingly secular and postmodern 
s o c ie ty .I  hope to demonstrate that practical theology is a discipline that 
can engage positively in the understanding of living, relational and ethical 
systems without sacrificing concepts of grace or spirituality.
Martin Heidegger argued that modern philosophy, beginning with Aristotle and Plato, is synonymous with the 
quest for 'truth' and 'first principles.' Not all philosophy retains this concept of truth as an organising principle, 
and Heidegger was one of the first philosophers to suggest that we try to imagine what philosophy was like 
beyond the modern. One of the persistent problems for Christian theology, in relation to postmodernism is that it 
has for centuries been indelibly marked by modern philosophy. (From Aquinas/Aristotle to contemporary remixes 
i.e. Browning/Aristotle,)
What Heidegger referred to as the predisposition or tuning of the individual to particular systems of thought. Its 
maintenance requires an intellectualism that mirrors it.
This sentiment is expressed in other disciplines too. It is found in the 'death of or 'end of arguments put forward 
by critics, ie\ the death of the novel, the end of narrative, the end of representation etc.
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Just as knowledge is the artefact of actual living systems, it is also possible 
to understand ethical existences as part of authentic engagement with the 
world. Knowledge and ethics are in constant flux. Rather than see this as a 
constant threat of relativism, we could view it as the ability to be 
responsive, rigorous and creative in our relationships with others.
I shall also argue that, in challenging the intellectualism within 
contemporary practical theology, new pedagogical strategies can be 
suggested for the future of practical theology within the post-modern 
university.
I will argue, in the second part of this thesis that practical theology does not 
have to give up an empirical methodology in order to engage in a 
contemporary culture. I will suggest that it is possible to develop an 
approach in which active engagement can be undertaken in conjunction 
with the challenging of an existing image of the world that has been created 
through the pre-conceptions embedded in our thinking.
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Chapter 4
GILLES DELEUZE: METAPHYSICS AND THE GENERATIVE SPIRIT
Then I discovered how much the human world of my time had become the enemy of spirit and 
therefore of its own light and peace. (Santayana, 1986, 540)
The works of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and his later 
collaboration with psychiatrist Felix Guattari provide us with a philosophy 
that can offer insights into how practical theology may expand into 
genuinely new space and avoid the narrowing of its application to the 
social science of moral theory. So, instead of being predominantly in 
pursuit of'practical wisdom', it takes responsibility for its part in creating 
an intellectual culture that recognises the potential for generative grace.
The concept of spirit has become less popular in recent times. It is not 
being advocated here that we return to the notion of spirit as a separate or 
disembodied substance. It will be viewed as part of the vital principle of 
life, that part responsible for the creative imagination enabling us to engage 
intuitively with our environment.
The concept of spirit explored here is that it is a finite and embodied aspect 
of being which nonetheless transcends its particular historical existence. It 
is an essential part of our capacity both to engage in history yet also to be 
beyond history.
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Metaphysics has for some time been keenly avoided by practical 
theologians. A key conclusion of this thesis will be that the work of 
theorists such as Deleuze, by questioning traditional empiricism, can help 
us review the purpose of metaphysics for practical theology. Deleuze was 
sceptical of the traditional view of the philosopher as an individual who 
devotes a life to the pursuit of truth as a 'pure' objective. He also 
challenged the ideological basis of philosophy, arguing that its close 
relation with the state compromised it:
The rational foundation of order, of course: philosophers have traditionally been employees of 
the State. The collusion between philosophy and the state was most explicitly enacted in the 
first decade of the nineteenth century with the foundation of the University of Berlin, which was 
to become the model for higher learning throughout Europe and the United States. The goal laid 
out for it by Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on proposals by Fichte and Schleiermacher) was the 
"spiritual and moral training, of the nation" to be achieved by "deriving everything from a first 
principle" (truth), by "relating everything to an ideal" (justice), and by "unifying this principle 
and this ideal in a single Idea" (the State) The end product would be a "fully legitimated subject 
of knowledge and society" each mind an analogously organised mini-State morally unified in 
the supermind of the State. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996, xii)''^
The 'traditional' philosopher aspires to the discovery of 'truth' as a guiding 
principle, but for Deleuze thinking, if it is genuine, is a confrontation with 
prevailing systems of thought. For the most part he believed that what is 
taken to be thinking is really only the endless repetition of the same pattern 
of thought.^ ^
60 In addition, this change brought about the increased specialisations o f subjects —  the aim to create 
discrete disciplines with 'experts' in diverse fields o f knowledge. Although I believe Deleuze to be 
correct about the relationship between the State and moral education I think in the case o f 
Schleiermacher (who in fact had difficulty with some o f  Fichte’s ideas) it could only be argued that his 
collaboration with the State came at a later period in his working life and coincided with his senior 
position within education. Schleiermacher's earlier works, which he never reneged on, were critical o f 
both state and church. A more contemporary example o f this relationship between the official state 
apparatus and moral theory would be Browning who advocates the use o f cultural apparatus for the 
dissemination o f  moral education.
Deleuze believed that this particular phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the cliché, is an effect 
that our senses are dulled to in normal day to day thinking. This same idea can find expression in 
literary form (Samuel Becket) and film (David Lynch). Sentimentality is an emotional equivalent.
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This Deluzean concept of thinking as an activity with the potential to 
evolve and escape from the endless cul-de-sac of repetition will be looked 
at in this chapter.
Knowledge as part of what Deleuze described as immanence is more 
inclusive than the theory of knowledge as an immutable structure. Its 
immediacy does not make it any less effective, and it does not reduce it to 
an internal fiction. Knowledge, when understood as the world folded into 
the consciousness of living systems, is still knowledge borne of an 
encounter with the world. It is still therefore empirical:
Leibniz's most famous proposition is that every soul or subject (monad) is completely closed, 
windowless and doorless, and contains the whole world in its darkest depths, while also 
illuminating some little portion of that world, each monad, a different portion. So the world is 
enfolded in each soul, but differently, because each illuminates only one little aspect of the 
overall folding. (Deleuze 1995, 157)
This alludes to the existence of a world that we can only ever hope to share 
knowledge of in small portions; but that sharing affirms our existence as 
ethical beings. We each preside over an individuation process that is 
creative, with each soul contributing to a unique aesthetic that is not static, 
but that is in a constant state of generation and reformation.
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4.1 Living Systems o f Thought
A philosopher worthy of the name has never said but one thing. (Bergson 1911, 813)
As a philosopher, Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) initiated his career in 
traditional fashion, the perceived wisdom being that no one can 'do' 
philosophy until well versed in the classical traditions. However, although 
Deleuze would sustain a lifelong interest in the 'giants' of philosophy who 
had so distinctively marked the history of western thought, he did not 
concede to the notion that these works were closed canons. Influenced by 
Henri Bergson (1859-1941),^^ Deleuze regarded the ideas of philosophers 
as still potent 'constellations' of thought rather than dead lines of history. 
He rejected the notion that progress takes place when new advancements 
supersede outmoded knowledge.
Discarding this assumption about the status of loiowledge Deleuze resisted 
locating his work on a linear historical map of ideas. He created instead a 
space that is 'less a dialogue among the dead, but an interstellar 
conversation, between very irregular stars, whose different becomings form 
a mobile bloc which it would be a case of capturing' (Deleuze & Parnet 
2002, 16). He did not seek to merely understand or interpret the work of 
other philosophers; he sought to attach their concepts to his own 
philosophical practice.
Deleuze was responsible for reviving interest in Bergson when he published Bergsonism  in 1966. 
Bergson was famous for his distinction between objective/external perception and intuition.
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In other words, his interest in classical philosophy was not merely in the 
production of monographic interpretations, but in the creation of living 
systems of thought (constellations). He followed the simple Bergonsonian 
principle, that the greatest of philosophers would generate a single idea. He 
then made this the working principle that was to underpin his synthesis of 
ideas. The chronology of philosophical ideas was less important to him 
than was the transmutability of modes of thought. His unique way of 
approaching the work of other philosophers enabled him to establish a 
working relationship with their ideas as 'philosophy that crosscuts its 
history without being confused with it' (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, 59).
Deleuze handled the ideas of philosophers as conceptual tools that could be 
bonded with his own work to achieve particular philosophical tasks. John 
Marks refers to this as the creation of a new authorial space:
Deleuze seeks to work with other thinkers and artists so that his own voice becomes indistinct.
In this way, he creates a zone of indiscernability between himself and the authors with whom he 
works. (Marks 1998, 25)
Deleuze was also prepared to work with intellectual aspects of 
philosophical systems that traditional philosophy had bypassed in favour of 
the more conventional elements of particular systems of thought.
This approach created philosophical fusions; his work would become: 
Deleuze/Hume (radical empiricism), Deleuze/Bergson (empirical 
imagination), and Deleuze/Spinoza (immanence) -  to identify just a few.
® Heidegger also argued that we could not fully understand philosophy through 'historical definitions', 
the history o f thought is not the same as philosophy. More important were the remnants o f 
philosophical thought that we could engage with. However, Deleuze explores further than Heidegger 
in examining the image o f thought and not just the ideas o f philosophy.
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Other authors, alive or dead, became possible theory partners and helped 
contribute to a rich fabric of concepts. These may be engaged and 
recomposed, depending on the purpose and emphasis of the theoretical 
task. This was a radical departure from treating the various philosophies as 
interesting, possibly relevant, but nonetheless dormant systems of thought.
Deleuze became a vital energy that facilitated the embodiment and 
reconstitution of philosophical notions from very diverse sources. His 
innovative reworking of philosophical concepts meant that they would 
never be the same as the original, but would emerge capable of performing 
new tasks in different contexts. So, for example, it is not a translation or 
interpretation of any particular philosopher's work he produced, but a 
transformation of what was already contained within the work. Deleuze's 
polytonality or 'zones of continuous variation' were about finding 
illuminations in the text that were, 'not merely wilfully contrary readings, 
they rather find something new in already existing texts.' (Marks 1998, 25)
He never sought to be a 'specialist' or an 'expert' in any particular 
philosopher. His tendency to move outside of the classical philosophical 
domain resulted in serial combinations with unusual modes of thought that 
produced writings on cinema, art and literature,*''^
Some examples of these are his writings on Proust (Proust and Signs 1972), Kaflca (Kaflca; Toward a Minor 
Literature. 1986) and Francis Bacon (Francis Bacon: logique de la sensation 1981). Most significant was his work 
on cinema — which was not a philosophy of cinema but the incoiporation of cinematograpiiy as a tool for 
exploring time and movement, what Bergson termed duration. (Cinema 1 : The Movement Image 1986, Cinema 
2; The Time Image 1989)
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Deleuze has also taken key concepts from philosophers who have not 
always been cast centre stage in the history of philosophy and even when 
he is working with 'giants', he presents new insights into their key notions. 
For example, philosophers like David Hume (1711 - 76), usually 
categorised as a traditional empiricist, can be freed from the historical 
truisms with which they have become associated.
While Hume is generally recognised as being one of the great empirical 
philosophers, less attention is paid to the psychological understanding of 
the subject that is inherent in his work (Hume himself having declared that 
self-identity was an illusion or 'bundle of perceptions'). Deleuze redirected 
attention from Hume's philosophical scepticism (eg: the flaws of induction) 
to focus on the positive aspects of the imagination and its function in 
constructing images of the self and the world. He rejected the notion of 
empiricism that has long been associated with Hume and concentrated on 
the relation between the imagination and the construction of the subject.
Put simply Hume's 'scepticism' becomes problematic through the 
weakening of scientific predictability and generalization when the 
individual is perceived as an independent observer of the world:
Viewed from this perspective, the textbook definition of empiricism, which attributes to 
experience the origin and the source of validity of all possible knowledge, is, in fact, an answer 
to the question. Strictly speaking, the definition is not even plausible, because, despite what the 
definition implies, knowledge does not represent the primary concern for the empiricist, nor 
does experience play the kind of constitutive role that textbooks assign to it. Knowledge is not 
primary. (Deleuze 1991, 5)
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According to Deleuze, Hume had replaced the primacy of laiowledge with 
belief. The association made between the relations of things in the 
imagination was highly problematic for a traditional empirical philosophy 
in its pursuit of truth and laiowledge.
Deleuze, on the other hand, realized that Hume's philosophy might have 
exposed the weakness of'common sense’ thinking but that it nonetheless 
opened new realms in enabling us to understand the relationship between 
subject and world. Instead of taking Hume's arguments to be a negation or 
a weakening of empiricism Deleuze portrays traditional empiricism as 
problematic. Traditional empiricism divides the world into observers and 
observed. This bifurcation of subject and object is challenged by inverting 
the traditional view and postulating a subject immersed in the world:
It follows, argues Deleuze, that empiricism is not a philosophy of the senses but a philosophy of 
the imagination, and the statement that "all ideas are derived from impressions" is not meant to 
enshrine representational ism but is rather a regulative principle meant to keep us within the 
straight and narrow of the atomists principle of difference.. .From a host of different 
perceptions, a subject is born inside the given, and the imagination is transformed into a faculty  
[my italics]. (Deleuze 1991, 8)
Nonetheless it is difficult to get beyond the epistemological anxiety that 
Hume's philosophy creates, as Boundas noted:
But ultimately, Deleuze-Hume cannot prevent a paradox from being inscribed in the heart of 
empiricism: the same critique which disciplines the mind and prompts it to reject the fictions of 
the imagination is also the critique responsible for leading the mind to the biggest of all fictions 
—  Subject, World and God —  and for turning these fictions into "incorrigible," constitutive 
ideas. (Deleuze 1991, 9)
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It has been observed by Boundas that Deleuze never returns to Hume after 
this early period. However, the absorption of this alternative reading of 
Hume's work in Empiricism, and Subjectivity is the hallmark present in 
every aspect of his work thereafter. What is important about this seminal 
work is both that it demonstrates the development of the mechanisms used 
to challenge how philosophy was traditionally understood, but that it also 
becomes the basis for Deluzean ontology.
Philosophy takes on new dimensions that are incompatible with a rigid 
traditionalist way of thinking. Evidence of the enduring influence that 
Hume's work had on Deleuze is found in the posthumous publication of 
some of his later work, Pure Immanence (2001). In this Deleuze returns to 
the theme in an essay entitled The Meaning o f Empiricism:
The history of philosophy has more or less absorbed, more or less digested, empiricism. It has 
defined empiricism as the reverse of rationalism; Is there or is there not in ideas something that 
is not in the senses or the sensible? It has made of empiricism a critique of innateness, of the a 
priori. But empiricism has always harboured other secrets. And it is they that David Hume 
pushes the furthest and fully illuminates in his extremely difficult and subtle work.... His 
empiricism is a sort of science-fiction universe avant la letter. As in science fiction, one has the 
impression of a fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the presentiment that this 
world is already ours, and those creatures ourselves, (Deleuze 2001, 35)
It is this process of revisiting texts and reinvigorating them with new 
energy 'to get things moving again' that makes Deleuze such a radical 
thinker. The central idea, the vital spark, of a philosopher's work remains 
recognisable but, stripped of its historicity, it becomes a transmutable 
concept. Rather than approach philosophy as the sequential unfolding of 
systems of thought he would arrange the key concepts into an assemblage
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of contemporary philosophical tools.D orm ant ideas are given new life.
As in the case of Hume, something already there (but concealed) becomes 
illuminated.
This is in part because Deleuze argued that all thought belongs to a wider 
ongoing movement. What is selected and what gets left behind makes all 
the difference to the meaning and energy that is present in a body of work. 
For example, while Newton's mechanical universe emerged as an important 
body of knowledge, his interest in the more 'whimsical' science of alchemy 
was set aside by later generations.
Deleuze may not necessarily be accepting of all that philosophers have 
written, but he is nonetheless interested in all the aspects that have 
contributed to their conceptual 'signatures'. Perfection is not a necessary 
attribute of valuable thinking. Deleuze does not expend energy on 
searching for weaknesses and flaws in order to negate the work of other 
philosophers. Rather he regards imperfection as a valid aspect of an 
author's working process. This is a bit like accepting that while scaffolding 
was necessary for the construction of some great edifice, it is no longer 
essential to the finished product:
When you admire someone you do not pick and choose; you may like this book better than any 
other one, but you never the less take them as a whole, because you see that some element that 
seems less convincing than others is an absolutely essential step in his exploration, his alchemy, 
and that he wouldn't have reached the new revelation you find so astonishing if he hadn't 
followed the path on which you hadn't initially seen the need for this or that detour.
(Deleuze 1995, 85)
This notion o f vitalism comes from Bergson who influenced Deleuze with his theory o f philosophy as 
a constellation o f thought, as opposed to the linear deposit o f  intellectual history.
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Paradoxically, Deleuze was seldom interested in the historical and 
biographical details of individual philosophers. Working to synthesize their 
conceptual ’signatures', separating them from 'personality' and historicity, 
was a technique that became formalized as an aspect of his ontological 
theory. He makes specific reference to this process in his joint publication 
with Felix Guattari: What is Philosophy (Deleuze & Guattari 1994).
His work with Guattari was also key to his developing an authorial 
technique that was itself the ideal medium for his ontological and 
epistemological theoiy, clarified and refined in a notion of dispersed 
enunciation and the belief that philosophers enfolded 'conceptual personae':
The conceptual persona is not the philosopher's representative but, rather, the reverse: the 
philosopher is only the envelope of his principle conceptual persona and of all the other 
personae who are the intercessors {intercesseurs), the real subjects of his philosophy.
Conceptual personae are the philosopher's "heteronyms," and the philosopher's name is the 
simple pseudonym of his personae. I am no longer myself but thought's aptitude for finding 
itself and spreading across a plane that passes through me at several places. The philosopher is 
the idiosyncrasy of his conceptual personae. The destiny of the philosopher is to become his 
conceptual persona or personae, at the same time that these personae themselves become 
something other than what they are historically, mythologically, or commonly (the Socrates of 
Plato, the Dionysus of Nietzsche, the Idiot of Nicholas of Cusa).
(Deleuze & Guattari 1994, 64)*^ ^
Deleuze would describe concepts as 'signed', for example Descartes' cogito, 
or Kant's transcendental. However, that the individual philosopher could be 
associated with signature concepts did not mean that ideas were the 
exclusive intellectual property of one voice. Though a conceptual persona 
represents the manifestation of a particular intensity of thought. It does not 
have a single significance.
65 This notion o f dispersed enunciation avoids slipping into the Hegelian vortex o f idealism; Deleuze 
combines his theory o f  enunciation with the Bergonsonian concept o f Duration and Matter. All ideas 
therefore have their origin in matter and all require reconstruction tlu ough matter. In other words spirit 
and body were both finite, there is no infinite unfolding o f the spirit through history.
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The political activities that led to the 1968 student uprisings had an impact on both Deleuze and Guattari. 
Guattari was a pupil and analysand of Jacques Lacan, but had different views about the application of 
psychotherapy in capitalist culture. Like Deleuze, he was a keen advocate of pedagogical reform, also like 
Deleuze he resisted the confines of pursuing the small spaces of'specialist' interest and engaged in a broad 
spectrum of disciplines.
The deployment of concepts is underpinned by the Bergsonian principle 
that knowledge is never a disembodied, disinterested artefact but is the 
direct and unmediated comprehension of experience in the world:
The concept is incorporeal, even though it is incarnated or effectuated in bodies. But, in fact, it 
is not mixed up with the state of affairs in which it is effectuated. It does not have 
spatiotemporal coordinates, only intensive ordinates. (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, 21)
The concept is not fixed to its original applications. It can be revitalized 
when it is set off in a new direction or given a new intensity. Crucially, 
these 'intensities' require a medium through which they can be reactivated. 
It was not only the traditional mode of 'doing' philosophy that Deleuze 
challenged, but also the relationship between philosophical concepts and 
the authorial process. His critique of a traditional authoring process became 
both an important aspect of how Deleuze viewed the 'craft' of philosophy 
and a decisive factor in his working relationship with others.
4.2 Polytonality and the Authoring Process
Deleuze' co-authorship with the work of psychiatrist Felix Guattari (1930- 
1992)^^ is probably the best demonstration of what he thought philosophy 
should aspire to be — an immanent collection of events, encounters and 
intensities. Although it is possible to distinguish the authorial voices of 
Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Deleuze & Guattari 1980), it
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goes against the intentions and the spirit of the work so to do.*'^  While both 
men have discernable styles, together they create a new voice.
In an academic culture protective about ownership of intellectual property, 
there is an almost statutory responsibility toward endorsement and clarity 
of authorship.*'^ This desire to police the boundaries of authorship is 
noticeable in the commentary of John Marks, who writes an informative 
introduction to Deleuze {Vitalism and Multiplicity 1998) but expresses an 
academic's discomfort over this aspect of the work:
Any study of Gilles Deleuze faces an obvious question about authorship, since a significant 
proportion of his work was written in close collaboration with Felix Guattari. I have attempted 
to be consistent in indicating within the text publications which are attributed to Deleuze and 
Guattari. (Marks 1998, viii)
This fretting is unnecessary and unhelpful because the act of co-authorship 
is a philosophical strategy within the work. It is deployed in order to detach 
said work from the notion of tenure in different systems of thought. The 
presumption of infinitude in authoring is carefully indicated at the start of A 
Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari). Polytonality, the presence of 
multiple authoring styles that are no longer distinguishable is intentionally 
a deterritorialising strategy. No individual enclosure exists for the 
isolation of each voice. This is a deliberate move away from the individual 
possession of intellectual material, in order to extend and multiply the 
thought process.
111 fact, I believe that it is almost impossible not to discern the individual styles, especially as any reader of 
Deleuze's earlier publications will be able to recognise (not so much his style but) the radical alteration that takes 
place in this style when he worked with Guattari. Using their own unique language they became a very powerful 
deterritorialising engine. In comparison to the highly charged kinetics’ of Guattari, Deleuze could look every bit 
the traditionalist, in a sort of Foucauldian way.
This is already beginning to alter. In a culture that is information/answer rich the combined authorial text will be, 
by necessity, the norm, and authoring a relatively devalued process. As we have seen, Don Ihde has argued that, 
in the future, the premium value will be on collaborative/generative research engines.
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It is also clear that the authors believe that the collective enunciation of the 
book extends beyond these two individuals bringing these ideas to a 
particular intensity. This approach to thinking, and the production of ideas, 
is based upon a radial theory of subjectivity. It is important because of what 
it implies about the status of the subject.
Nonetheless, Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge the awkwardness of 
attempting a new mode of nomadic thought, while still being the named 
authors:
The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipm  together. Since each of us was several, there was already 
quite a crowd. Here we have made use of everything that came within range, what was closest 
and what was farthest away. We have assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition. Why 
have we kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. To make ourselves 
unrecognisable in turn. To render imperceptible, not ourselves, but what makes us act, feel, and 
think. ...To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but to the point where it is no 
longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his 
own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996, 3)
This is very different from the multiple authorship found in academic 
publications where individuals have come together to produce a 'collection' 
of essays on a particular subject, or even an interdisciplinary work. In such 
cases the separate pieces are attributable to particular authors.
We have examples in practical theology. These often take the form of 
pedagogic exemplars such as the Blackwell Reader in Practical Theology 
(Woodward & Pattison 2000) in which different professionals write 
individual chapters on the definition and development of practical and 
pastoral theology. There is a necessary and clear differentiation of 
intellectual property. This is particularly important in contemporary 
academia where plagiarism is the dark spectre hovering around 'ideas' 
without clear and traceable husbandry.
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However, plagiarism is part of a different system. Plagiarism is a legal term 
that belongs to a world that has a defined notion about the relationship 
between the individual and ideas. This issue of authorship is not a new one 
to philosophical discourse; Roland Barthes (1915-80) and Michael 
Foucault (1926-84) had made significant contributions to the discussion 
about what defines the author.
To deploy semantics in order to clarify the meaning of authorship is to 
misunderstand that the issue for Deleuze and Guattari is both conceptual 
and ontological. Trying to define the author, or arguing that the concept of 
authorship is outmoded, is merely a continuation of the usual categories we 
use to designate authorship.
John Marks (1998) worked with these principles. Hence he misrecognised 
the nomadic mode of thought in Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In so 
doing, he confused a new form with an old form. He thereby misses an 
important aspect of the work by submitting it to an inappropriate critique 
by a conceptual order/logic incapable of recognising a different system. 
Neither were Deleuze and Guattari being modest in their resistance to 
taking individual ownership of intellectual 'set' pieces, they were operating 
with very different criteria. This contrast to the way in which we normally 
conceive authoring was recognised by Foucault as a way of disclosing and 
deflecting power:
It could be said that Deleuze and Guattari care so little for power that they have tried to 
neutralize the effects of power linked to their own discourse.
(Michel Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xiv)
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However, whilst there is no doubt that the dispersal of power plays a role in 
the way that Deleuze and Guattari chose to write together it is more 
important to understand the onto-epistemological implications. Whereas 
they sought a means of democratising creativity, the assignment of 
enunciation to individual subjects is a function of a capitalist system 
distributing its ideology
The social character of enunciation is intrinsically founded only if one succeeds in 
demonstrating how enunciation in itself implies collective assemblages. It then becomes clear 
that the statement is individuated and enunciation subjectified, only to the extent that an 
impersonal collective assemblage requires it and determines it to be so. It is for this reason that 
indirect discourse, especially "jree" indirect discourse is of exemplary value: tliere are no clear, 
distinctive contours; what comes first is not an insertion of variously individuated statements, or 
an interlocking of different subjects of enunciation, but a collective assemblage resulting in the 
determination of relative subjectification proceedings, or assignations of individuality and their 
shifting distributions within discourse. (Deleuze & Guattari 1996, 80)
Experience is a question of social conventions, part of a movement that is 
constantly regrouping and dispersing. This is combined with Hume's 
influence on issues of self-identity and individuality:
We start with atomic parts, but these atomic parts have transitions, passages, "tendencies", 
which circulate from one to another. These tendencies give rise to habits. Isn't this the answer to 
the question "what are we?" We are habits, nothing but habits — the habit of saying "I." 
Perhaps, there is no more striking answer to the problem of the Self. (Deleuze 1991, x)
Deleuze is working with a concept of the subject that is not stable, but is 
capable of endless reconfigurations by breaking down and regrouping.^^
Deleuze was influenced by Spinoza's concept of longitude and latitude, what become the attributes of a 
delineated individual existence is a question of social conventions, which are constantly regrouping or breaking 
down, Deleuze and Guattari described this process as territorialisation and deieriitorialisation.
In A Thousand Plateaus (1998,198-200) Deleuze enlists Scott Fitzgerald's novella The Crack Up as an example 
of how and individual can breakdown and reform — becoming something new under the concealment of the 
'crack up.' The character experiencing a breakdown goes through a disconnecting process in which everything 
previously taken for granted disappears. There are no familiar 'props' for identity. Previous relationships cease 
and so too does his identity. Gradually a new identity is allowed to emerge. The subject matter of this story Is 
depressing but it is actually a very life affirming story.
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This notion of self also becomes the basis for Deleuze' concept of 
concealment, what people are becoming is not always perceptible, as the 
characteristic of habitual behaviour is not a constant to rely on. There is 
always the potential for different assemblages that will alter the 'tendencies' 
to pursue a line without any enduring core.
A very apposite demonstration of this concept was made by the conductor 
Daniel Barenboim in Radio Four's 2006 Reith Lecture; In the Beginning 
Was Sound (Barenboim 2006).^^ Barenboim, just like Deleuze, had been 
influenced by a life long study of Spinoza's ethics. He was trying to explain 
how making music and playing in an orchestra is a very good analogy for 
understanding the democracy of creativity. His example is also useful as a 
model for dispersed subjectivity:
The oboe plays the most wonderful tune in a slow movement of Brahms symphony, and the 
whole orchestra, all ninety or ninety-five of them, and the conductor with the big ego, is 
following him. (Laughter) Everybody is following him, everybody supporting him, adjusting 
everything for him to be able to express this thing. He is the king of the world — and that lasts 
for eight bars. (Laughter and Applause) And then, on the ninth bar, he holds back...back in the 
society, in the collective, and he has to do what ninety five people have been doing for him for 
eighty five bars, he has to do maybe for the double basses or for the clarinet or whatever the 
case may be. (Barenboim 2006)
Deleuze believed that traditional systems of philosophy can fail to 
innovate; especially if they are impeded with a notion of the subject that 
has accepted unquestioningly the politics of self-identity that are derived 
from Descartes and Locke. Contemporary philosophies certainly challenge 
the relationship between agency, autonomy and self-identity.
The Reith Lectures were begun in 1948, in honour of the first Director General of the BBC, John Reith. They 
have been commissioned annually ever since and are usually given by leading figures in Science, Industry, 
Education, Politics, Theology etc. The first Reith lecture was given by Bertrand Russell {Authority and the 
Individual 1948)
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Deleuze and Guattari, however, explore the thinking behind identity. In A 
Thousand Plateaus (1996), they argue that it is possible to have a personal 
experience without having a personal history of that experience in what is 
described as a transversal relation. What this means is to 'cross the line' to 
experience what another may have. Hence, individuals do not emerge 
from within (Lockean) personal memory banks, provided with cohesive 
narrative identities, but from series of relations which they both affect and 
are affected by. Advocating that experience is transversal, insofar as it is a 
distinct component of the milieu (part of an orchestrated experience) and 
hence external to the subject, has obvious consequences for approaches that 
value individuals' ethnographic experiences as sources for insight and 
knowledge of those individuals (Deleuze & Guattari 1996, 11).
The perception of individuality is challenged with the notion of haecceity, 
and a model of individuation that diverges from the Western concern with 
psychobiography :
Longing for identity conies from the desire for security, itself an ambiguous feeling. However 
exhilarating it may be in the short run, however full of promises and vague premonitions of an 
as yet untried experience, floating without support in a poorly defined space, in a stubbornly, 
vexingly 'betwixt and between' location, becomes in the long run an unnerving and anxiety- 
prone condition. On the other hand, a fixed position amidst the infinity of possibilities is not an 
attractive prospect either. In our liquid modern times, when free-floating, unencumbered 
individual is the popular hero, 'being fixed' —  being 'identified' inflexibly and without retreat — 
gets an increasingly bad press. (Bauman 2004, 29)
Deleuze and Guattari's concept of individuation as movement is the 
opposite of the static 'roof image of the 'self that emerges from a layered
The example used in is Henry Miller's experiment in intoxieating another with water. I think another complex 
example of this is the way in whieh individuals perceive their emotional history. Establishing what it means to be 
Scottish and Jewish or Irish and Catholic for example is often related to assembling a collective memory that 
cannot be experienced in an individual’s lifetime but is assimilated into the present through memorializing rituals. 
{Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. I A Thousand Plateaus 166) (DC4)
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system of growth. Theirs is a model of surface movements; individual 
identity is a series of events and relations at points (intensities) on a current 
network.
This can seem an incongruous notion if contrasted with the conception of 
personhood as an intimate possession. That difference or individuality is 
more to do with numeral diversity of the body than with deep narratives of 
the mind is a departure from the enlightenment proposition that we hold 
our fate in personal custody. Deleuze and Guattari engage in a different 
approach where the image of the self is disturbed and shifted,
There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or 
substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date 
have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that 
of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of 
movement and rest between molecules and particles, capacities to affect and be affected. (1996 
A Thousand Plateaus page 261)
Deleuze and Guattari build on a theory of milieus as a relational 'orchestra' 
of mutuality. Individuals emerge from environments and through 
encounters on what they refer to as a plane o f composition or plane o f  
consistency. However the individual is not merely a malappropriated body, 
because creativity is an ongoing relationship within an immanent 
environment. This is a theory of becoming that leaves behind the pursuit of 
the personal in order to understand the process of 'becoming' as a response 
to existing themes. It means that what we become depends on the 
immediacy of the environment in which we occupy. However, it also 
means that within this environment we can create harmony, melodies or 
discord. This is counter to the position of saying, 'I'm this, I'm that' — and
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74thus reinforcing an uncritical acceptance of self-possession.
Crucially, for Deleuze and Guattari, individuality is not a personal status 
but is a series of events that are not exclusive. They question the nature of 
thought that allows us to think of ourselves as individuals. This challenges 
our existence as a being with roots and a personal biography. Hence the 
comment that thinking is a 'perilous' act whose first victim is the 'self.
Experience, according to Deleuze is a combination of events that take place 
in a milieu, a habitat that provides the opportunity for events. All events 
and possibilities are taking place at a surface level and the personal is a 
synthesis or an assemblage of such events. Ian Buchanan summarizes this 
in his introduction to A Deleuzean Century',
Experience, then, is not something that a person has, or even happens to one; it is, rather, what 
one is made of. This means, of course, that experience itself cannot be personal but must be non 
personal, which, in turn, demands that the very notion of experience be rethought. If not the 
property of the individual, then what is it? (1999,6 A Deiuzean Century)
This questions the relationship between knowledge and personal 
experience. It also raises problems of personal testimony within the history 
of religion. Like Job, having personalized and privileged our relationship 
with God through such means, we have been naïve in our expectations of 
what the 'jusf ought to receive and who indeed are just. This has been the 
basis for our confidence in the idea that we can construct moral theory. But, 
rather than think of this new ontology as problematic, should we not ask:
It could be argued that this weakens the case for Individual responsibility but on the other hand it opens a wider 
range of potentials for change. It is interesting that Guattari was influenced by the work that Psychiatrist R D 
Laing carried out on the condition of Mental Illness, and particularly Schizophrenia. He argued that the individual 
patients condition should not be considered in isolation from family and social circumstances and that to bring 
about a 'cure' the immediate environment of the individual would have to be taken into account.
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How can practical theology explore the potential it provides for an 
expanding, rather than diminishing, landscape?
The polytonality of Capitalism and Schizophrenia is an endeavour to put 
into actuality one of Deleuze and Guattari's most famous concepts the 
rhizome. With this they bring together a wider range of intellectual strands 
and demonstrate how the traditional function of authoring can potentially 
stop the flow of productive encounters. The traditional mode of authoring 
is founded on self-identity as the sovereign autonomous individual.
Deleuze and Guattari have challenged this by the way in which they write 
together.
4.3 Rhizomorphous Thinking
Deleuze always worked at close quarters with practical problems, and 
educational reform was one of his main projects. In 1969, in the midst of 
social and political upheaval, his appointment to the University of Paris at 
Vincemies St Denis meant that he could participate in an experimental 
school that would explore educational reform. His pedagogical, ontological 
and epistemological concepts were always part of this practical working 
process. These, combined with his particular style of philosophy, led to him 
consider different models of knowledge and its transference. A central 
question was whether the educators had a responsibility to disseminate 
knowledge or be participants in its construction?
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This could only be answered through an examination of the prevailing 
model of what constituted knowledge and learning. So, for example one of 
the most obvious aids to learning in the west the text book, with its 
centralized order, is challenged by the a-centred rhizome:
You set about opposing the rhizome to trees. And trees are not a metaphor at all, but an image 
of thought, a functioning, a whole apparatus that is planted in thought in order to make it go in a 
straight line and produce the famous correct ideas. There are all kinds of characteristics in the 
tree: there is the point of origin, seed or centre; it is a binary machine or principle of dichotomy, 
with its perpetually divided and reproduced branchings, its points of arborescence; it is an axis 
of rotation which organises things in a circle, and the circles round the centre; it is a structure, a 
system of points and positions which fix all of the possible within a grid, a hierarchical system 
of transmission of orders, with a central instance and recapitulative memory; it has a future and 
a past, roots and a peak, a whole history, an evolution, a development; it can be cut up by cuts 
which are said to be significant in so far as they follow its arborescences, its branchings, its 
concentricities, its moments of development. (Deleuze & Parnet 2002, 25)
Capitalism and Schizophrenia is not a 'book' in the sense that we 
understand the structure of narrative form and the transference of 
knowledge. Deleuze and Guattari are seeking to provide a radically new 
approach to individuality and epistemology, and consequently they explore 
the thinking behind identity. In A Thousand Plateaus (1996), they argue 
that it is possible to have a personal experience without having a personal 
history of that experience in what is described as a transversal relation. 
What this means is to 'cross the line' to experience what another may have.
Hence, individuals do not emerge from within (Lockean) personal memory 
banks, provided with cohesive narrative identities, but from series of 
relations which they both affect and are affected by. Advocating that 
experience is transversal, insofar as it is a distinct component of the milieu 
(part of an orchestrated experience) and hence external to the subject, has 
obvious consequences for approaches that value individuals' ethnographic
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experiences as sources for insight and loiowledge of those individuals 
different image (and vitally different function) of the book that prevails in 
our culture. Capitalism and Schizophrenia has no pedagogic aspirations, 
no responsibility to transfer knowledge.
This point is taken up by Foucault in his preface to Anti-Oedipus. It is not 
the power of intellectual possession Deleuze and Guattari seek, but an 
image ’contrary to a deeply rooted belief that the book is an image of the 
world. Therefore, the experience of reading Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
is not intended to be like that of any other philosophical text. It does not 
attempt to 'lead' its readership or construct the perfect reader. In the words 
of its translator, Brian Massumi:
A Thousand Plateaus is conceived as an open system. It does not pretend to have the final word. 
The authors' hope however, is that elements of it will stay with a certain number of its readers 
and will weave into the melody of their everyday lives.
(Massumi in Deleuze & Guattari 1996, xiv)
The desire for authorial concealment is in keeping with the attempt to avoid a hierarchical 
pursuit of knowledge but it also discloses the habit of identity as the ensemble of experience. 
This is the point where the personal T is no longer important (Deleuze & Guattari 1996, 3).
Capitalism and Schizophrenia does not provide the security of a narrative 
carefully constructed to ensure a certain path is under surveillance. The 
normal function of authoring stops the live flow and productivity of 
encounters. The multimodal nature of the text of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia deploys one of the most famous concepts of Deleuze and 
Guattari, the rhizome.
The book in our academic culture has traditionally been a means of 
communicating knowledge to the reader. The traditional book constructs
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knowledge as it takes the reader through its organised chapters. 
Recommended reading lists for academic courses provide and create a 
shared curriculum memory, consistent objectives and anticipated outcomes.
This image of the book belongs to an arborescent system of thought. The 
rhizome is a radial system of roots, the opposite of the deep root system of 
the tree. In contrast, the rhizome is a collection of shallow sub-surface 
connections, capable of breaking of at one point and re-assembling at 
another. A rhizome is made of plateaus with no distinguishable beginning, 
middle and end. The tree has only one deep root to sustain its system and 
everything comes from its centrality. By contrast, the rhizome has a 
multiplicity of connections, not all dependent on the same core. The 
rhizome is not teleological. Order is not a goal:
It would be a mistake to read Anti-Oedipus as the new theoretical reference (you know, that 
much heralded theory that finally encompasses everything, that finally totalises and reassures, 
the one we are told we "need so badly" in our age of dispersion and specialization where "hope" 
is lacking.) One must look for a "philosophy" amid the extraordinary profusion of new notions 
and surprise concepts: Anti Oedipus is not a flashy Hegel. I think Oedipus can be best read 
as an "art"... (Foucault in Deleuze & Guattari 1983, xii)
Deleuze and Guattari use the imagery of the rhizome to challenge the 
prevailing 'arborescent' structures of Imowledge. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia is a medium for some of Deleuze and Guattari's most 
challenging concepts. If it is read in the way that a traditional book is 
approached, looking for a central coherent theme, then it will leave the 
reader frustrated. This point is also made by Simon O'Sullivan:
To read it as a purely scholarly text, to read it simply for meaning, is to position it always 
already within that field that it writes against — representation. (O’Sullivan 2006, 9)
There is a degree of discomfort for the readership, in the sense that the 
authors would appear to be unaware of them. However this sense of
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authorial abandonment results because it is intentionally at odds with the 
trend to impart knowledge to the reader. O'Sullivan again makes the point 
that it is 'at odds with much academic writing'(2006, 9).
In fact Capitalism and Schizophrenia (and more specifically Volume 2 : A 
Thousand Plateaus) is a working guide for some of Deleuze's earlier 
writings. In its determination to be connective rather than instructive it 
encapsulates Deleuze and Guattari's concept of immanence. The notion of 
two planes, a Plane o f Order and a Plane o f Immanence, originally 
appeared in Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 1994) in which Deleuze 
first challenged the Image o f Thought in western academic culture. These 
two planes provide the means for two different approaches to thinking and 
different ways of forming concepts which construct an image of the world.
1 : The Plane o f Organisation — Deleuze introduced the concept of the 
plane of organisation that facilitates the image of thought that is prevalent 
in our culture. Writing on the image of thought, Deleuze introduces us to 
his 'four fold roof image of thought. On the plane of organisation thought is 
categorical, what is visible, audible and sayable is checked against the 
representation of thinking. Participation on the plane of organisation 
requires this degree of recognition.
The plane of organisation is concerned with universal truths and stability. It 
rejects the unrecognisable and everything is controlled by an 'in house' 
logic that is measurable and quantifiable. The development of method 
within the social sciences and practical theology would come under the 
plane of organisation. The plane of organisation is static and controlled by
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its process of recognition, and everything beyond recognition is either left 
out or made subsidiaiy to the existing categories. Cohesion and conformity 
are essential aspects of the Plane o f Organisation.
2: The Plane o f Immanence — the concept of immanence begins to emerge 
with the concept of the rhizome. Immanence becomes a crucial theme 
throughout all of his philosophy. Immanence is simply 'life', but life before 
it is taken up as a historical life; Deleuze himself describes this in Pure 
Immanence using the author Charles Dickens to illustrate his point:
What is immanence? A life... No one has described what a life is better than Charles Dickens, if 
we take the indefinite article as an index of the transcendental. A disreputable man, a rogue, 
held in contempt by everyone, is found as he lies dying. Suddenly, those taking care of him 
manifest an eagerness, respect, even love, for the slightest sign of life. Everybody bustles about 
to save him, to the point where, in his deepest coma, this wicked man himself senses something 
soft and sweet penetrating him. But to the degree that he comes back to life, his saviours 
become colder, and he becomes once again mean and crude. (Deleuze 2002, 28)
This life, before it becomes a particular life, stimulates the care and 
represents a value for life per se, beyond its distinct manifestation. This 
complex alteration, between two contrasting responses of respect and 
repulsion, catches something we are not immediately aware of because we 
can never have a state of pure immanence — life is always in the state of 
becoming a life. The plane of immanence resists facile organisation and 
arbitrary unity. It is about becoming, lines of flight, intersections and 
multiplicities. It is not measurable and we must 'gauge' movement, intensity 
and effect. Pure immanence is always the capacity that precedes 
historically specific haecceity.
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The principles that form the rhizome are summarised (as outlined below) at 
the start of the second volume, A Thousand Plateaus, of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (Deleuze & Guattari 1998, 3-38).
(a) Multiplicity: The rhizome has neither subject nor object; its multiplicity 
exposes the pseudo-multiplicities of the arborescent model. The multiples 
from the tree model still come from a central organising principle. For 
example, a traditional approach within the scientific method separates 
subject and object, man 'studies' world. By contrast, rhizomatic multiples 
emerge from 'assemblages' that can change as it expands and disconnects.
There is no central organising principle. There are no beginnings or ends on 
the rhizome, there are only ever middles, with a constant emerging from 
the middle/milieu. There are no set points of reference, no controlling 
centres, there is a 'loss of centres' and it is this aspect contributes to the 
present anxiety about foundations. The rhizome 'increases tenitory and we 
are encouraged to form our own rhizomes. (Deleuze & Guattari 1998, 11) 
There are multiple alliances on the rhizome, with no exclusion zones. 
Boundaries are crossed and no permanent affiliation is necessaiy. It is a 
state of 'plasticity' and not consolidation. It is possible to make random 
connections with no determining 'organising' principle.
The rhizome is not teleological. It has no 'end purpose', no essential 
relationships. It can attach and detach, territorialize and deterritorialise. 
With no set order, it is possible to have multiple configurations. There is no 
chronological order. The rhizome does not trace an earlier cartography. It 
maps a 'new' one, dispensing with 'decalcomania' or transference of one
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thing into another. A decal simply transfers an image already mapped 
down. There is no stability of substance. What we observe today might not 
be detectable in that form again. The rhizome is fluid, transient and 
passing. It reveals and conceals in an endless possibility of new 
configurations, making creativity possible.
(b) Heterogeneity: There is no ideal reader or listener, no homogenous 
linguistic community and no desire to remake in the image of the book. 
There is no legislative regime of recognition to impose a hierarchical order. 
A rhizome will never be 'over coded' it has no formal hierarchy. It is not an 
elitist 'root and branch' structure.
(c) Rupture and connection: The rhizome may be broken up, but only to 
start up again on another line or to connect to new lives. Identity is in flux 
and constantly altered. Status is not permanent because the process of 
connections means that there is a constant movement, Deleuze talks about 
different speeds. A rhizome is an a-signifying rupture. It is not about the 
permanent allocation of meaning.
The arborescent model of thought always seeks to designate, specify and 
make sure all meaning is viable in its transference. Being allocated, 
belonging to, being attributable to and originating from a legitimate central 
command. Rhizomatic thought by contrast bursts through membranes, 
escapes and is capable of severance Deleuze and Guattari talk about 'lines 
of flight.' Thought is not tightly organised and limited to what is 
recognizable. The rhizome, in other words, is not a zone of representation.
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4.4  The Image o f Thought
A system is not something presented to an observer, it is something recognized by him. 
(Maturana & Varela 1980, 67)
Deleuze examines the nature of recognition and the role it plays in the 
construction of a knowing subject indelibly marked for a particular order. 
His critique of the image of thought is crucial to this.
In western academia, there is a belief that the search for Icnowledge 
receives validation by the discovery of order and purpose, that good 
reflective thinldng has a good objective. There is a problem for method 
within this assumption. Deleuze designates this 'the dogmatic image of 
thought'. This comes from one of the first major publications of his work 
and is not a direct collaboration with other philosophers. It is therefore very 
much his 'signature.' As such it can be seen a preparation for the nature of 
his collaborative work.
In his preface to the English edition of Difference and Repetition 
Deleuze'stresses the importance of the Image o f Thought in relation to all 
his philosophical works. We have a belief that the search for Imowledge is 
legitimated by the discovery of order and purpose, for which good 
reflective thinking provides a suitable method. The dogmatic image of 
thought is that it is capable of producing comprehensive order and 
systematic theories of purposeful praxis. We seek through our methods to 
make purposeful statements, to contribute to decision making, to erect 
moral theories. Deleuze stresses the importance of the Image o f Thought 
that is uncritically present in relation to all philosophical premises.
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Deleuze challenges the process of thinking. He discloses how thought has a 
pre-established image we are uncritical of. This in turn limits our ability to 
'see' or interpret things outside of an existing frame of reference/ingrained 
image of thought. The first setback to new thinldng is what Deleuze refers 
to as the idea of thinking as common sense, quite literally 'cogitatio natura 
universalis' (Deleuze 1994, 131).
Because everybody thinlcs, thinking is (by default) a natural talent. We may 
manifest historical ways of thinking, and even culturally specific thinking, 
but thinking itself is taken as granted:
This element consists only of the supposition that thought is the natural exercise of a faculty, of 
the presupposition that there is a natural capacity for thought endowed with a talent for truth'or 
an affinity with the true, under the double aspect of a good will on the part o f  the thinker and an 
upright nature on the part o f  the thought. It is because everybody naturally thinks that 
everybody is supposed to know implicitly what it means to think. (Deleuze 1994, 131)
There is an undisclosed connection made between the capacity to think and 
the possibility to thinlc well. Deleuze begins with the most well recognized 
link between knowledge, truth and thinking. The Cartesian subject of the 
cogito 'I think therefore I am'.
Descartes expounded the universality of this premise, confident that 
everyone could understand what it is to think. This became the premise 
upon which he would build his certainties. In making this claim, the 
philosopher has allowed thinking, as a natural capacity, to be 
presuppositionless. Thinldng is divided into the capacity for thought and 
thought 'perverted by the generalities' of time. In this, there is a hidden 
suggestion; what Deleuze refers to as an Implicit presupposition, a pre- 
philosophical and natural image o f thought’ — that everybody has 'good
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sense' and a desire to elicit the 'true'. He calls this image the 
dogmatic/orthodox or moral image.
There are altogether eight different postulates of the dogmatic image of 
thought:
1. The principle — Cogitatio natura universalis or the goodwill of the 
thinker, the good nature of thought.
2. The ideal — common sense as Concordia facultatum and good sense 
as the distribution, which guarantees this concord.
3. The model of recognition, the ability to judge thought the logic of 
identity (this is found in Plato, Descartes and Kant)
4. The element — representation. Difference is subordinated to 
similar/same.
5. The negative — error, everything that can go wrong in thought as the 
result of external mechanism.
6. Logical function — the proposition.
7. The postulate of modality — solutions. Problems are traced from 
proposition to solution. Defined by the possibility of being solved.
8. The postulate of the end — Imowledge. The subordination of 
learning to Imowledge.
We have seen how the fourth postulate, representation, creates problems 
when theorists try to understand postmodernism from within a modernist 
frame. The first three postulates outline the prevailing dogma for thinking.
However, the last postulate (the one that justifies thought, the gaining of 
knowledge) is the veiy thing that Deleuze and Maturana drop from their 
concept of exteriority/empiricism. Maturana argues for the dispensability of 
teleonomy and Deleuze deploys Bergson's theory of luminosity to provide 
an alternative theory of exteriority.
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4.5 The Bergson Affair: Creative Evolution and the Empirical 
Imagination
The transition from phenomenology to nomadic sensation and thought finds its mature moment 
in Deleuze enlisting Bergson in the cause of radical empiricism. (Boundas 2006, 5)
Once the evolution of mind is granted, it is a short step to the activist theory of knowledge. 
Before we learned to think in terms of evolution, knowledge seemed to us a faculty superadded 
to our powers of action; we used to contrast knowledge and action, regard them as independent 
things, as if an organism might act and not know, might know and not act. Bergson joins issue 
with that view. Intelligence, he maintains, develops pari passu with the organism; for the 
measure of intelligence is the measure of the organism's power of action. (Luce 1922, 10)
One of the most important ideas that Bergson has contributed to the 
Deiuzean canon is the relation between matter and memory and creative 
evolution. Bergson attempted to demonstrate the evolution of the human 
mind. Bergson's philosophy, which portrayed reason as a fluid and 
evolving faculty stood in contrast to the more static Kantian concept of 
reason as an analytical tool.
Bergson's theory places human reason in the current of evolution. He treats 
reason the same way evolutionary biology treats material forms. 
Intelligence, for example, is not a superior faculty above evolutionary 
forces. The intellect is not a detached spectator already equipped with 
twelve categories and two forms. It too had humble beginnings and its 
future camiot be predicted. Bergson's theoiy of knowledge is an activist 
theory of Imowledge. Knowledge is embodied and cannot be separate from 
immanent experience. Its growth is in direct relationship with the physical 
power to act that the organism has.
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Bergson differentiated between the intellect and intuition. Before we can 
have any real development of thought an act must take place. Before 
thought comes action. What Bergson was arguing for is a perception of 
knowledge that is deeply involved in the practicality of'becoming'. Reason 
is not a disinterested party. Intelligence is fully integrated into experience 
and its purpose is ultimately practical. The business of reason is to extend 
into the environment. Far from being a rarefied faculty that transcends the 
world, it achieves its best work in matter and immerses itself in matter.
The intellect grasps all {all) relevant aspects of its immediate surrounding. 
It cannot act otherwise in order to 'be' anything it must make this leap into 
the world. Reason, like the material world, has a finite and non- 
transferable existence. What Spinoza was able to achieve in his theory 
about the relationship between the soul and the fantasy of immortality, 
Bergson does for the intellect and the fantasy of a transcended 
truth/knowledge.
Deleuze holds these important notions at the core of his ontology. Reason 
is not a tool that might be applied to discern practical moral wisdom. It 
would be better to explore the nature of ethical existences rather than 
pursue an objective moral wisdom, which is also what Spinoza set out to 
achieve. With Bergson 'what to think' determines 'how to think' and 
intuition as the initiation of thinking and the result of thinking are 
indivisibly connected. Bergson's 'one thing' was to disclose the relationship 
between matter and memory — as duration. The work that the intellect has 
to do will only seiwe a purpose if it is immersed in the world. There are no 
abstract truths beyond this.
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Crucially, however, a universe that 'becomes' a new world in the making 
requires more than a simple readjusting of the faculty of reason. It needs 
the growth of new concepts, powers of perception and apprehension. Our 
'common sense thinking' our 'plane of organization' serves an already 
settled universe. Intelligence is a faculty that not only copies this universe, 
but can re-map it. This is why Deleuze believes that 'thinking' can be a 
revolutionary act.
The notion of the 'plane of organization' in Deleuze derives in part from 
Bergson's 'plane of intelligence'. Bergson's concept of intuition is likewise 
the corollary of the Plane of Immanence', the immediacy of life, the 
conscious self incorporating its environment and extending itself into the 
environment. We resist new ways of thinking about the world because the 
thinking of the past is comfortable. It has a familiarity about it that gives it 
the status of being 'natural'. Once accepted as natural it can be difficult to 
contemplate new ways of thinking. Schweitzer, for example, was reluctant 
to let go of the concept of humanity as individuals graduating into 
psychological and moral maturity. Giving up this staple of modernity gives 
rise to intellectual anxiety. Arguments about the loss of Truth’ betray the 
same sentiment. The role of reason is to discover this truth. Yet Bergson 
believed that it was the role of every individual to create. The intellect is an 
instrumental and utilitarian faculty with the capacity to conform to matter 
and re-create order.
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When Bergson declared human creativity a manifestation of the cosmic 
élan vital, he bracketed artistic creativity as both producer and producer of 
a metacreative process. Far from being a unique evolutionary force, the 
creative activity of each individual was part of a super creative universe. 
Each a single tone in an ongoing durational melody. Every individual's role 
is to be creative in the evolution of the intellect.^^
Bergson's is an activist theory of Imowledge. He is an advocate of intuition 
as the real vital force in creative evolution. Creative evolution is a process 
whereby we construct our image of the universe. It is not pure subjectivity 
because, for Bergson, intuition works within the realm of experience and 
activity. It is an organism, a power to engage in the world that makes 
knowledge pro-active. The intellectual method, by contrast, is unproductive 
and non-progressive.
Bergson impeached reason as an inadequate sovereign power of 
knowledge. Moreover, as part of creativity, intelligence actually fails the 
thinker. Deductive logic simply reproduces a static regime of tautological 
ideas. Evolving thought is the result of almost imperceptible gradations of 
sensation. While we have (in fact) moments where we can be intensely 
focused on some aspects of our environment, it is proposed by Bergson that 
at any given time there is a plurality of routes/incidents/possibilities to be 
taken, of which at any given point only a small part is brought into focus:
While his stance has obvious consequences for pedagogic practice, it also has implications for the practice of 
theology. For example instead of advocating a model of theology that has the theologian as a professional 
consultant who makes recommendations for the dissemination of moral theory we perhaps ought to be proposing 
a model that discloses the capacity for ethical existence, intuitive responses and the total immersion of individual 
experience in the event; rather than leave it to the chance of our being advised by professional bystanders.
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Consciousness, being in its turn formed on the intellect, sees clearly of the inner life what is 
already made, and only feels confusedly the making. Thus we pluck out of duration those 
moments that interest us, and that we have gathered along its ocourse. These alone we retain. 
(Bergson 1998, 273)
Some incidents come into focus because of our interest in them. Bergson's 
contention is that knowledge is not a disinterested and detached 
accumulation of data that is then analysed. From the start, what becomes 
knowledge is governed by our intuitive response to our environment. The 
intellect then has the task of policing the categorical boundaries of what is 
regarded as legitimised. Bergson argues that, rather than reason playing a 
role in illuminating the world to what can be known, it is instead intuition 
that illuminates:
From the first awakening of reflection, it is this that pushes to the fore, right under the eyes of 
consciousness, the torturing problems, the questions that we cannot gaze at without feeling 
giddy and bewildered. (Bergson 1998, 275)
Memory for Bergson is not the Lockean cabinet in which things are 
stored/accumulated or inscribed on a tabula rasa for future categorizing 
and reference. But most important is Bergson's separation of the intellect 
and intuition in relation to creative thinking. According to Bergson's theory 
there are things that exist without necessarily being in the direct line of our 
perception. This radial division between the immediacy of intuition and the 
mediated intellect gives rise to two different notions of knowledge. There 
are things that are perceived intuitively, without them necessarily being 
seen {e.g. \ the sublime/concealed).
This whole notion of a zone of sense and perceptibility is demonstrative of the form that Deleuze’s own 
philosophical method takes. What he brings into his own ’territorial zone' of immanence are the reissued concepts 
of philosophy. Philosophers can no longer be sovereign rulers of their own domain. Deleuze's own 
concept/image of the philosopher is of someone who works the conceptual tools that available. His co-opting of 
past concepts and co-authoring of contemporary ideas is a tribute to the Bergsonian principle of memory being an 
immediacy and entirety. Everything is at once folded in and puffed up into the present experience.
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Hence, for example, great painters are those people who posses an 
image/vision of things that may eventually become the vision of others/^ 
Perception, therefore, is to some extent a fteedom until it finds its 
constraint in matter.
The élan vital that underpins Bergson's theory of creative evolution is not a 
teleological movement. This is not an unfolding of spirit in the purposeful 
Aristotelian or progressive Hegelian sense. It is a constant movement that 
involves struggling with (and adaptation) to the historical and material 
realm. The intellect and the body are not two different ways of 
experiencing the world. The intellect is formed post-experience as a 
product of experience. It is not only the mind that extends beyond the 
frontiers of experience to create new thinking. Total immersion of the 
individual within a situation forms the intellect. Therefore, Bergson's idea 
of the intuitive process of becoming that influenced Deleuze was not a 
revival of enlightenment romanticism.
The individual cannot transcend experience with reason because reason is 
an artefact of living systems. This tension between the individual intellect 
and the temporality of experience is comparable to a melody, a linear 
succession of tones that cannot be divided. Life is an ensemble of rhythmic 
accord. Change comes gradually but is concealed within the perpetual 
movement of duration, where past and present is one.
There is an obvious flaw in this argument inasmuch as the impressionism of artists can be part of the process that 
initiates change and maintains a particular view — the propagation of ideas. Nonetheless this does not detract 
from the argument that creative thinking takes place outside of the present regime of thought. The problem of the 
new imitating the old insomuch as it becomes the 'new order' only suggests that revolution, movement, evolution 
should be permanent.
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The position of theorists such as Butler, Haraway and Deleuze revealed the 
radical structuralism of a new ontology which negates the earlier 
romanticism of the enlightenment that posited reason as the route to 
knowledge and human freedom. This implied that humanity has the 
capacity to decide its own destiny. As well as offering an alternative 
empirical approach, Bergson's theory puts a check on a purely rationalist 
theory of knowledge. Individuals have the potential for an unmediated 
access to the world. Each individual, by merely connecting to a life, is a co­
producer of the inliabited world.
Furthermore, as Ranciere's strange collections demonstrate, creativity will 
out. He was anti-elitist to the extent that he believed the intellect was a 
universal faculty that made creative 'becoming' in the world possible. But, 
of course, this is only possible within an environment that has no interest in 
either dividing the intellect or limiting creativity. Practical theology is part 
of a pedagogical culture that concedes to the parcelling-up and distribution 
of knowledge.
What remains undisclosed in this relationship is the necessity for 
knowledge to be fully appropriated and legitimated before dissemination. 
The state, via its educational institutions, holds the franchise on what are 
deemed legitimate forms of know ledge.O ur pedagogic model of 
knowledge contains the presumption that Icnowledge is an external reality.
There may be at any given time strong alternatives to the prevailing orthodoxy, but by the designation alternative 
they still use legitimate forms as a measure, which is an inverted confirmation of its rule. A strong culture of 
autodidacts may arise but this too exists within the delineating boundaries of legitimate forms.
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What I have argued is that knowledge is not transferred via a variety of 
teaching methods, but that knowledge is constructed in only two ways. It is 
either genuinely created, or it is superimposed as the legitimate property of 
the state. Hence the transference of knowledge in the pedagogical tradition 
becomes merely an exercise in recognition.
Deleuze provides an alternative way of examining works from the past. He 
is the medium through which concepts are bought back into 
circulation/constellation. He takes conceptual personae or signature themes 
from other philosophers and uses them to construct an alternative ontology. 
His own unique concept is that of Immanence. This is an amalgamation of 
the Bergsonian notion of duration, Hume's empiricism and Spinoza's 
ethics.
In the next chapter I intend to apply this approach to the work of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and demonstrate how Schleiermacher's work, usually 
regarded as the origin of modern theology, can be deployed in a 
postmodern context to provide the basis for a practical theology in the 
realm of the postmodern university. Using the same approach as Deleuze, 
we can look to Schleiermacher as a 'living author' without being 
anachronistic. Schleiermacher can then be read as a theologian for a 
postmodern practical theology of the 21st century.
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4.6  Conclusion
The history of knowledge in the west has, in the past, been accompanied by 
an intellectual devaluation of the body. Plato, for example, compared the 
body to a dungeon. Descartes relegated it, because he believed it to be a 
medium of deception, to the inferior 'natural' realm. The body could 
contaminate the less worldly intellect/mind or soul/spirit. By contrast the 
spirit is superior and above the physical laws of nature. In Augustinian 
Christianity the body was an unremitting source of temptation and sin.
The body, being finite and bound by the laws of nature, must die. The 
spirit, being infinite, transcends both body and death. The systematic 
theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, which incorporated a modified 
Aristotelian dualism, supplied an intellectual basis for a belief in the 
resurrection of body and spirit. Nonetheless, it was still the case that body 
and spirit were separated by death, even if they would eventually come 
together again. Besides which, those epistemologies that separate the 
intellect from the body do little to alter its perceived 'secondary' status in 
the world.
Friedrich Schleiermacher changed this perception by introducing the notion 
of immanence to theology; he believed the spirit (like the body) to be finite. 
This aspect of his thinking was to prove invaluable for the emerging 
methodologies of the New Humanities (what we now call the social 
sciences).
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Whether or not we choose to believe that the spirit is linked to God is a 
metaphysical choice — but the notion of a constitutive spirit, drawn from 
the work of Deleuze and Schleiermacher, offers the possibility of an 
understanding of the spirit as a vital (if finite) and co-creative aspect of the 
historical self and the developing human subject. The work of Deleuze 
provides important insight that can help re-vitalize and maximize 
Schleiermacher's contribution to contemporary practical theology by 
enabling us to read Schleiermacher anew. The Deleuze-Schleiermacher 
affiliation is already a multiple in as much as they both envelope the work 
of Spinoza. Similarly, Deleuze's technique can provide insight into how 
other theorists have enlisted Schleiermacher's historical hermeneutics as the 
organising principle of method for the new humanities.
In other words, if we can read Schleiermacher by extracting his signature 
and applying it to contemporary practical theology, we can also see how 
that signature has been extended and multiplied in other thought systems. 
More specifically, it is in one of Schleiermacher's early texts On Religion: 
Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, originally published in 1799, that we 
find his unique ontology and philosophical persona/signature. There is 
already a strong kinship between Deleuze and Schleiermacher in that they 
both had a deep affinity with the writings of Benedict Spinoza. Like 
Spinoza, they each shared a desire to separate ethics from morality and are 
both inclined toward an ethology of existence rather than moral science.
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Chapter 5
SCHLEIERMACHER: A THEOLOGIAN FOR POSTMODERNITY
No matter what one's attitude toward Schleiermacher's method and his utterances on religion may 
be, one is time and again enthralled by his original and daring attempt to lead an age weary with 
and alien to religion back to its very mainsprings; and to reweave religion, threatened with 
oblivion, into the incomparably rich fabric of the burgeoning intelleetual life of modern times. 
(Rudolf Otto in Sehleiermacher 1958, vii)
It is over two hundred years since the first publication of Schleiermacher's 
On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (hereafter: Speeches). Yet 
its subject matter still has resonance with many contemporary papers on 
practical theology. In Speeches, Schleiermacher expressed the same concern 
for the credibility and status of religion that some theologians seem to have 
today. He was responding to contemporary shifts in the foundation of 
knowledge, a new confidence in the humanities and an ensuing contempt 
and mistrust of religion. The eighteenth century had seen the publication of 
Voltaire's Ignorant Philosopher (1767) a collection of essays dismissive of 
religion. This was a small but important work which reflected the contempt 
for religion then prevalent in philosophy.
Contemporary practical theology is self-conscious about its deployment of 
theological concepts and therefore finds its academic confidence elsewhere, 
specifically in the social sciences. Increasingly practical theology as a 
discipline is sensitive to being associated with a clerical paradigm that is at
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odds with contemporary culture. One of the questions that this thesis has 
been concerned with is whether or not we can create a new space for 
practical theology that does not fall into the clerical realm but also resists 
being dependent quite so much on the social sciences.
A theologian of Schleiermacher's status is never ignored, but his 
contemporary reputation is largely defined as the founding father of 
modern theology within this clerical paradigm. There is a strong sense that 
Schleiermacher (as the originator of the modern faculty of theology) was 
once essential, but is now a depleted force. His work is often reduced to a 
few well-worn habitually repeated clichés that demonstrates familiarity with 
his contribution to the lineage of modern theology. What was innovative 
about his work is often buried in the foundations.
Schleiermacher was responsible for the creation of three categories of 
theology within an arborescent model. These were famously explicated in 
his Brief Outline on the Study o f Theology (hereafter Brief Outline), first 
published in 1811. This now legendary triad is composed of: philosophical 
root, historical body, and practical crown (Schleiermacher 1970, 27).
It is in Brief Outline that we find Schleieimacher's description of theology as 
a 'positive science', one 'whose parts join into a cohesive whole'. The work 
concerns itself with definitions of leadership and responsibility within the 
church:
The purpose of the leadership in the Christian church is to hold the various concerns of the church 
together and to build on them further, both in a comprehensive as well as in a concentrated way. 
The knowledge concerning this activity forms a kind of technology which, in combining all its 
different branches, we designate as practical theology. (Schleiermacher 1970, 24)
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In isolation from Schleiermacher's complete canon, Brief Outline becomes a 
legacy model for a practical theology concerned only with church offices. 
This understanding persists to some degree in contemporary thinking, 
although this might perhaps be changing. Here Alistair Campbell dismisses 
Schleiermacher's 'religiosity' which he holds responsible for the confinement 
of practical theology to an ecclesiastical community:
Most unfortunate of all was the total identification of the discipline with the church directed 
functions of ministiy. Since the church was seen in Schleiermacher's terms as the fellowship of the 
pious, this meant the imprisoning of practical theology in the world of the religiously minded. 
(Campbell 2000, 79)
Campbell's view is one that is mirrored by many other practical theologians, 
some of whom feel especially strongly that Schleiermacher leaned toward 
the state institutionalisation of the church. For example, Duncan Forrester 
accused Schleiermacher of creating:
No more than the craft of church management, the channel through which the theories of biblical 
and systematic theology flow to nourish the life of the church. The present structures of church 
and ministry were accepted uncritically, as was the assumption that the subject addressed itself 
exclusively to the practice of the clergy. (Forrester 1999, 18)
Don Browning is also critical of what he sees as Schleiermacher's narrow 
concern with the realm of ordained ministry. Browning feels that practical 
theology has made good progress since Schleiermacher's time:
Rather than envision practical theology as primarily theological reflection on the task of the 
ordained minister or the leadership of the church, as was the view o f  Schleiermacher, these newer 
trends define practical theology as critical theological reflection on the church's ministiy to the 
world [my italics]. (Browning 1999, 53)
Schleiermacher is held responsible for the division of theology into discrete 
areas of special interest within the modern university. This may be 
considered positively, as (for example) James Fowler suggests:
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Schleiermacher's famous proposal for the role of practical theology as the place where the 
theological disciplines meet to inform the work of ecclesiastical science provided one of such 
influential rationale for the continuing presence of theological faculties in the now secularising 
universities. (Fowler 1999, 77)
Giving a more neutral evaluation of Schleiermacher's contribution to the 
development of practical theology is Elaine Graham, who holds 
Schleiermacher to account for contemporary developments, arguing that he:
...is responsible for what many regard as the definitive categorisation of theological studies in the 
academy, and is the theologian from whom several significant trends in modern practical theology 
can be traced. (Graham 1996, 59)
These last points of Fowler and Graham are important. They emphasize how 
important the perception is that Schleiermacher was the founder of a 
differentiated discipline in the modern university. Regardless of how flawed 
or awkward Schleiermacher's work has become for practical theologians, he 
still provides the markers for the inauguration of the modem discipline. 
Having influenced practical theology in its initial stages, Schleiermacher 
continues to have a presence as the 'founding father' of modern theology. 
There remains within the discipline an understanding of Schleiermacher as 
the scholar who was responsible for the development of practical theology as 
a modern 'positive science' in the university.
It is around the Schleiermacher of Brief Outline that practical theology has 
built its own origin myth, a 'roots and shoots' imagery that has become part 
of the recognised history of what we delineate as the beginning of practical 
theology as a modern discipline. This also presents practical theology with 
an irony. Schleiermacher is held to be both responsible for the beginning of 
the modern discipline and accountable for its undesired clericalisation.
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As we have seen, Donna Haraway argued that one of the core characteristics 
of any academic community is the need to present its own histoiy with a 
collective memory linking its founding narratives to its present legitimacy. 
New and imiovative reconstructions can then be located on a historical map 
of the discipline to which they are intended to contribute. Practical theology 
can then present an unbroken line of progressive stages through its various 
correctives. Its histoiy and legitimation become conceptually inseparable.
Hence Schleiermacher remains influential — but only as a sleeping giant. As 
the ’starting post' for modem theology, he is cmcial to the intellectual histoiy 
of practical theology. The nairatology of any discipline, its coherent 
representation of its own inheritance, is also a key element in its 
authoritative identity. Schleiermacher thus becomes an important marker in 
the 'collective historical production' of a discrete discipline in the creation of 
a narrative that is complete with the language of'indebtedness, of individual 
achievement and ascribed identities' (Haraway 1991, 86).
Consequently, practical theologians can employ Schleiermacher both as an 
authoritative founding figure for the discipline and as a measure of how far it 
has moved on from the clerical paradigm. Therefore, two things occur when 
Schleiermacher is allocated a definitive place in the history of practical 
theology. Firstly, his canon of work establishes the recognizable orientation 
that is handed down by every succession of theorists. The story has a 
familiar ring: Schleiermacher was the founder of modern theology, but we 
have since moved on and his model of theology is no longer compelling.
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As Schleiermacher is associated with the ecclesiastical bondage that much
academic practical theology wishes to be free of, his original insight
becomes inaccessible. Meanwhile, Schleiermacher's masterpiece {Speeches)
is often glossed over as over as the work of a less than mature theologian. As
. .Richard Crouter argued in the introduction of his translation of the first 
edition of Speeches:
Ultimately Schleiermacher's fame derives from his systematic interpretation of Christian theology, 
The Christian Faith {Glaubenslehre [1821-2, 1830-1]), whose relationship to On Religion is often 
disputed (Crouter 1998, xi).
However, it will be argued here that The Christian Faith and Brief Outline 
can only really be understood as part of the movement that makes up all of 
Schleiermacher's work — in which context, the isolation of Speeches has a 
certain hermeneutic irony. Written some twelve years before Brief Outline, 
Speeches is a seminal work that underpins all of his later work. Crouter 
argues that there is no evidence to suggest that Schleiermacher ever rejected 
Speeches in favour of any later work. Schleiermacher himself edited the 
continued publication of later editions, while extending the work through 
added explication — but this was primarily an exercise in clarification. It 
was not a revisionist process.
Speeches, if it is to be included in our understanding of his work, present us 
with a paradox. How can we justify the perception of Schleiermacher as 
someone who was a proponent of the clerical paradigm when he has also 
been critical of both church and institutionally sanctioned morality?
The answer might lie in the fact that Speeches has been largely neglected. 
When intellectual interest in it is now shown, it is usually treated as the 
'earlier' work of the 'younger man’ — thereby suggesting it does not reflect
Schleiermacher's mature beliefs. Yet, before taking up the radical conceptual 
signature of Speeches, it is important to follow the alternative trajectory into 
which Schleiermacher's ideas are deflected into by the emergent nineteenth 
century humanities.
Schleiermacher is held up by theorists of other disciplines as the original 
architect of historicisation of the discrete faculties within the modern 
university. Wilhelm Dilthey, who deployed Schleiermacher's hermeneutics 
in the new humanities, was responsible for an interpretation of 
Schleiermacher that still characterizes him in contemporary theory.
This is significant, not least because of the link from Schleiermacher (by 
way of Dilthey) right tlirough to Weber; which provides the connection 
between Schleiermacher and contemporary phenomenology.
However, Schleiermacher's assimilation into the New Humanities involved 
interpreting his work from a rationalist perspective. This was ironic in itself 
because Schleiermacher had tried to find the right balance between 
enlightenment rationalism (Kant), and German Romantic Idealism (Schlegal, 
Herder, Fichte, and Goethe).
Using the same approach as Deleuze (see Chapter 4 above), I propose to 
explore Schleiermacher's signature or conceptual persona, his notion of the 
historical soul that experiences the anxiety between 'being' per se and 
particular historical existences. We begin to see in Schleiermacher a 
theologian who can make a considerable contribution to a postmodern 
practical theology.
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Contemporary theory is full of anxiety about truth and moral certainty; 
religion has been traditionally used to lend authority to morality. In 
Speeches, Schleiermacher is explicitly critical of the artificial synthesis 
between religion and moral theoiy.
As I have demonstrated above, some practical theologians argue that the 
dissemination of moral theory is a good rationale for its existence as a 
discipline. Schleiermacher's critique of moral theory is challenging, but it is 
also revitalizing. If practical theology must justify its existence apart from 
contemporary moral theoiy, how is it to do so?
To this end, it might help to tiy to understand why Schleiermacher was to 
have such a profound influence in the construction of what was eventually to 
emerge as the social sciences of the twentieth century. Schleiermacher 
provided the conceptual apparatus which provided support for the 
historicisation of the other specific disciplines.^^ The argument here will be 
that Dilthey's interpretation was responsible for a bias toward the 
rationalization that detracted from Schleiermacher's aesthetic of absolute 
dependency.
5.1 Dilthey, Schleiermacher and the New Humanities
There can be little doubt that Schleiermacher was an important figure, not 
only in theology, but also within the development of the humanities and 
(ultimately) the social sciences. His contribution to the understanding of the 
historical nature of reason and his exploration of that finite aspect of the
It is after all only fifty years after Schleiermacher that Karl Marx was able to write about historical consciousness. 
The thinking behind concepts such as Historical Materialism is made possible by tbe likes of Schleiermacher. Much 
is made of the fact that Marx 'turned Hegel on his head', but Schleiermacher had already argued for the notion of a 
finite historicised soul.
206
human spirit provided Dilthey with a contrast to the traditional empiricism of 
Locke and the methods of the natural sciences;
The purposive activity of an individual —  characterized by Schleiermacher the 'will to know,' and 
by others as the 'drive to know'...must count on purposive activity by other individuals, both to 
incorporate it and to have an effect on it. (Dilthey 1985, 177)
Dilthey introduced the concept of the psychological and historicized subject 
to the new humanities. He felt strongly that the social sciences should have a 
philosophical foundation that was discernable from the natural sciences. 
Dilthey wanted a systematic approach that could explain the purposeful 
intentions of the individual. He wanted to create a methodological 
independence for the new humanities.
To give some perspective to Dilthey's aspirations we have to take into 
account the intellectual climate at the outset of the 18^*^ century. Beginning 
with a mechanistic worldview (based in large measure on conceptual 
advances by the likes of Locke, Leibniz and Newton), a new intellectual 
confidence began to emerge — as evidenced in such works as Vico's New 
Science (1725), lAxm.diQ\xsBystema Naturae (1735) and Hume's Enquiries 
(1748) m d Natural History o f Religion (1757).
Optimism in the creativity of humanity was implicit in the romantic idealism 
of Goethe, Herder and Fichte. Lessing published his treatise on education 
(1780) manifesting the high expectations of human progress. Not least, this 
was the century that heralded the age of reason in philosophical works such 
as Kant's Critique o f Pure Reason (1781), Prolegomena to any Future 
metaphysics (1783), Critique o f Practical Reason (1788) and Critique o f  
Judgment (1790).
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Impartial and independent scientific knowledge was the desired outcome. 
However, with no real epistemological guide of any greater significance than 
Sir Francis Bacon's publication of The New Organon (1690), the humanities 
would struggle with the methods available.
Schleiermacher makes his contribution to the enlightemnent just at the very 
end of this remarkable century. At the height of this optimism 
Schleiermacher was about to dampen down the celebrations with his 
reproving counsel in the publication of Speeches. For Dilthey, 
Schleiermacher's reproaches resulted in a fascinating insight into the 
historical dimension of human psychology:
The dramatic surge in the natural sciences soon effaced developments in the other disciplines, 
tempting many of the humanities into an often futile effort to emulate the positivistic methods of 
chemistry, physics, and biology. As a result, thinkers in the "human sciences" sought new 
justifications for their disciplines. One of the most influential was the philosopher Wilhelm 
Dilthey, who in the later nineteenth century began to distinguish rigorously between the 
Natunvissenschaften (natural sciences) and what he termed the Geisteswissenschafteii (sciences of 
the human mind), which are based, he argued, on "understanding" {Verstehen) rather than the 
"explanation" that characterizes the natural sciences. (Ziolkowski 2004, 14)
The result was a change in how individuals were regarded in relation to their 
lifeworlds. Modernity's concept of personal identity is embryonic in Locke's 
profile of the individual as a psychophysical unity. Locke closed the gap of 
Cartesian dualism and introduced the idea that memory and language were 
crucial elements of 'same consciousness' identity. The individual is like an 
'empty cabinet', as Locke put it, of empirical rationalism. Each 
consciousness collects its own histoiy of experience through its own 
substance, the body. As autonomous beings, we each have a new beginning;
A particiilai' concept of what it means to be human emerges from the work of Foucault, who suggested that the 20th 
century is a Deleuzean century, in much tbe same way as the 17th century was Kantian. By this, I think we can take 
it that he is talking about a philosopher who encapsulates a new vision of a kind of post-humanism.
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The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and the mind by 
degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to 
them; afterwards, the mind, proceeding farther, abstracts them and by degrees learns the use of 
their names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials 
about which to exercise its discursive faculty; and the use of reason becomes daily made visible, 
as these materials, that give it employment, increase. (Locke 1823, 21)
Each individual is 'topped up' with experience and memory. Although 
language and memory are key concepts in Locke's understanding of the 
accumulation of knowledge, they are mechanical rather than creative. Locke 
simply asked how it is that we come to know anything - and used the 
empirical method of the natural sciences to obtain his answer. The result was 
reason, understood as a faculty that operates when fuelled with facts from 
the external world.
Kant took this further and questioned the role of reason in understanding. 
Where Locke used his enquiiy to disclose the apparatus of reason, for Kant 
the individual is the instrument of laiowledge and understanding. Reason is 
not merely a storehouse that works thi*ough use and accumulation of detail. It 
also plays its role as a faculty of understanding. Truth is the objective, but 
to access it understanding is needed of the nature and function of the 
instrument of knowledge — of the individual made proficient through 
reason. This is summarised in Hegel's critique of Kant:
Knowledge is hereby represented as an instrument, as a method and a means whereby we 
endeavour to posses ourselves of the truth. (Hegel's Philosophy of History 1900, 428)
For Kant the mind provides the luminosity through which human reason 
gathers up the world and imposes order.
This image of reason as the instrument of illumination is later challenged by Bergson's argument that the mind is in 
fact what deflects the luminosity that exists in things in the world. Deleuze takes this notion of luminosity and 
generates a new empiricism. According to which truth is no longer an objective and the relationship between things 
takes priority. Empiricism of the senses is replaced with empiricism of the imagination.
209
Although not in any sense making a direct response to Kant's rational view 
of the universe, Schleiermacher is nonetheless critical of what is 
recognizably a Kantian view of moral order:
And what does your morality do? It develops a system of duties out of human nature and our 
relationship to the universe; it commands and forbids actions with unlimited authority. Yet 
religion must not presume to do that; it must not use the universe in order to derive duties and is 
not permitted to contain a code of laws. (Schleiermacher 1996, 20)
This is significant because Schleiermacher is very clear about the synthetic 
quality in the relationship between metaphysics, morality and religion. What 
is taken to be religion is actually a number of discrete and independent 
theories put together in such a way that 'the lawgiver might be engraved at 
the front of so splendid a code':
If you put yourselves on the highest standpoint of metaphysics and morals, you will find that both 
have the same object as religion, namely, the universe and the relationship of humanity to it. This 
similarity has long since been a basis of manifold aberrations; metaphysics and morals have 
therefore invaded religion on many occasions, and much that belongs to religion has concealed 
itself in metaphysics or morals under an unseemly form. But shall you, for this reason, believe that 
it is identical to one of these? (Schleiermacher 1996, 19)
Schleiermacher insisted that religion is the unifying principle that makes all 
theories possible but that religion could not be identified with any single one 
of them. Religion is the capacity of the individual to intuitively comprehend 
and extend the self in the environment:
Intuition is and always remains something individual, set apart, the immediate perception, nothing 
more. To bind it and to incorporate it into a whole is once more the business not of sense but of 
abstract thought. The same is true of religion; it stops with the immediate experiences of the 
existence and action of the universe, with the individual intuitions and feelings; each of these is a 
self-contained work without connections with others or dependence upon them; it knows nothing 
about derivation and connection, for among all things religion can encounter, that is what its 
nature most opposes. (Schleiermacher 1996, 26)
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Throughout the eighteenth century individual psychology was important but, 
initially, then curi'ent theories lacked the dialectical relationship that was to 
become prevalent in social philosophy after Hegel The early works of the 
enlightenment had an understanding of consciousness that was, according to 
Dilthey, mechanical and one-dimensional. Locke, Hume and Kant had failed 
to incorporate the idea of meaningful or purposeful histoiy. Dilthey turns to 
the works of Hegel, Schleiermacher and Schelling to fill in this gap for the 
new humanities. Dilthey argues that the positivism of the natural sciences 
that had influenced the enlightenment concept of the knowing subject was 
inadequate.
In the introduction of his philosophy of social science, Dilthey argues for the 
inclusion of psychology in fully understanding the human condition, but this 
also helps him to distinguish the humanities from the natural sciences:
No real blood flows in the veins of the knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume or Kant, but 
rather the diluted extract of reason as a mere activity of thought. A historical as well as 
psychological approach to whole human beings led me to explain even knowledge and its 
concepts (such as the external world, time, substance and cause) in terms of the manifold powers 
of a being that wills, feels, and thinks; and I do this despite the fact that knowledge seems to be 
woven of concepts derived from the mere contents of perception, representation, and thought. 
Therefore I will use the following method in this book: I will relate eveiy component of 
contemporary abstract scientific thought to the whole of human nature as it is revealed in 
experience, in the study of language, and in the study of history, and thus seek the connection of 
these components. The result is that the most important components of our picture of knowledge 
and reality —  our own personality as a life-unit, the external world, other individuals, their 
temporal life and interactions — can be explained in terms of this totality of human nature. In the 
real life process, willing, feeling, and thinking are only different aspects. The questions, which we 
all must address to philosophy, cannot be answered by the assumptions of a rigid epistemological 
apriori, but rather only by a developmental histoiy proceeding from the totality of our being. 
(Dilthey 1985, 50)
The term 'social philosophy' still applies to these early concepts of humanity because there was as yet no discrete 
discipline of social science.
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This indicates a shift toward an understanding of consciousness as the result 
of an interactive relation with history imbued with purpose and meaning, 
which becomes the core of Dilthey's philosophy.
Using Schleiermacher's example Dilthey argued that social and historical 
reality is preserved within the individual historical human consciousness. 
Willing, feeling and thinking are historical expressions of a universal 
psychological faculty, which become tools for the understanding of 
particular historical epochs. From the experience of the individual, an 
'immutable law' would emerge^^:
The result is that the most important components of our picture and knowledge of reality —  our 
own personality as a life unit, the external world, other individuals, their temporal life and their 
interactions — can be explained in terms of this totality of human nature. In the real life-process, 
willing, feeling and thinking are only different aspects. The questions, which we all must address 
to philosophy, cannot be answered by the assumption of a rigid epistemological a priori, but rather 
only by a developmental histoiy proceeding from the totality of our being. (Dilthey 1989, 51)
Crucially, for Dilthey, Schleiermacher's work enabled the historicizing of 
these new academic faculties which Kanf s inflexible categorization and 
Newton's mechanics could not. This was a point established in Dilthey's 
incomplete Life o f Schleiermacher, in which he instigates a hermeneutic of 
‘biographical presentation'; arguing that Schleiermacher's theology was 
indivisible fi’om his psycho-historical situation.^"^
This principle would run throughout much of late 19''’ and early 20‘'' century pastoral theology. For example in the 
work of Hiltner who would seek to find a 'unifying principle' from the testimony of individuals.
This kind of psychobiography became, and remains, a popular way of presenting intellectual and emotional history. 
For a classic example see Young Man Luther: a study in psychoanalysis and histoiy. Erik Erihon ( London Faber 
1958.) For a contemporaiy example the American television production of The Sopranos in which psychoanalysis is 
used as a hermeneutic trope for understanding the coexistence of violence and sentimentality in 'Mob' psychology.
In one scene Toni, the mob leader, almost beats his mistress to death because she has crossed the line and phoned his 
wife pretending to be a real estate sales person. His anger comes from the feeling that his 'family values' have been 
violated an emotion expressed weeping to his psychoanalysis. The Sopranos, however, represents the death of 
psychoanalysis in its exposure of psychological 'set pieces' of sentimentality and cliché.
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This was an ironic turn given Schleiermacher's awareness of the tension 
between the individual and history and his simple faithfulness to Spinoza's 
first proposition. Existence is the prerequisite for particular existences; we 
do not enter into history and gradually shape our existence from a blank 
slate. We enter in the midst of life.
Schleiermacher's address in Speeches was essentially about this tension. 
Schleiermacher attempts to capture the space or the moment between the 
individual and history:
Each human sou I-its transitoiy actions as well as the inner peculiarities of its nature that leads us 
to this conclusion-is merely the product of two opposing drives. The one strives to draw into itself 
everything that surrounds it, ensnaring it in its own life, and wherever possible, wholly absorbing 
it into its innermost being. The other longs to extend its own inner self ever further, thereby 
permeating and imparting everything from within, while never being exhausted itself. 
(Schleiermacher 1996, 5)
This is an aspect that is lost in Dilthey's acceptance of an individual's identity 
within historical experience. He is interested in a more stable representation 
of identity, not least because he wants to use it as a guiding principle for his 
new science. The psychobiography of the individual is still evident in the 
notions of'life cycles' found in 20^ '^  centuiy practical theology. For example, 
in the work of Don Browning, we can recognize Dilthey's working principles 
deployed to supplement an image of the moral individual:
It is the primary task of pastoral theology to bring together theological ethics and the social 
sciences to articulate a normative vision of the human life cycle. Pastoral theology involves stating 
the appropriate relation between a moral theology of the human life cycle and psychodynamic, 
developmental, and other social science perspectives that describe or explain how human 
development comes about. (Browning 1983, 187)
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This principle is, for Dilthey, key to understanding 'the reality of our own 
essence.' We recognize this biographical narrative because we all have our 
own sense of personal growth and history. On the one hand we have a 
physical and biological existence. We start life as helpless infants and much 
of our identity is organised around pre-existing expressions of life. Gender is 
an example of this.
Beyond the biological we have also have geographical and social 
determinants of identity. We may be aware of the cultural and socialization 
processes that contribute to identity but we certainly feel a strong sense of 
being a personal 'self different and separate from others. The self is capable 
of making choices and decisions. This is important when it comes to moral 
theory and it has certainly been a morally autonomous self that has been the 
basis for contemporary practical theology. The physical development of a 
person has been matched by theories of psychological development. This 
combination provides a very authoritative image of the life of a person as a 
natural linear succession of the physiological and psychological. There 
might be a capacity for social and historical variants but at the core is this 
enduring vision of humanity.
This image of the subject has been the basis for much of contemporary 
practical theology. We find it in the concept of a 'normative vision of the 
human life cycle,' in the work Don Browning (1983) and in the 'life cycles', 
'life histories' and 'life maps' in James Fowler's Stages o f Faith (1995).
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Its most recent use is to be found in the work of Friedrich Schweitzer in 
Practical Theology and Postmodern Life ( 2001) who, as we have observed 
still tries to retain some aspects of the modern 'life cycle' and even goes as 
far as introducing the notion of a 'postmodern life cycle'.
And yet Dilthey, because of his own remit to build a systematic analysis 
under the heading the Inner Perception and the Experiences o f Psychic life 
(Selected Works 195), ignored those aspects of Schleiermacher's writing 
which were nearer to German Romantic Idealism. Richard Crouter has 
argued this may well be because being associated with Romanticism had 
negative connotations:
Hans Eichner offers the apt reminder that "romanticism is an unpleasantly vague term, whose 
meaning depends only too often on the preoccupations of the person who happens to use it." But 
Schleiermacher's involvement in Romanticism can be approached on the basis of something more 
than a whim. As Friedrich Sclilegel's intellectual confidant, Schleiermacher shared his friend's 
sensibility and intellectual belief. If little scholarly consensus exists regarding Schleiermacher's 
relationship to Romanticism, this is partly due to efforts to explain away the relationship. Since 
Paul Kluckhorn, German literary scholars readily acknowledge that Schleiermacher fully shares 
the Romantic world view. Some writers in theology and literaiy studies (Dilthey, Haym, Redeker) 
resist this view and present Romanticism as a passing phase of his thought, while others (Forstam, 
Dierkes, Nowak) recognize the commonalities but stress Schleiermacher's distinctive contribution 
to a movement that was always heterogeneous. (Crouter 1998, xxvi)
Crouter is right to point to a debate that exists between scholars about the 
nature of Romanticism and the guiding principles of Schleiermacher's 
writing. He suggests that 'Christian apologists minimize Schleiermacher's 
Romanticism in order to project the theological orthodoxy of his mature 
teachings,' (Crouter 1998, xxviii) but ultimately the text itself provides the 
substance behind the claim for Romanticism being within the body of the 
work.
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1Schleiermacher does not make any direct references to Kanf s rationalist 
concept of faith and neither does he hold totally with Herder’s view that 
history is a progressive revelation of divine order. He is generally critical of 
the previous trend for a certain type of metaphysics:
What does your metaphysics do-or if you want to have nothing to do with the outmoded name that 
is too historical for you, your transcendental philosophy? It classifies the universe and divides it 
into this being and that, seeks out the reasons for what exists, and deduces the necessity of what is 
real while spinning the reality of the world and its laws out of itself. (Schleiermacher 1996, 20)
Schleiermacher may have been critical of rationalism and he construed a 
more complex notion of Romanticism, but it is nonetheless Romanticism 
that is at the heart of Speeches, This is very clear in his expectations that it is 
the very 'cultured despisers', the leaders of Romantic Idealism, whom he 
expects to give the most service to religion. Indicating how strongly he felt 
that the church is merely one historical manifestation of religion. His 
conviction that the resurgence of religion is just as likely to be orchestrated 
outside the church is expressed in the third speech:
Look there, the goal of your present highest endeavours is at the same time the resurrection of 
religion! It is your efforts that must bring about this event, and I celebrate you as the rescuers and 
guardians of religion, even though unintentionally so. Do not retreat from your posts and your 
works until you have unlocked the innermost element of knowledge and, in priestly humility 
opened the sanctuaiy of true science where, to eveiyone who enters and even to the sons of 
religion, everything is replaced that superficial laiowledge and arrogant boasting caused them to 
lose. (Schleiermacher 1996, 70)
Schleiermacher was calling for the 'cultured despisers' to give up the notion 
of exclusivity and individual genius in recognition of the role that religion 
plays in science and art. Religious intuition is after all what makes science, 
art and poetic creativity possible.
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For Schleiermacher, religion is an aesthetic sensibility. The human spirit is 
extended through art and science. However, it would be a mistake to imagine 
that Schleiermacher believes that they are in competition with religion, as 
Crouter seems to be suggesting:
If art and religion both serve as the basis for an intuition of the universe - a  view that undeniably 
follows from Schleiermacher's argument -what makes religion distinctive and worthy of pursuit 
for its own sake? (Crouter 1996, xxxiv)
Crouter has missed the point that Schleiermacher is making. Art and science 
would merely be the repetitive transference of ideas without any new 
imaginative insights made possible by the existence of religious intuition.
Without religion, how can praxis rise above the common circle of adventurous and customaiy 
forms? (Schleiermacher 1996, 23)
This observation was not linked to a desire to elevate art or science to 
religious status, but to indicate that neither of them can be historically 
manifest or innovative without this religious sensibility. Religion is not part 
of a trilogy i.e. Science, Art and Religion. Religious sensibility is the 
grounding for science and art. What the 'cultured despisers' have judged has 
not been religion but only what has been distorted and mistaken as religion. 
Crucially Schleiermacher did not believe that we find in religion a formula 
for good living, but that success in the attempt to live well may be 
achievable with the help of the intuitive faculty of religion.
Dilthey certainly had more cause to emphasize the rational rather than the 
romantic aspects of Schleiermacher. He had a veiy definite purpose in 
assimilating Schleiermacher's work into his own philosophy.
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Dilthey and others were intellectually engaged with the notion of history 
found in Schleiermacher's work. Even contemporaiy writings on 
Schleiermacher focus on this characteristic.
Wliat I will argue here is that for Schleiermacher the recognition of the 
various historical manifestations of religion was never as important as the 
emphasis he put on the imperfect nature of any historical reality. His view of 
history was never as simple as Lessing's unfolding enlightenment or Herder's 
notion that histoiy was progressive revelation. Schleiermacher’s view of 
history was not epic or teleological and, although he did historicize religion, 
he did not treat these manifestations as necessary.
It is evident that Schleiermacher's notion of an historical soul had an appeal 
to Dilthey and others like him who were searching for a rational method that 
would counter the positivism of the natural sciences. But there is a trap here, 
which Dilthey manages to fall into, of classifying Schleiermacher with other 
thinkers of his time. The concept of histoiy as the progressive unfolding of 
spirit in the world (Hegel), or the advancement of enlightenment ideals 
through the education of humanity (Lessing), or indeed history as revelation 
(Herder), makes it seem reasonable to assume that Schleiermacher's concept 
of history was part of this historical ensemble.
But Schleiermacher's notion of the historical soul provides us with a 
different concept of history; one that diverges from teleological versions.
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5.2 Romanticism and the New History
The history of a thing, in general, is the succession of forces which take possession of it and the 
co-existence of the forces which struggle for possession. The same object, the same phenomenon, 
changes sense depending on the forces which appropriates it. (Deleuze 2002, 3)
Theologies, moreover, may differ according to eveiy particular mode of faith, in that they 
correspond to the distinctiveness of each both in content and form. (Schleiermacher 1970, 19)
Dilthey is a key figure in demonstrating the influence that Schleiermacher 
had on the embryonic social sciences, especially in relation to his notion of a 
philosophy of a life world (Lebensphilosophie). Dilthey created and 
deployed a Schleiermachean hermeneutic in his work. He also applied this to 
the understanding of Schleiermacher’s ideas. Kant's theory required no 
immersion in his life world and as a consequence morality was detached 
from the world. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, made no separation 
between morality and subject:
Schleiermacher staunchly refuses to accept the 'duality' of the human moral agent upon which 
Kanfs system rests. The phenomenal and the noumenal selves must be conceived together if we 
are to consider a person as a moral agent. (Crouter 1996, xxi)
However, Dilthey's approach was intended to serve his own methodological 
purposes and he therefore ignored the Romanticism inherent in 
Schleiermacher's work. Dilthey was not opposed to rationalism for its own 
sake, but to the separation of the psychological component of the individual 
and the world that it inliabits. Kanfs transcendent rationalism was based on a 
division between knowledge and experience.
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Insofar as Schleiermacher was struggling against Kant's rational concept of 
faith, Dilthey was in agreement. He was astute and appreciated the potential 
of understanding human experience through the interpretation of an 
historical milieu. He was less keen to pursue the abstract categories, being 
more concerned with the psychic realities of experience. Nonetheless, he 
was still interested in pursuing laws.
However, Schleiermacher's concept of history was far more complex. With 
Schleiermacher, there is a grasp of the difference between the finite 
historical presentation of a thing and the infinite nature of its source. Perhaps 
one of the best demonstrations of this is to be found within the entirety of his 
work. On the one hand, Speeches is a ground breaking innovative 
masteipiece. Brief Outline, on the other hand, is an excellently crafted 
didactic document. The two are perfeetly compatible. Schleiermaeher 
demonstrates an awareness of exactly what the function of Brief Outline is in 
his preface to the first (1810) edition. He actually wrote two prefaces to the 
book. The preface to the second edition in 1830 is not much more than a 
small piece of publishing etiquette. It is veiy different in style and function 
fi’om the preface to the first edition of 1810, in which Schleiermacher is 
quite explicit that what he has written is a textbook that contains, like other 
textbooks, his particular school o f thought.
This is particularly significant because it reveals that he was veiy aware of 
its place in academia. This was the inauguration of Schleiermacher's career 
as University teacher:
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I have always found it extremely difficult to conduct academic lectures by following the outline of 
someone else's textbook. ...O f course, the more the particular views of people on details are 
subordinated to a common viewpoint, ie\ the more what is called a school obtains, the easier it 
becomes to use such a procedure. But everyone knows how little this is the case in theology at 
present. (Schleiermacher 1970, 17)
So here is a text that has emerged amid veiy specific circumstances; a 
teaching aid that makes no claims to be definitive but does claim to represent 
the broad spectrum of the author's outlook, prepared for the use of his 
students. Furthermore its very distinctness can be attributed to its being a 
scholarly document and not an exclusively theological treatise — in short, it 
is a prototype for the teaching of contemporary practical theology. For 
example, in its acknowledgement that uniformity of cuiTiculum content is 
desirable but has not been achieved, its author displays the hallmarks of 
someone who is endeavouring to perform a professional task.
Schleiermacher (along with others of that period, i.e. : Kant, Schelling, 
Lessing and Fichte) was seeking to create a unified view of knowledge that 
would provide a consistency in the curriculum for teaching purposes.
There was a certain se lf consciousness concerning the academic status of 
theology and philosophy at a time when the modern university was emerging 
with Law and Medicine as faculties in greater demand. Therefore, it has 
very different objectives from his earlier work in Speeches.
^^Fichle divided laiowledge into three distinct areas of study Philosophical, Philosophical/Historical and Historical. 
Historical knowledge played a crucial role in understanding the progression of humanity toward perfection. 
Schleiermacher too was concerned to present theology as a coherent scientific system but he did not agree with Fichte 
teleology,
For an excellent account of the historicizing of the new faculties see chapter one of Clio, The Romantic Muse by 
Theodore Ziolkowski (Cornell University Press, 2004)
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However, the comparison is unhelpfiil. Speeches was a work that addressed 
the epistemological and ontological changes of the 18^^^  century, and Brief 
Outline is a working tool serving a particular didactic purpose. 
Misunderstanding it as a departure from the earlier (younger)
Schleiermacher has long been one of the reasons that he has been perceived 
as merely a civil servant fulfilling state and church duties.
It would also be incomect to suggest that all of Schleiermacher's work is 
simply an unfolding of Speeches into a variety of forms. There is a more 
nuanced relationship between Speeches and the rest of his work. Although 
Schleiermacher later makes no overt references to the earlier work, it has a 
presence in his approach to the historical nature of religion. In fact, the view 
that he sketches of theology in Brief Outline would not have been possible 
without sustaining the idea of the tension between the individual, faith and 
history elaborated in Speeches,
In other words, the first proposition of Speeches serves as a guiding principle 
that exists throughout Schleiermacher's work. He was clearly more 
impressed with the notion that (not only was religion not containable within 
the strictures of given traditions but that) religion itself was what made the 
multiplicity of its historical manifestations possible. There is then no 
contradiction in working within the remit of a particular cultural expression 
of religion:
You will fmd the spirit of religion, not among the rigid systematizers or superficial indifferentists, 
but among those who live in it as their element and move ever further in it without nurturing the 
illusion that they are able to embrace it completely. (Schleiermacher 1996, 113)
111 the introduction to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari make the same mistake. They are 
critical of Schleiermacher and Fichte for being complicit in the dissemination of state ideology at the level of 
individual consciousness, creating a moral order that serves the state. This is a good example of how 
Schleiermacher work is felt to be familiar — there is no reference that indicates Deleuze or Guattari were aware 
of the ideas found in Speeches.
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Schleiermacher's view of religion as the aptitude to assimilate history is 
different from the notion that religion merely develops and changes 
according to some notion of progression. Schleiermacher's rejection of any 
dualism between reason and experience brings some alternative ontological 
characteristics not commonly associated with the enlightenment/romantic 
equation.
However, if Schleiermacher has been interpreted from a rationalist 
perspective that is unsympathetic to his closeness to the Romantic school of 
thought then it would be equally erroneous to see him as a Romantic Idealist. 
His century was not epistemologically homogenous; it was neither 
exclusively rationalist nor romantic. Nonetheless, in Rudolf Otto's 
introduction to Speeches the work is treated as being unequivocally 
Romantic:
In a particular sense, however, the work is a monument of the young Romantic school. Stemming 
directly from this circle and its atmosphere, it is a veritable manifesto of the Romantics in its view 
of nature and histoiy; its struggle against rationalist culture and Philistinism of rationalism in the 
state, church, school and society; its leaning toward fantasy, melancholy, presentiment, mysticism; 
its bias in favour of the historical and positive "becoming" in contrast to the "natural"; its 
championship of the individual, and its preference for the strange and the curious as over against 
"universal reason"... .In style and literaiy manner, the Speeches. . .are a model of romantic prose. 
(Schleiermacher 1958, xi)
Otto's reading of Schleiermacher was influential for most of the 20^ *^  centuiy, 
but he too failed to fully grasp the significance of the work. Nonetheless, it 
would be wrong to ignore the influence of the Romantic Movement on 
Schleiermacher.
Interpretation of Schleiermacher as a 'Romantic Liberal' made him a good counterbalance to the 
Biblical Orthodoxy of Karl Barth. This is worth the mention because it is another demonstration of 
how Schleiermacher can be used to serve the purposes and arguments of those who translate and 
interpret his work, whether it be with the rationalism of a Dilthey or the liberalism of an Otto.
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After all, his theory of an absolute aesthetic dependency encompassed both 
the sciences and the arts. Some of his greatest work was on translating Plato, 
and he had an affinity with pre-rationalist culture.
Speeches emerged from and in response to these two quite distinct 
intellectual cultures. For example, Kant influenced Schleiermacher at a time 
when he was questioning the nature of faith. In this sense, Kant became a 
catalyst for some of the thinking that underpins his work. Therefore, even 
though Schleiermacher would ultimately be critical of Kant he was still an 
important figure in the formation of some of his ideas. Working in Berlin, as 
a hospital chaplain, he befriended intellectuals and poets of the Romantic 
Movement. Both Fichte and Schlegel were amongst this group. This was 
also the time when the authorities were most concerned about the influence 
of contemporary philosophy on his theology.
Schleiermacher, like his contemporaries shared in a vision of a humanity 
increasingly optimistic about its ability to shape destiny. He benefited 
intellectually from the freedom of the Romantic period. As Theodore 
Ziolkowski (a scholar of the German Literature from this period) has argued, 
the new philosophies were experimenting with language and were creating 
new forms for the mediation of new ideas. At times they produced, as 
Ziolkowski suggests, difficult language to comprehend.
This was necessary for the avoidance of a reduction of philosophy to mere 
'empty formalism' (Ziolkowski 2004, 49). This was especially true of Hegel's 
philosophy, written in what Ziolkowski describes as a 'language of
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estrangement.’
It was Hegel's conviction that the reader, by working his way through his complex prose, would 
be compelled to recapitulate in his own mind the process of thought that brought Hegel to his 
conclusions, rather than simply accepting them. (Ziolkowski 2004, 49)
This problem of concealment occupied Schleiermacher, who ultimately 
came to see that (through poetry, literature and other aesthetic forms) 
‘cultured’ individuals could be a source of discovery. For Schleiermacher 
this aesthetic sensibility was the source of revelation^^:
It should be realized that what might be called this language of estrangement, exemplilying the 
consciousness of a new age, is typical of many young thinkers of the period. During their mutual 
time in Frankfurt, Hegel's friend Holderlin was creating an utterly original poetic language that did 
not permit the reader to fall back into the easy familiarities of earlier eighteenth-centuiy poetiy but 
that demanded his active participation; and much of Ho Merlin's finest poetry still challenges even 
his linguistically and theoretically most adept admires. (Ziolkowski 2004, 50)
Ziolkowski argues that Schleiermacher was responsible for achieving the 
same for theology, and it is certainly true that Speeches introduces the reader 
to a radically new concept of religion with a style very different from the 
familiar theological treatises.
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Hegel's 'complex prose' seems to be overwhelming in a contemporary academic age where simplicity and clarity are 
sought. However, Ziolkowski is making an important point about the use of language and how difficulty of 
understanding is not always due to perversity on behalf of the author. It is hard work to overthrow old patterns of 
thinking. Interestingly Deleuze and Guattari felt that they were often criticized for using complicated terminology in 
order to be 'trendy'. They felt the criticism to be unjust because a concept would sometimes need a new word to 
express it.
Although Hegel and Schleiermacher were working in isolation from each other, there is an underlying principle in 
the writings of both. Hegel very much wanted to be the 'people's philosopher'. Ironically his work is difficult to read, 
it is hard to imagine how you could have Hegel as a people's pedagogue when even experienced scholars will settle 
for reading only the preface of phenomenology o f spirit. However, it was not this that concerned Hegel so much as 
the notion that ultimately everyone would have the freedom which it is possible to attain through an enlightened 
consciousness: 'I am free when I am fiilly awaie of myself. The point is that Hegel was, through his writing, trying 
to reveal how constrained most of humanity is, and that existing thought processes conceal this lack of freedom. 
Exactly the same argument is made by Schleiermacher about religion; that the 'cultured despisers' have no awaieness 
that the capacity for religion is the exact thing that makes their particulai- aesthetic possible.
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However Speeches is an extraordinary work, not only because it takes on 
board the intellectual 'estrangement' from old ways of thinking, but because 
Schleiermacher exercises caution at celebrating the notion of individual 
genius. Where other enlightenment thinkers embraced new thought as a 
means for discrediting religion, Schleiermacher would argue that new 
thinking is only possible through the mediation of a religious sensibility.
His views were neither popular nor mainstream. He was unique, however, 
insofar as he acknowledged the potential he found within Romantic 
Liberalism without giving sway to its more hedonistic aspects. 
Schleiermacher assimilated these liberating ideas, but ultimately came up 
with a very distinct ontology.
While Richard Crouter argued that the Romantic Movement was responsible 
for the revival in the interest of Spinoza through the publication of On the 
Teaching o f Spinoza: Letters to Mr. Moses Mendelssohn (1998, 24 
[F.H.Jacobi 1743-1819]), there is little doubt that Spinoza also has an 
intellectual presence in the text of Speeches. Schleiermacher certainly feels 
compelled to share with the reader his admiration for Spinoza:
Respectfully offer up with me a lock of hair to the manes of the holy rejected Spinoza! The high 
world spirit permeated him, the infinite was his beginning and end, the universe his only and 
eternal love; in holy innocence and deep humility he was reflected in the eternal world and saw 
how he too was its most lovable mirror; he was full of religion and full o f the holy spirit; for this 
reason, he stands there alone and unequalled, master in his art but elevated above the profane 
guild, without disciples and without rights of citizenship. (Schleiermacher 1998, 24)
In this homage to Spinoza, Schleiermacher is all too aware that the fate of 
maligned outsider could be his too. He makes an important observation in 
this passage about the status of knowledge. Schleiermacher maintains, in his 
defence of Spinoza, that no one really understood the significance of his 
predecessor's work.
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Schleiermacher knew that the work was not only of its time but also of veiy 
avant-garde in its mood. The publication of Speeches came at a time when 
the educated classes dismissed religion with hostility. Nonetheless, the 
church and the state both defended religious orthodoxy. Schleieiinacher was 
at odds with the educated classes, the church and the state simultaneously, he 
refused to apologize for his inclusion of Spinoza.
Accordingly, he defended the use of Spinoza within the text. He himself 
stood accused of pantheism and was potentially at risk of censorship and 
exclusion. Yet he never reneged on the justification of using Spinozean 
concepts in later editions of Speeches. However, unlike the Romantics, 
Schleiermacher did not believe that Spinoza's theory of determinate 
existence necessarily led to atheism. Romanticism may have influenced 
Schleiermacher, but his interpretation of Spinoza led him to very different 
conclusions.
Schleiermacher sought to mitigate the more hedonistic aspects of Romantic 
Idealism with an interpretation of Spinoza's Ethics, with the narcissistic 
elements muted by his theory of absolute dependency, as propounded in 
Speeches, The text of Speeches makes a slight volume in comparison to 
Schleiermacher's later works, but it provides the conceptual fabric behind all 
his later publications; being (in this sense) the greatest of them all.
The notion of a historicized spirit may have been a key concept in the 
development of Dilthey's method of'meaningful history', but (at the same 
time) it detracted from Schleiermacher's radical ontology and his parallel 
concept of histoiy.
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5.3 Religion and History: Schleiermacher's Speeches
Speeches is a treatise on the nature of religion which is concerned with its 
shifting and displaced frontiers, not with its formal organization. 
Schleiermacher intends to demonstrate not only that religion is infinite, but 
that it manifests itself in transient historical detail. That it is not an 
organizing principle but that it can be manifest in the 'organizing principles' 
of historically situated loiowledge. Religion is immanent, not detached. It is 
continually in flux. While it may be associated temporally with some 
historical feature or other, such is but a worldly association. This directly 
rejects Rant's attempt to reduce religion to a practice of following the 
correct moral imperatives from some rational perspective or other.
Schleiermacher makes veiy radical statements about religion in Speeches. 
Religion has had multiple alliances and will never be 'completed' in any one 
historical experience. It has no exclusion zones. It crosses all boundaries and 
cannot be contained within formal institutions like the church. It can engage 
and disengage. It has no permanent affiliation with any particular historical 
manifestation. Therefore, religion resists permanent transference into 
specific cultural traditions. That which we may observe today as religious is 
not stable but is transient. It can go through periods of being visible as well 
as periods of concealment.
Religion is not teleological. It has no preset order and therefore has the 
potential to have multi-configurations. It has no necessary formal hierarchy. 
It is not elitist. It only appears as such in certain formations where 
stratification is part of the manifest order. Its connections are never
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permanent — as Schleiermacher argued in the case of Kant's metaphysics 
and moral theory:
Religion never appears in a pure state. All these are only the extraneous parts that cling to it, and it 
should be our business to free it from them. (Schleiermacher 1996, 21)
Understanding the veiy human and cultural dimensions of religion and 
(more importantly) that they can never comprise the totality of religion, is 
the starting point for Schleiermacher in his address to those who only think 
they know what religion is. In his first speech, he identifies his intended 
audience. It is the educated and avant-garde thinkers of the time, those who 
have benefited from an enlightemnent philosophy of self-improvement. 
Those who are so sophisticated they would not give religion a second 
thought:
You have succeeded in making your own lives so rich and many sided that you no longer need the 
eternal, and after having created a universe for yourselves, you are spared from thinking of that 
which created you. (Schleiermacher 1996, 3)
Therefore we are led to understand from the outset that Schleiermacher is 
not concerned with the atheist or the sceptic but that he is focused on the 
emergence of the kind of thinkers that not only do not even concern 
themselves with the existence or non-existence of a deity but to whom it is 
not even a matter worthy of intellectual space. However, Schleiermacher 
argues that veiy few have been able to discern authentic religion from its 
historical and cultural 'trappings':
From time immemorial faith has not been eveiyone's affair, for all times only a few have 
understood something of religion while millions have played with its trappings with which it has 
willingly let itself be draped out of condescension. (Schleiermacher 1996, 3)
Schleiermacher's 'cultured despisers' associate religion with historical
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facades and have convinced themselves that they have managed to fulfil 
their lives through the new arts and sciences, and that they no longer need 
God as an explanation for existence. Furthermore, they are optimistic that 
humanity is in control of its destiny.
Having identified his target audience, Schleiermacher then takes care to 
distance himself from others in his profession who merely lament the decline 
of religion.
What I intend lies almost outside their sphere and would hardly resemble what they want to see 
and here. I do not chime in with the ciy for help of most of them concerning the demise of 
religion, for I would not know what other age may have accommodated it better tlian the 
present... (Schleiermacher 1996, 4)
Distancing himself from what he considers the restrictive legalistic mode of 
both Jewish and Catholic traditions, as well as from his own peers, 
Schleiermacher makes it clear that his concerns extend beyond the usual 
boundaries of anxiety within religious circles. The commonplace arguments 
and prejudices are not the objects of his quest. Schleiermacher wants a shift 
of perspective in the discourse on religion. He wishes to cordon off the 
social and cultural (even the political) influences. Leaving aside all historical 
persuasions and manifestations, he desires a proposal with no preconceived 
cultural agenda.
It is, of course, significant that at the time of writing this address 
Schleiermacher was not attached to the state machinery. He had also gone 
into voluntary exile from his friends to write the book. Therefore, it was as 
an outsider he compiled Speeches. This was not the case with his later work.
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Schleiermacher also wished to make it clear that he was not speaking in 
defence of any prevalent school of thought. He regarded all existing 
arguments (whether rational pious or teleological) as mere fashions, 
secondary to the true nature of religion:
That I speak does not originate from a rational decision or from hope or fear, nor does it happen in 
accord with some final purpose or from some arbitrary or accidental reason. It is the inner, 
irresistible necessity of my nature; it is a divine calling; it is that which determines my place in the 
universe and makes me the being that I am. Even if it were neither suitable nor prudent to speak of 
religion, the thing that thus drives me crushes these petty notions with its heavenly power. 
(Schleiermacher 1996, 5)
Religion, as Schleiermacher perceives it, has no necessary relationship with 
the trappings of history. History in this sense is not revelation. It may 
disclose religion in its manifest traditions, but this is where Schleiermacher's 
view of histoiy departs from the Hegelian notion of history and, indeed, 
from those of Herder and Lessing. History is not the unfolding of truth and 
the path to completeness.
On the contrary, history for Schleiermacher is problematic because an 
individual has no real chance of reaching a perfect state. At best, individuals 
may reduce the anxiety of what he describes as a 'holy sadness' by becoming 
parts of the greater accumulation of individual experiences. Individuals seek 
to reduce the anxiety of remaining outside history. They seek to embrace 
particular fates in order to engage with life.^^
Nietzsche would some time later introduce the notion of Tate amori' to describe this dilemma. The point is to 
embrace your fate, but this is not to be a passive acceptance. Nietzsche believed that once this was accepted, we 
could have power over our own life circumstances.
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5.4 The Malleable Spirit o f Co-creation
To such a tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself on the stream, to a single sharp impression, 
with a sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone by, what is real in our life 
fines itself down. It is with this movement, with the passage and dissolutions of impressions, 
images, sensations, that analyses leaves off —  that continual vanishing away, that strange, 
perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves. (Pater 1893, conclusion)
À
One of the reasons Schleiermacher was able to mitigate the more hedonistic 
aspects of Romanticism was his admiration for Spinozean ethics. Influenced 
by Spinoza, Schleiermacher believed that each individual life is part of a 
continuum of gain and loss. Each individual is taken and absorbed in the 
greater whole. The individual has a finite historical existence; this includes 
the spirit or the soul.
Spinoza believed that the soul died with the body and this becomes the basis 
for Schleiermacher's understanding of the spirit as historically finite and 
plastic:
You know that the deity by an immutable law has compelled itself to divide its great work 
endlessly, to fuse together each definite being only out of two opposing forces, and to realize each 
of its eternal thoughts in twin forms that are hostile to each other. This whole corporeal world, 
penetration into whose interior is the highest goal of your investigations, appears to the best 
informed and most thoughtful among you only as an eternally prolonged play of opposing forces. 
Every life is a continuous appropriation and repulsion; everything has its determinate being only 
by the way in which it uniquely combines and retains the two primal forces of nature: the thirsty 
attraction and the expansion of the active and living self. It seems to me even if the spirits, as soon 
as they are transplanted into this world, would have to follow such a law.
(Schleiermacher 1998, 5)
Spinoza's concept of the finite soul or spirit is nearer to the modified dualism 
of Aristotle. For Plato, the soul was transcendent and the body was merely a 
vehicle that it passed through. The soul would caiTy on after the death of the 
body and inhabit another. But the soul would experience a 'forgetting' of all
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the knowledge accumulated in a past life. Hence for Plato learning was akin 
to remembering and his method of dialogue would bring out Icnowledge that 
the soul already possessed. For Aristotle the soul and the body had one finite
•  ^ 92existence.
Resisting the dualism of the spirit and corporeal existence has important 
implications for ethics and epistemology. Knowledge has no transcendent 
and abstract existence. Experience and knowledge become intrinsically 
woven. For Schleiermacher, we have a concept of spirit drawing on the 
world in order to release the tension of being without existence. Given the 
inseparability of both, becoming in the immediate world is an act of creative 
consent. Spirit, because of its desire to 'be' becomes imbued with and shaped 
by the circumstances from which it emerges. This is conceptually different 
from the Hegelian spirit that unfolds through the material world.
For Schleiermacher there is a tension which is only temporally reduced 
thi'ough the act of becoming. The individual spirit, in as much as it has 
awareness of its finite and historical existence, laiows that to live 
authentically is to live this particular life. This commitment to life does not 
diminish the 'holy longing' that discloses the opposing forces of nature and 
spirit. However, this struggle takes place in the unity of the individual. 
Hence inner reflection becomes a means of reducing the tension between 
history and the soul. There is a sense of sacrifice and resistance, awareness
It was Aristotle's concept of one body, one soul that was adapted by Thomas Aquinas and became the basis for the 
Christian notion of the beatific vision. Of course for the Christian concept of the afterlife (in which the body was 
resurrected as well as the soul) this unique identity was important, otherwise there could be no conceivable way that 
a just allocation of reward or punishment could be administered.
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that the movement into a particular self is also a movement that allows 
history to consume the potential to be other than this. How might one live?
Moreover, this particular existence will be able to identify within the shared 
existence (a shared sensibility) of the particular common bond of 
consciousness:
The perfection of the intellectual world consists in the fact that not only are all possible 
combinations of these two forces between the two opposed ends really present in humanity, with 
now one and now the other nearly excluding everything and leaving only an infinitely small part 
to its opposite, but also a common bond of consciousness embraces them all so that each person, 
even though he can be nothing other than what he must be, nevertheless recognizes all others as 
clearly as himself and perfectly comprehends all individual manifestations of humanity. 
(Schleiermacher, 1996, 6)
On the one hand, the spirit strives to bring into it the experiences of the 
historical location and, on the other hand, to permeate that same experience 
by extending an 'inner self that is part of/dependent on the infinite:
The former desire is oriented toward enjoyment; it strives after individual things that bend toward 
it; it is quieted so long as it has grasped one of them, and always works mechanically on whatever 
is at hand. The latter drive despises enjoyment and only goes on to ever-increasing and heightened 
activity; it overlooks individual things and manifestations just because it penetrates them and finds 
everywhere only the forces and entities on which its own forces breaks; it wants to penetrate and 
fill everything with reason and freedom, and thus proceeds directly to the infinite and at all times 
seeks and produces freedom and coherence, power and law, right and suitability.
(Schleiermacher 1996, 5)
With this concept of the historicized spirit, Schleiermacher has introduced a 
tension between individual desire and historical circumstances. He used 
Spinoza's Proposition 1, the prior existence of a substance to its modification 
{Ethics, 5), to form his theory that the body and the soul are both subject to 
historical adaptation:
The soul, as is shown both in its passing actions and inward characteristics has its existence 
chiefly in two opposing impulses. Following the one impulse, it strives to establish itself as an 
individual. For increase no less than sustenance, it draws what surrounds it to itself, weaving it
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into its life, absorbing it into its own being. The other impulse, again, is the dread fear to stand 
alone over against the whole, the longing to surrender oneself and to be absorbed in a greater, to 
be taken hold o f  and determined [my italics]. (Schleiermacher 1958, 4)
Spinoza's concept of the spirit as finite, with the replenishing theme of gain 
and loss in relation to the individuation process, provided Schleiermacher 
with a concept of histoiy as the ebb and flow of constant change in spirit as it 
extended thi'ough its historical individual becomings. This also meant that 
the particular conditions of being were transient and the trappings of a 
particular historical existence linger as a remnant.
Religious sensibility was not in the remnants of a particular historical 
manifestation but in this movement of the soul. For Schleiermacher what he 
refers to interchangeably as the soul, mind or spirit had a plastic quality. It 
was capable of being formed or created, giving it a sculptural quality that 
makes it enduring, in that it extends into history as a particular historical 
consciousness. This aspect of Schleiermacher's work was crucial for 
Dilthey's understanding of the world;
The purposefiil activity of an individual —  characterised by Schleiermacher's the 'will to know,' 
and by others as the 'drive to know'.. .must count on corresponding purposive activity by other 
individuals, both to incorporate it and to have an effect on it. (Dilthey 1989, 177)
In this sense, the individual is a closed unit. Through the spirit, the opposing 
forces of the spiritual and natural realm are one. Each individual must make 
the movement toward the world in an act of self formation. However, to 
become aware of God and experience revelation requires an expulsion of the 
historical self; a sacrifice that Schleiermacher portrays as dangerous but 
rewarding. This is at the core of his theory of absolute dependency and the 
relationship between revelation and self denial:
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Observe yourself with unceasing effort. Detach all that is not yourself, always proceed with ever- 
sharper sense, and the more you fade from yourself the clearer will the universe stand forth before 
you, the more splendidly will you be recompensed for the horror of self annihilation through the 
feeling of the infinite in you. (Schleiermacher 1996, 68)
Schleiermacher is acknowledging that there exists an awareness of the 
diverse pull between spirit and the world, but (unlike Kant) he does not 
believe in a clear division between the two. Extending the self into history is 
irresistible. The desire to become part of history is equal to the will to be.
At the same time, withdrawal from the world is necessary for awareness, not 
only of the divine, but also of an understanding of the finite limitations of the 
historical T. Schleiermacher's process of intuition is a retreat from the world 
in order to then merge with one's place in the world. Except through the 
material conditions of the body, there is no other means by which the soul 
can thrive.
When Schleiermacher makes a distinction in his third speech between the 
religion of art and artistic sense, he is making a significant statement about 
the nature of art and the nature of religion. Their appearance is as that of 
separate entities, but they are both part of the same sensibility. Art is 
perceived as intuitively creative but not necessarily the same as religion. 
Schleiermacher is saying otherwise, that the same capacity in the human 
imagination that is authentic to religion makes art possible too.
Religion and art stand beside one another like two friendly souls whose inner affinity whether or 
not they equally surmise it, is nevertheless unknown to them. Friendly words and outpourings of 
the heart always hover on their lips and return again and again because they are still not able to 
find the proper manner and final cause of their refection and longing. They hope for a fuller 
revelation and, suffering and sighing under the same pressure, they see one another enduring, 
perhaps with inner sympathy and deep feeling but yet without love. (Schleiermacher 1998, 69)
Schleiermacher is not contusing religious art or art that is promoted to the
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status of religion with the artistic sense that makes the actual production of 
art possible. Both art and religion share an aesthetic dependency. For each, it 
emerges from precisely the same source, the spirit.
At the same time, this source is the very goal to which both are striving to 
return. Like religion, art shares in the ability to make manifest perceptions of 
the infinite and bring vision to fruition:
Look there, the goal of your present highest endeavours is at the same time the resurrection of 
religion! It is your efforts that must bring about this event, and I celebrate you as the rescuers and 
guardians of religion, even though unintentionally so. Do not retreat from your posts and your 
works until you have unlocked the innermost element of knowledge, and, in priestly humility, 
opened the sanctuaiy of true science where, to everyone who enters and even to the sons of 
religion, eveiything is replaced that superficial knowledge and arrogant boasting caused them to 
lose. (Schleiermacher 1996, 70)
The claim that Schleiermacher is making here is that even the church and the 
clergy can benefit from the insight gained from artistic pursuits.
Furthermore, the passage makes it clear that all along Schleiermacher's 
'culture despisers' have been in possession of this aesthetic sensibility and 
that he has addressed them in particular as a way of showing how the new 
class of thinkers in a modern world owe their creativity to this absolute 
dependency on the infinite and therefore owe religion their service. 
Schleiermacher believed that religious ethics, as the lived conatus of 
individual souls could be demonstrated through an aesthetic sensibility that 
could comment on the presence of the infinite in our existence. The question 
arises: Can this remain true for contemporary art?
237
Conclusion
Schleiermacher's significance, for postmodern theology, lies in his 
commitment to the notion of the historical and finite soul/spirit. This has a 
part to play in an onto-theological and epistemological conception of being. 
For practical theologians it means that an authentic contribution can be made 
to contemporary theory from an authentically theological perspective rather 
than settling for an assimilation of anthro-sociological understandings of 
experience. It brings the spiritual back into the arena of practical theology.
What I have argued for in this chapter is that practical theology should have 
access to a Schleieimacher unburdened of the various interpretations and 
misrepresentations that have been responsible for detracting from his radical 
ontology, thereby allowing the discipline to re-engage with some of the 
innovative concepts he had with regards to history and knowledge. The first 
misrepresentation was the notion that Schleiermacher's contribution to 
modern theology consisted merely in the organization of theology into 
carefully differentiated annexes. He had the reputation of being the 
theologian most responsible for the clerical paradigm, which most 
contemporary practical theologians want to distance practical theology from.
Schleiermacher's later work was consistent with (and modified by) his 
involvement in the creation of a curriculum in the new modern university in 
which theology, like other disciplines, was a discrete subject. It no longer 
held the place it had occupied in the older regime. Schleiermacher was 
influenced both by Schelling's approach to teaching as a vocation and by
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Fichte's attempt to make knowledge systematic. The organization of 
knowledge into different categories was characteristic of the new world 
order. This curriculum served a particular culture.
There is nothing in Schleiermacher's later systematic work that contradicts 
his ontology or his belief about the underlying spiritual basis for loiowledge 
of any kind. The state and the church had more reason to emphasize the 
pedagogical and clerical aspects of Schleiermacher's thinking. I do not 
believe that this was in any way conspiratorial, even though both were very 
critical of what they took to be the 'pantheistic' influences of Spinoza. 
Schleiermacher was nonetheless accorded a position of considerable 
influence and responsibility.
The second misrepresentation comes from Dilthey, who was keen for the 
opportunity to translate Schleiermacher's concept of the historical soul into 
his own concept of an historical psyche. This provided Dilthey with a 
psychological perspective for the explanation of experience — something 
which the methods of the natural sciences, with their emphasis on empirical 
and measurable facts, could not provide.
However, Dilthey was satisfied that these experiences were a legitimate 
source of knowledge, whereas Schleiermacher had presented a more subtle 
understanding concerning the individuals and their historical circumstances. 
He recognized that fate was, in some sense, both limiting and liberating, 
whereas Dilthey had his own motivation for deploying Schleiermacher's 
historicalization of the spirit.
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Schleiermacher's concept of religion as the 'inner' or intuitive process 
emerged from his attempts to show what religion was not. It was not a 
product of the rational mind; in the second speech Schleiermacher makes it 
very clear that he wishes to disassociate religion from Kanf s transcendental 
moral philosophy. This is an important critique, which has a contemporaiy 
resonance with practical theology because some practical theologians are 
still in pursuit of an all-inclusive method that will deliver moral theoiy and 
practical wisdom as the result of a rational process.
Dilthey was responsible for taking Schleiermacher in a direction that led to a 
hermeneutics of historical understanding. This ultimately distracted from the 
insight that Schleiermacher had into the historicalization of religion (and, for 
that matter, science and art).
What Dilthey was in fact analysing was the product of this capacity for the 
human spirit/soul to engage in history. The desire to understand the 
'purposeful' nature of praxis is not the same as understanding the 
ontological/creativity of the commitment/emergence of an individual to 'a 
life'.
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Chapter 6
ART AND NEW PASTORAL SPACES
Above all practical theology has to believe in itself. The opportunities, despite all the negatives of 
shrinking resources, are there. It will survive and flourish if it can produce the goods. Pastoral 
theology is genuinely useful. It can enlarge the universe of human discourse, instruct, provide 
practical council, illuminate human nature and provide moral direction. But pastoral theology is at 
the bottom like all art —  pleasurable, amusing, refreshing, fun. Indeed that is its usefulness 
(Ballard in International Journal of Practical Theology 1999 Vol.2 308)
As I have demonstrated above, practical theology has generated a historical 
narrative in order to establish its academic bearings. Calibrating the 
discipline to establish a consistent pedagogy involves locating and 
coordinating all the familiar landmarks so that a well-mapped landscape 
can emerge. This sense of an inhabited and settled space is evident in the 
work of Paul Ballard, e.g.: in the report entitled Where is British Practical 
Theology? The map that Ballard uses here is intellectually similar to those 
of other academic disciplines.
The fact that Ballard can declare that the ‘first and natural’ place to look for 
practical theology is in academic structures serves to emphasize this 
heritage. Practical theology extends itself from within an educational 
organisation, and seeks to build on this foundation:
Practical Theology (PT) emerged afresh on the academic scene in the 1960s. Subsequently, it 
has been struggling to find distinct form and content and to become established in the 
theological curriculum. (Ballard & Pattison 2002, 15)
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Within this scheme, while art may be perceived as an extra-curricular 
subject area that can be deployed by practical theologians as a useful 
activity which is nevertheless conceptually separate from academia, I will 
argue in this chapter that this view differs from Schleiermacher's concept 
of art. The portrayal of art as 'pleasurable, amusing and refreshing' places it 
in a very minor role in comparison with art as it is understood by some 
contemporary theorists.
By the mid-twentieth century, we begin to see the theorisation of art reflect 
an aesthetic creativity as a medium not just for portraying or representing 
the world around us, but through which human experience and the world 
are reconciled. This is an understanding of art that is close to 
Schleiermacher's concept of the spirit. I will argue in this chapter that art 
and human creative activity should have a much more central role in how 
we understand spiritual life. I will examine the emergence of these new 
dimensions of art theory through the writings of Joseph Kosuth, who has 
made a significant impact on the recognition of art as an integral part of 
human understanding.
Kosuth was not only an artist; he was also a philosopher of art insofar as he 
wrote about the critical understanding of how art work is created. His 
writings contributed to the discourse of art criticism. He wished to separate 
art from traditional aesthetic criticism and challenged conventional notions 
about art. The theory of aesthetic perfection/beauty is not the measure of 
good art and the 'object' of art is not a static form. The result was a 
philosophy of art that subverted traditional classifications.
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New thought, new thinking always seeks out some new form of presenting. 
Repetition of these forms is always possible but the origins have the 
uniqueness of communicating the innovative concepts through the working 
process of the artist.
In his influential essay, Art after Philosophy, (Kosuth 2002) Kosuth put 
forward the idea that the real significance of art is to continue where 
philosophy has left off.^  ^The separation of the understanding of art from 
the self-reflexive activity of the artists was how art criticism usually 
worked. Kosuth argued for the right for the artist's thought process, the 
ideas incorporated in a work, to be part of the understanding of the work. 
The term conceptual art emerged from Kosuth's writings. He also argued 
that art was not a discipline that could be isolated from culture, perception, 
language and understanding. Moreover, in searching for a way to reduce 
art's isolation, he opened up the means of understanding that all these 
separate disciplines have a common principle. Whatever makes language, 
culture, belief and understanding possible was also the basis for art works:
In seeking to identify the notion of artistic work with the conceptual artist, Kosuth has not only 
aligned art with language and culture but has helped to reduce its status as an isolated 
independent discipline. (Guercio 2002, xxii)
Wishing to dispel the myth that art was something that took place beyond 
the ordinary experience of existence, Kosuth made it possible for the 
audience the reader or the viewer of art to be able to perceive art as both 
universal and integral to the creative process and the human condition.
This was in specific reference to philosophy after Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and his Tractatns Logico- 
Phitosophocus ( 1921) and postcolonial anthropology.
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He worked on understanding artists' conceptual processes, thus providing 
new critical insight into the creative practices and new forms that reveal 
different perceptions of reality.
In the past man has considered the picture of the world which was given to him by his vision as 
being totally true or real and absolute. The mathematical perspective invented by renaissance |
scientists gave the artists an opportunity to make 'real' works of art. Modern scientists have 
realized the limitations of our vision. Technological 'aids' to vision, such as the advanced 
microscope or telescope, show us how much we don't see. If man's natural vision could see 
molecules or distant planets, surely his consideration of reality would be much different. The 
level of our perception of the world around us is arbitrarily arrived at by our vision. (Kosuth 
2002, 5)
For Kosuth, conceptual art replaces philosophy and anthropology because 
it expands the intellectual space that philosophy and anthropology can no 
longer sustain. Conceptual art seeks to make the excess beyond the 
controlled boundaries of the narrative form (or plane o f organisation) 
accessible; or at least to make it palpable, even if it cannot make it visible.
Lyotard sums up this elusiveness as: 'the perceptible is not entirely 
perceived; the visual is more than the visible' (Kosuth 2002, xvi).
Conceptual art creates the form through which this is disclosed. This 
understanding of art is very different from the kind of art that Ballard 
proposes as a 'fun' aspect of practical theology. As Kosuth presents it, art is 
a powerful mode of 'presenting' or disclosing the invisible through 
whichever form it selects. It is a valid analysis of reality when it ceases to 
be merely an 'investment', a pleasing pastime or entertainment:
Here then I propose rests the viability of art. In an age when traditional philosophy is unreal 
because of its assumptions, art's ability to exist will depend not only on its not performing a 
service —  as entertainment, visual (or other) experience, or decoration —  which is something 
easily replaced by kitsch culture and technology, but rather, it will remain viable by not 
assuming a philosophical stance; for art's unique character is the capacity to remain aloof from 
philosophical judgments. It is in this context that art shares similarities with logic, mathematics 
and, as well science. But whereas the other endeavours are useful, art is not. Art indeed exists 
for its own sake. (Kosuth 2002, 24)
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Kosuth's definition of art's viability resonates with Schleiermacher's 
concept of religions sensibility, which exists for its own sake — not for the 
purpose of any applied morality of liturgical correctness, but as an infinite 
and non-contingent faculty manifesting itself in historical form. However, 
those forms are neither the meaning nor the purpose of it. It exists as part of 
human understanding, not as some abstract entity possessed of independent 
existence. It exists because we exist. It is that part of our being that reaches 
out to grasp fate, but is also the part of us that can influence history through 
the modifying effect we can have upon it. Schleiermacher makes this point 
about religion and art being misunderstood when considered as separate 
and distinct:
Religion and art stand beside one another like two friendly souls whose inner affinity whether or 
not they equally surmise it, is nevertheless unknown to them. Friendly words and outpourings of 
the heart always hover on their lips and return again and again because they are still not able to 
find the proper manner and final cause of their reflection and longing. They hope for a fuller 
revelation and, suffering and sighing under the same pressure, they see one another enduring, 
perhaps with inner sympathy and deep feeling but yet without love. (Schleiermacher 1996, 69)
Schleiermacher is not confusing religious art, or art that is promoted to the 
status of religion, with the aesthetic capacity that makes creativity possible. 
Both are one and the same and share an absolute dependency on the spirit. 
For Schleiermacher, it is the 'cultured despisers' who are most likely to be 
able to demonstrate this in an age wary of religion:
Look there, the goal of your present highest endeavours is at the same time the resurrection of 
religion! It is your efforts that must bring about this event, and I celebrate you as the rescuers 
and guardians of religion, even though unintentionally so. Do not retreat from your posts and 
your works until you have unlocked the innermost element of knowledge, and, in priestly 
humility, opened the sanctuary of true science where, to everyone who enters and even to the 
sons of religion, everything is replaced that superficial knowledge and arrogant boasting caused 
them to lose. (Schleiermacher 1996, 70)
Schleiermacher is claiming here that the church and the clergy can benefit 
from the insight gained from artistic pursuits.
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Furthermore this passage makes it clear that all along Schleiermacher's 
'culture despisers' have been in possession of this aesthetic sensibility. He 
addressed them in particular with the aim of showing this new class of 
modern-world thinkers how they source their creativity in this absolute 
dependency on the infinite and, therefore, owe religion their service. 
Schleiermacher believed that religious ethics, as the lived conatus of the 
individual spirit could be demonstrated through an aesthetic sensibility that 
would disclose the spirit. Might this remain true for contemporary art?
Schleiermacher's significance, for postmodern theology is to be found in 
his commitment to the notion of the historical and finite soul/spirit. This 
insight might yet contribute to a new onto-theological and epistemological 
conception of being. For practical theologians, it would entail making a 
valid contribution to contemporary theory from an authentically theological 
perspective, rather than opting exclusively for anthropological and 
sociological understandings of experience. In other words, it brings the 
spirit back into the arena of practical theology and uses this to expand the 
conceptual landscape in order to create new pastoral spaces.
I will now explore how art can help us do this through the work of artists 
Barbara Hep worth, Tacita Dean and Zoë Leonard, after which I shall 
consider how the reflective theology of Heather Walton contributes to the 
creation of such new pastoral spaces wherein new ethical subjectivities can 
be constructed.
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6.1 Barbara Hepworth: The Body as Pastoral Space
Here is a system of images which I term my perception of the universe, and which may be 
entirely altered by a very slight change in a certain privileged image —  my body. This image 
occupies the center; by it all others are conditioned; at each of its movement everything 
changes, as though by the turn of a kaleidoscope. (Bergson 1994, 25)
Barbara Hepworth (1903-1975), an English modernist working in the early 
to mid 20* century, produced sculptures reflecting the environment. Her 
landscapes are expansive. In common with her friend, the abstract sculptor 
Henry Moore (1898-1986), Hepworth believed in the 'intrinsic emotional 
significance' of the sculptures she produced. It was not representation she 
wanted, but a harmonious relationship between material and form.
For Hepworth there were both potentials and limitations to the materials 
with which she worked. Ultimately, while stone remains true stone and 
wood is still wood, the materials have their own poetic value and are never 
consumed in representation. Sculpture is a medium through which aspects 
of human consciousness can find expression. Stone is the material through 
which the emotion of her art is shaped. Her work became progressively 
more abstract.
Freedom from the constraints of representational art meant that Hepworth 
could pursue her own sculptural poetics.
I discovered a new approach which would allow me to build my own sculptural anatomy 
dictated only by my poetic demands from the material. (Hepworth 1946, 47)
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The human form is also a medium in her sculptures. Mother and child is a 
consistent theme throughout her work. This was in spite of the ambiguous 
personal feelings she had about actual motherhood. There is a keemiess in 
Hepworth's art to express her own human existence in her sculptures, but 
not in an obvious sense. Therefore, abstractions of the human form 
permeate her work. Her materials, and the shape she gives to them, provide 
a monumental presence for the human form. This becomes a testimony to 
the capacity for humanity to reconcile existence to some particular concrete 
subsistence. Her sculptures exhibit new ways of exploring these 
relationships between nature, humanity and material environments:
I began to imagine the earth rising and becoming human. I speculated as to how I was to find 
my own identification, as a human being and a sculptor, with the landscapes around me. 
(Hepworth 1946, 45)
Hepworth describes her relationship with the materials she uses as crucial 
to the development of the ideas that will emerge from her sculptures. She 
follows what she (along with Henry Moore) refers to as an honesty of the 
material. For example, the 'whole growth' of wood is vertical and it can be 
carved up, down or across it. The use of the material involves her senses, 
which have developed through her use of them in these particular 
circumstances. When Hepworth describes marble as 'delicate' and 'easily 
bruised', she is doing so from a very personal and intimate loiowledge of 
the materials she appropriates for her ideas. But this is language that 
extends her subjectivity into the material. When using stone, she pays close 
attention to the sound her hammer makes, using her ears to determine 
whether the cut will be good or bad, 'listening how each hammer blow is 
going to take away the piece you want' (Hepworth 1946, 8).
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There is an intimate relationship here, between the body and the production 
(whatever the form). The sculpture as an independent object is mirrored as 
a real somatic and sensual modification on the body. Hepworth's own 
subjectivity is altered and enhanced through the same aesthetic process that 
enables her to fold this development back into her work, as Simon 
O'Sullivan points out:
We are, if you like, representational creatures with representational habits o f thought. We
inhabit an internal world and an external world. We separate ourselves as subjects from the |
object world. Indeed this alienated state is the very precondition of self-consciousness. Art, at
least as it is figured within representation, is complicit in this dynamic. Art mirrors back the
apparently reassuring image of our own subjectivity (an outer and an inner content). As such a
transformation in how we think about art will necessary alter the topology of how we think
about ourselves and vice versa. It is in this sense that the crisis of representation is also a crisis
in typical subjectivity. (O'Sullivan 2006, 16) j
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Hepworth's art was her life; her children spent their early years in a nursing 
home, a sacrifice that made her art possible. Paradoxically a lot of her 
sculptures are visually nurturing. Two Heads (Mother and Child) 1932, 
Figure (Mother and Child) 1933, Mother and Child 1934 and Nesting 
Stones 1937 are all evocative of tender images of maternal care. It would 
be easy to interpret this as compensation. However, these sculptures of 
maternal care are best considered as part of the larger vision Hepworth had 
of humanity and nature. Her sculptures are not representational and her 
emotional response to nature was that she herself was, 'cradled in the 
anatomy of landscape.'
It is this relationship with the landscape that is given form in her sculpture, 
not the domestic maternal space. 'I rarely draw what I can see — I draw 
what I feel in my body' (Hepworth 1966, 11). There is a sense with 
Hepworth that the body and the landscape have no boundaries, so when she
describes what it is she feels in her body it is also what she has distilled 
from her environment:
Sculpture is a three-dimensional projection of primitive feelings; touch, texture, size and scale 
hardness and warmth, evocation and compulsion to move, live and love. Landscape is strong — 
it has bones and flesh and skin and hair. (Hepworth 1966, 11)
Hepworth understands life as this assimilation of materials, which is why 
her work is motivated by the need to co-ordinate the location of the human 
figure within this landscape, rather than try to represent the experiences of 
the individual life. The human spirit is inseparable from the landscape it 
inhabits, poetically, emotionally and physically.
The rich mineral deposits of Cornwall were apparent on the very surface of things; quartz, 
amethyst and topaz; tin and copper below in the old mineshaft; geology and prehistory —  a 
thousand facts induced a thousand fantasies of form and purpose, structure and life, which had 
gone into the making of what I saw and what Ï was. (Hepworth 1966, 13)
This is in stark contrast to traditional pastorals^" ,^ which conceal the 
philosophical and ideological separation of humanity and nature. 
Hepworth's pastoral is closely focused on the human condition and the 
influence of nature in shaping the spirit. Hepworth's pastoral landscape 
sculptures demonstrate the engagement of humanity with the environment 
and in doing so help to remove the illusion of independence or separateness 
from our immediate environment whether it is natural or technological.
This is a concept of the body engaged, assimilated and worn though in 
multiple environments yet humanity still seem to have the capacity for 
quiescent and delusional self-absence.
The pastoral as a concept, with its collection of portraits from biblical images of care and Virgil's classical notion 
of retreat and return, divisions of country (nature) and town (culture) have been in circulation for thousands of 
years. However The Garden o f Eden is one of the earliest idyllic pastorals deployed to explain the human 
condition as the result of knowledge. Describing a utopia from which humanity has been expelled and to which 
there is a longing to return. This edenic longing represents a desire for humanity to be free from suffering and 
alienation. Hepworth in her work seeks to close the gap between nature and humanity.
Although the new eco-politics of the 2H‘ century suggests a change in this perception, the concern for the
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6.2 Tacita Dean: The Sailor Who Fell From Grace With the Sea
And Jesus was a sailor 
when he walked upon the water 
and he spent a long time watching 
from his lonely wooden tower 
and when he knew for certain 
only drowning men could see him 
he said All men will be sailors then 
until the sea shall free them
but he himself was broken long before the sky would open
forsaken, almost human
he sank beneath your wisdom like a stone
(Leonard Cohen)
Sister I won't ask for forgiveness, my sins are all that I have...
(Bruce Springsteen)
The sea has always been an important metaphor for human experience, 
Hans Blumenberg, who has made the 'seascape' a paradigm for existence, 
argues that it serves to disclose the 'transgression of boundaries':
Humans live their lives and build their institutions on dry land. Nevertheless, they seek to grasp 
the movement of their existence above all through a raetaphorics of the perilous sea voyage. 
The repertory of this nautical metaphorics of existence is very rich. It includes coasts and 
islands, harbours and the high seas, reefs and storms, shallows and calms, sail and rudder, 
helmsmen and anchorages, compass and astronomical navigation, lighthouse and pilots. Often 
the representation of danger on the high sea serves only to underline the comfort and peace, the 
safety and serenity of the harbour in which a sea voyage reaches its end. (Blumenberg 1997, 7)
The sea (with its vastness and sense of being 'other world', unlaiowable,
environment is global and there is a growing amount of literature on dystopian pastorals. Hepworth's art resonates 
with this contemporary crisis; a finite soul shaped by the environment is ultimately one that is diminished or 
enhanced accordingly. There is something reminiscent of the theology of Athanasius in this notion of the soul: the 
more alienated it is in this world, the less defined it becomes — resulting in the image of the divine both 
dispersing and weakening.
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unpredictable and powerful) has long been an inspiration in the work of 
artist Tacita Dean (1965- ). In her art, the sea is used to emphasise human 
vulnerability and dependency
Often when I consider the desolation of the sea, I imagine it as a place unchanged by the 
passage of time, a rare prehistoric world where a human being can be truly lost.
(Dean 1999, 48®^
Her work ’Disappearance at Sea' (1996) is influenced by the tragic events 
that led to the suicide of yachtsman Donald Crowhurst almost some thirty 
years earlier. The story of Crowhurst and his fall from grace from the sea 
becomes a contemporary parable demonstrating that obtaining a definitive 
moral interpretation of an event is a never-completed task.
For many, Donald Crowhurst is just a cheat who abused the sacred unwrittens of good 
sportsmanship. But for some it is more complicated than this, and he is seen as much as a victim 
of the Golden Globe as the pursuer of it. His story is about human failing; about pitching his 
sanity against the sea; where there is no human presence or support system on which to hang a 
tortured psychological state. His was the world o f acute solitude, filled with the ramblings of a 
troubled mind. (Dean 1999, 7)
Donald Crowhurst was an amateur yachtsman who participated in the first 
solo round the world yacht race in the summer of 1968. The race was for 
the 'Golden Globe' trophy, and was sponsored by the Sunday Times 
newspaper. Crowhurst was a competent 'weekend' sailor who was 
experiencing financial difficulties, who hoped the publicity of victory (and 
the prize money) would rescue him from financial ruin. The other 
interested party in the story was the town council of Teignmouth, who were 
delighted that Crowhurst had adopted their town as the 'home port' of his
Many of Deans works are influenced by seafaring stories, her 1998 Chalk on blackboard drawings were 
influenced by Shakespeare's play the Tempest. At the end of this tale, Prospero has lost his superhuman/magical 
powers and appeals for mercy from the audience who can set him free through their forgiveness. This is in a way 
what Dean is asking the viewer to do for Crowhurst — to see his broken state and allow mercy to set him free.
As the pages in Tacita Dean's book Teignmouth Electron are not numbered, all page references are 
counted from the beginning of the Introduction as page 1.
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voyage. The media coverage meant that this small town would attract 
visitors and benefit financially from the public interest in the competitor 
Crowhurst:
Crowhurst's voyage was inextricably caught up with the affairs of Teignmouth Council. He 
became a tool for their Publicity Committee, and after he had found financial support for the 
construction of his trimaran locally, he named it Teignmouth Electron after the town. From what 
I can gather, he probably loved being the darling of Teignmouth in those few hectic months 
prior to his departure, but gradually this local pride became too much to bear, and in those 
agonising days when he was desperately trying to get ready to leave, he must have despised the 
bunting on the quay, and the dignitaries preparing to wave him off. They stood before him and 
his way of escape. He must have known that there was no getting out of it then, and that he was 
trapped by his own bravado, and by their zealous civic pride. (Dean 1999, 3)
The narrative foundation of the real time story of Donald Crowhurst is 
straightforward enough. It is the story about someone who, for whatever 
personal reasons, had chosen to attempt something which was beyond his 
capabilities, but was nonetheless carried along by public enthusiasm. The 
event had taken on a momentum beyond the management of Crowhurst. 
Someone should have put a stop to Donald Crowhurst's voyage, but too 
many people had too much invested in the event. The town council played 
a particular role in orchestrating events. Making history was not merely 
Crowhurst's personal adventure. A strong communal drive was behind him, 
summed up in a postcard printed and sold at the time:
The postcard showed Crowhurst standing on the prow of the Teignmouth Electron. He was 
wearing a V-neck jumper with a tie, awkwardly formal for someone who spent time around 
boats. He was looking down at the deck. On the back, it read, 'Greetings from Teignmouth the 
Devon resort chosen by Donald Crowhurst as the home port for his triumphant around the 
World Yacht Race'. (Dean 1999, 5)
Dean, in her explorations, never settles on the flaws of one character. 
Culpability for this very public folly is shared. Dean puts the Crowhurst 
tragedy into the context of the 1960s. It was an era of irrepressible
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optimism, when longing for new experience led to a drive for adventure 
and experimentation — against which the Crowhurst story sets its warning 
of the darker side of voyaging into the strange unknown world of the sea.
In this work, the Crowhurst story also becomes a medium through which 
we can scrutinize the notion of truth as she examines the moral boundaries.
Crowhurst was not far into his venture, although Dean suspected in fact 
before it had begun, when he realised that he would not survive a solo trip 
around the world with his ill-prepared trimaran. The limited period he had 
for the kind of preparation required for such a trip meant that he had 
compromised on most of the essential safety organization. Dean records 
that many of his spares and supplies were left behind in the confusion of 
his departure Teignmouth.
Crowhurst was as skilled in deceit as he was a sailor. In an age of relatively 
simple communication devices, he was able for a time to fake his positions 
and (though his reported times were unrealistically fast) on paper at least he 
looked set to win.^^ Nevertheless, when his logbooks were placed under 
scrutiny, his deception would become all too apparent. The deceitful 
competition would then be over for him. However, before this could occur, 
a strange inner voyage began to replace of the original external one. The 
false log was never recovered. Perhaps Crowhurst took it (and his faulty 
chronometer -  see following paragraphs) overboard. What he left behind 
(purposefully?) was an alternative log of his descent into a timeless abyss, 
with no real hope of rescue from his completely uncharted inward voyage.
Robin Knox Johnston was the first to complete, this left Crowhurst and another competitor, Nigel Tetley as 
contenders for second place. Tetley was actually far in the lead, and could possibly have beat Robin Knox- 
Johnston due to his later starting date. As a result, Tetley, who had genuinely circumnavigated, pushed too hard, 
destroyed his own trimaran and had to abandon the race. Nigel Tetley committed suicide a year after this event.
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Perhaps Donald Crowhurst used his broken chronometer to weigh himself 
down into the calm and silent Sargasso Sea. The image is haunting, 
especially so because of his increasing identification with the vast 
timelessness of the sea:
God's clock is not the same as our clock. He has an infinite amount o f  our' time. (From the 
logbook of Crowhurst in Dean 1999, 46)
It would seem that Crowhurst had been anxious about the reliability of his 
chronometer throughout the voyage. At sea, sailors cannot afford to make 
even the smallest of errors in time; if an error becomes apparent then the 
flaw is immediately calculated in to bring about consistency. Crowhurst did 
not have at his disposal the added safety of satellite navigation. Losing the 
bearing of time left him at the mercy of the sea. For him the loss was 
unbearable. His time became a perpetual present to which he had 
constantly to adapt. Crowhurst had begun to suffer from 'time madness' a 
condition suffered by sailors when failing to keep immaculate time using 
the chronometer.
By the last day of his voyage, his chronometer had run down and stopped. 
Resetting it, he recorded in his logbook the words. 'MAX POSS ERROR' 
(Dean 1999, 47) and counted down his last agonising statements using 
chronometer time, until he wrote the words:
It is fmished-It is finished IT IS THE MERCY
(Dean 1999, 47)
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Disappearance at Sea
The day was ending in a serenity of still and exquisite brilliance. The water shone pacifically; 
the sky without a speck was a benign immensity of unstained light... And at last, in its curved 
and imperceptible fall, the sun sank low, and from glowing white changed to a dull red without 
rays and without heat, as if about to go out suddenly, stricken to death by the touch of that 
gloom brooding over a crowd of men. (Conrad 1899, Part 1)
Thus, the imagination will not allow itself to be fixed by the principle of habit, without at the 
same time using habit for the purpose of passing off its own fancies, transcending its fixity and 
going beyond experience. (Deleuze 1991, 69)
Tacita Deans' artwork Disappearance at Sea is an atmospheric film about 
the disappearance of light, a rhythmic decline into pitch darloiess, an 
exliibit that leaves no tangible subject. A camera fixed on the revolving 
mechanism of a lighthouse beam creates the effect. The film moves toward 
a dark landscape beyond the lighthouse, to a vanishing point. Sound is an 
important aspect of all Deans' work, and here it is the mechanical work of 
the lighthouse and the noise of sea birds at dusk that provides the 
soundtrack for a scene with no actual human presence. A convergence of 
familiar enough sounds is made to seem strange through this particular 
arrangement.
Much of Dean's work is about dislocation, familiar everyday experiences 
becoming strange and disconcerting environments through which we try to 
navigate. She manages to replicate an environment in which sound, time 
and vision become disproportionate in the absence of haptic events. The 
artwork demonstrates that sensations of sight and sound become estranged 
and amplified when the sensation of touch is excluded as a means for 
psychological orientation. The orientation of the soul depends upon the 
haptic event. In the eventless environment in which he found himself,
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Crowhurst began to experience himself as part of a vast universe with no 
boundaries within which he could retain an image of himself.
Dean compares romantic notions about the healing powers of the sea with 
the tragic consequences for those who underestimate the danger of being 
'all at sea'. She is ambiguous in her work about the notion that the sea has 
healing powers and that it is for some a vast pastoral space from which 
there is the possibility that a troubled soul might return calmed. Crowhurst 
did not possess the mindset needed for this. For him, the sea held no cure. 
The more he tried to control his environment, whether by deceit or 
otherwise, the more overwhelmingly lost he became:
He became dislocated, and absorbed himself in his writing and calculations, and particularly in 
his reading of Einstein's theories of relativity. Space and time became interwoven in a single 
fabric. (Dean 1999, 47)
For Crowhurst nothing could help him endure the vastitude of the sea.
There was no organisation of the living into which he could extend his 
broken spirit. His diaries suggest that he had mentally vanished into the 
sea's formlessness long before he went overboard. Part of his suffering, his 
'time-madness', was the eventual erosion of any former identity. Crowhurst 
was a 'cosmic being' with no limits to his spirit. Dean believes that he 
drifted in to a world of abstract ideas to 'deny his predicament in the 
physical world.' However, it is just as likely that his reality had become 
something other than ours — something which obscured his real situation, 
disguising his lonely rupture from the world.Crowhurst's predicament 
raised the issue of the relationship between the individual and the 
environment, spirit and the world. He had left behind the concrete hardware 
of one world while trying to fabricate another.
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Ultimately, he fell between the two. All the previous connections and 
interactions, the actual relations that made him an integrated part of a wider 
unity, that would finely tune his identity on a daily basis, were gone. In the 
absence of a continuous regenerative framework Crowhurst's sense of self 
spills over. It is unsuiprising that a person who is already trying to fulfill a 
fantasy fails to keep centred in the absence of external references.
What is telling about this experience is how rapidly what would have 
appeared to be formative and foundational, the personal history, dissolves. 
Crowhurst was unable to subordinate the sea for the purpose of his own 
sense of self. He was unable to retain a personal and independent status. 
Instead, he was possessed and consumed by the sea until he reached his 
vanishing-point.
Where sensation plays an important role in our imaging of life, Crowhurst 
was left with his reality patched together as if it were part of some abstract 
game with the cosmos:
And so Crowhurst retreated into a world of abstract ideas in order to deny his real predicament 
in the world, and being a very good chess player, chose to use its rituals to set out the rules for 
the cosmic game he was about to play. He stated that the game had to be played in the mind and 
not outside it; otherwise it would make God sad. (Dean 1999, 47)
Dean's art suggests that just before Crowhurst vanished overboard, he had 
reached that point where his life was just 'pure immanence' beyond the 
small domestic measure of good and evil. Had he survived he would have 
been a cheat and a failure, he could not have been saved by Dean's art, his 
widow's stoicism or Robin Knox-Johnston's noblesse oblige. Instead, his 
confession was both a death speech and a passage to peace:
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He could have continued to deceive the world -  thrown all his logbooks overboard or faked an 
accident at sea -  but he chose the truth, 'the great beauty of the truth.' For Donald Crowhurst, it 
was the deceit that was unbearable. That was the sin; his 'Sin of Concealment'. He gave up his 
life as atonement for this sin, so that we might have the truth. (Dean 1999, 51)
The biblical overtones are not a new feature in the work of Dean. Such 
notes play a significant role in much of her work.^^ For example, the 
commentary to Structure of Ice (1997) is spoken in reverential tones, 
making the molecular structure liturgical, making Dean’s work sacramental.
In a 'real-time' narrative, this 'sin of concealment' reference would be 
unambiguously directed to the race. Dean's book however, is not a mere 
collection of facts. It is both a construction of facts and an investigative 
imagination. Her sleuth persona pulls together coincidence and fragments 
of detail, thereby recreating Crowhurst's story. Through this work, though 
Crowhurst cannot be mistaken for someone else, he becomes someone 
new. His 'sin of concealment' started long before the race. Some signs were 
already there to suggest a life not felt to be authentic, e.g.: the remark about 
his V-neck jumper, the comparison between Crowhurst and a 'real' 
contender like Knox-Jolinston, his own self-diagnosis as a 'misfit':
Save some pity for the Misfit, fighting on with bursting heart;
Not a trace of common sense, his is no common flight.
Save, save him some pity. But save the greater part 
For him that sees no glimmer of the Misfit's guiding light.
(From the logbook of Donald Crowhurst in Dean 1999, 61)
For Dean, the Crowhurst tragedy provided a means of exploring the nature 
of reconciliation. In the end, through the lens of her own personal vision of 
the sea as a healing-space, she saw Crowhurst as 'atoning' for his 'sin of
The reverential notes she so frequently uses give her works something of a liturgical tone.
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concealment'. Crowhurst only gained redemption when he 'gave up' or, to 
use his own words, 'resigned from the game' to honour God who had 'won'. 
What had started as a yacht race had developed into a universal pilgrimage. 
Crowhurst gave himself to the sea; he 'saved/redeemed' himself and offered 
his peace to all:
That has been my problem that is the problem everyman must solve for him self. This is how I 
have solved the problem. And to let you inside my soul, which is now "at peace", I give you my 
book.
(From the logbook of Donald Crowhurst in Dean 1999, 30)
Dean's work has a sacramental and liturgical rhythm all the way through. 
She has picked up the remnants of religious ritual, lately emptied and 
abandoned, re-used them in an appropriate context. In her work they do not 
sound awkward. They imbue her works with a solemnity that suggests 
wonder (The Structure of Ice, 1997) sacredness (Crowhurst 'my peace I 
give you') and liturgical rhythm (the lighthouse in Disappearance at Sea), 
the ethereal movement of women bathers and the suggestion of a healing 
'baptism' in water (Gellert 1998).
Dean has lifted Crowhurst out of his own narrow cultural frame (the culture 
of the sporting hero) with its rigid moral edge (the rules of the race), and 
expanded his experience into a new space. This new space becomes 
universal, inviting us into the sojourn that Crowhurst made; which is (in the 
final analysis) offered up for his redemption:
If you ask anybody about Donald Crowhurst, they will talk, more often than not, about fraud 
and deceit, and about the man who faked his journey around the world. But the story of Donald 
Crowhurst is more about integrity than forgery. It is a story about truth. (Dean 1999, 31)
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The chief vehicle for this redemption of Crowhurst is the effort of Dean in 
her weaving together of the fragments of this sad tale beyond its original 
circumstances. We are the privileged spectators of a strange experience, an 
experience with which (because it reflects our own flaws and vulnerability) 
we are able to identify ourselves. In this sense, Dean's art (through being 
prepared to put sacredness at the core of its attempts at resolution) seems 
offer both respectful reflection on and honest recognition of Crowhurst's 
own feeling of being part of something that, ultimately, is greater than 
himself.
6.3 Zoé Leonard: Art as Necessary Memorial in the Process o f Creativity
Trees show up in my work over and over again. I think Ï use them so much because they are 
such an essential symbol. Trees represent home, shelter, the seasons, change and stability, life 
and endurance. They offer wood and food: fire, building material, fruit. They are beauty. They 
occur as religious symbols — representing the connection between earth and sky, as signs of 
both abundance and longevity. They reflect seasonal changes clearly and dramatically. They 
indicate water sources and survival zones, marking oases in the desert, and timberline in the 
mountains. Although trees are much larger than we are, they sort of set the scale for us -  we 
rest beneath them, cultivate them in orchards. Our language reflects our relationship with trees 
and forests. We speak of having roots, of bearing fruit, of family trees.
(Leonard & Dungan 2002, 76)
Zoë Leonard is a contemporary American artist, whose organic imagery of 
left-over relics of life (caiTying residues of the past) explores how humanity 
and nature manage to co-exist in the urban environment. Using materials 
that have become estranged from what might be considered their 'natural 
habitat' {e.g. ; trees in urban built-up areas), her work exhibits an 
unromantic, realistic vision of nature which aims at exposing the anxieties 
we all feel about our immediate surroundings. She uses sculpture to
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allegorise the human condition. She proffers no solution. There is no 
utopian message of harmony. Yet, in all her work there is a sense of hope 
and graced endurance.
For Leonard, her art does not exist to appease the senses. If it informs us 
about affliction, it does so as that which is left in the wake of human 
suffering. It is not offered as contemplative reflection to raise the human 
spirit from despair. Instead it memorializes suffering by creating 
encounters that can move the spirit into unfamiliar landscapes.
Leonard's use of trees in her art provides her with the opportunity to 
explore the relationship between nature and creativity. In one notable work, 
she has presented a series of photographs of trees growing within the 
disfigured urban landscape. Yet these trees have not only survived and 
thrived, they have become part of the very environments that have made 
their growth so difficult. Some of them (originally planted within iron 
railings placed to promote straight growth) have outgrown their prisons -  
though they bear bulges and scars sustained in their escape. Some have 
even absorbed the fencing into their very trunks. In such art works,
Leonard captures and develops her themes of displacement, destruction, 
repair and survival.
In 1997, for the July Vienna Secession, Leonard made Tree. For this she 
took a whole broken-down tree {let me see your beauty broken down as you 
would do for one that you loved) and 'repaired' it with steel splints. She 
refers to it as her 'Frankenstein Tree'. She said it was as if the tree had been 
in a terrible accident. In such works, she is concerned with the survival and
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persistence of life in a harsh environment -  in an environment which so 
impinges on 'natural' growth that the trees have to integrate themselves into 
their inhospitable milieu to remain viable within it.
As well using sculpture, Leonard employs photography to 'reframe' the past 
inviting the onlooker to take a second glimpse at the remains of an event. 
Using black and white photography has the effect of sharpening the focus 
on her subject. She invites us to view things differently with both her 
choice of subject and its artistic medium. For Leonard her role as an artist 
is to navigate, to act as a link between strange worlds.
For example, in having the capacity to be co-creative (to absorb and enfold 
the world into their structure) trees modify the environment that modifies 
them -  and stand revealed as monuments of reconciliation. Some of 
Leonard’s trees are depicted with the debris of modern life clinging to 
them; used and indestructible plastic bags caught in the branches and 
blowing like streamers in the wind^^ :^
The tree + bag pictures were taken over several years in New York. I kept noticing a particular 
place where the wind catches stray plastic bags and floats them up into the branches of these 
two small trees. After a windy day there could be four or five, or as many as a dozen, plastic 
bags hanging off the branches. I loved this: the beauty and ugliness of it. If s an odd image: 
cheerful and depressing at the same time (Leonard 2002, 76)
Leonard's art is thematically underpinned by her political and ecological 
awareness, in the light of which she addresses luodern complexity about 
what it is to be human, or the 'good citizen'. What does it mean to be goodS 
Is it related to the environment we have to survive in? How does (if it does)
In Ireland and the West of Scotland, the bags on the trees have long been named 'witches knickers' -  similarly in 
Leonard's New York, with its strong Irish influence.
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this environment affect us? On all levels, Zoe Leonard is constantly aware 
of this complexity -  as her oeuvre demonstrates. The images she produced 
of'Hunting in Alaska' are perfect exemplars of this contemplative 
relationship with her immediate environment:
In 1994,1 started spending time in Alaska. The first time, I stayed six months. I returned in 
1995 and lived up there alone for a year and a half in Eagle, a small village on the Yukon River. 
I got interested in the idea of subsistence — of living more directly from my own labour. I 
heated with wood, hauled my own water, and gathered and grew some of my food. Gradually 
my experience there seeped into ray work.
I was afraid at first that I would have a hard time making art in Alaska. What I found was the 
opposite. I was surrounded by the complexity of nature, and began to think about our 'progress' 
as a people, about the choices we have made. I thought a lot about hunting, about our predatory 
nature. No one wants to admit they're a predator, but it's impossible to find someone who 
doesn't sanction killing on some level —  for food, or for political or moral reasons.
(Leonard 1999 Gallery 2 Warsaw The Centre for Contemporary Art. Interview Online)
However, she also evokes past environments, along with their attendant 
ideologies; bringing them out into the immediate present. Her photographic 
work on museum images of women challenges our current perceptions of 
what we regard as morally appropriate by comparing the altering status of 
the subjects, as depicted through the lens of the historically changing 
values of our culture. In her black and white pictures of museum displays 
of anatomical models of women, used to delineate 'abnormality' or medical 
models, she invites us to look anew at what was once acceptable.
These strange objects were supposedly originally meant to serve some 
educational and scientific purposes. In reality, they disclose the absurdity 
of their age. The pictures show anatomical models of women with their 
chests or abdomens opened up to display the position of internal organs. 
What makes them curiosities, as opposed to mere teaching tools, is that the 
models have been posed to reflect 'delicate' femininity. One model sits
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upright on a chair, in a pose that suggests a coy self-consciousness about 
her exposed flesh. She has raised a hand to cover her face and her shame. 
Frozen in this pose are the values and precepts of that particular era. 
Another model (lying in a glass museum case) has her organs displayed, 
yet is still adorned with a double strand of pearls. The original justification 
for these displays is gone. They are now relics, remnants of the past with 
all pretence of educational or scientific value long gone. Nevertheless, the 
images provide a haunting evocation of the history of attitudes to female 
anatomy in the history of the advance of science.
Perhaps most disturbing of all is Leonard's presentation of the 'Bearded 
Lady'; the actual head of a woman preserved under a scientific bell jar. 
Such images go through a process of conceptualisation. Beginning as 
'teaching' tools, they have now become museum curiosities — a curiosity at 
which Leonard is asking us to 'look again'. In the context of her 
photographs they become artifacts that disclose how the altered manner in 
which they are viewed reveals the changes in the conceptual apparatus that 
surround them. The objects have not changed, but how we look at them 
has. Leonard has taken images that have been 'framed' by ideologies of the 
past and refrained them to expose more not only the object but also its 
conceptual and contextual history.
These are repellent objects, but nonetheless of value to our understanding 
of the continuous flux in sensibility they reveal:
I first saw a picture of the anatomical wax model of a woman with pearls in a guidebook on
This process continues in presenting these as examples of changing ideology, epistemology and ontology in the 
present work.
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Vienna. She struck a chord in me. I couldn't stop thinking about her. She seemed to contain all I 
wanted to say at that moment, about feeling gutted, displayed. Caught as an object of desire and 
horror at the same time. She also seemed relevant to me in terms of medical histoiy, a gaping 
example of sexism in medicine. The perversity of those pearls that long blond hair. I went on 
with this work even though it was gory and depressing because the images seem to reveal so 
much. I was shocked when I came across the bearded woman's head, I couldn't believe that here 
was this woman's head, stuffed and mounted, in ajar. The bell jar was just sitting on a file 
cabinet in a corner of the room, in an obscure museum in Paris, a place completely closed to the 
general public (it is part of the school of medicine at the University of Paris). Her head was 
placed in the Jar to be looked at. But ifs not just her head that I see. I see the bell jar, the 
specimen identification card, the carved wooden pedestal. I see a set of implied circumstances. 
Who was in charge? Who put this woman's head in a jar and called it science?
(Leonard & Cottingham 1993)
Leonard's work challenges the ontological and epistemological frames that 
legitimated the original context of these exhibits. What she now exhibits in 
her reworking/reframing of these is the obscenity inherent in the original 
matrix. Moreover, for Leonard they provide a means for exposing the 
continuity of perversity in contemporary culture:
I am moved by her, anxious to know more about her life. But, these pictures don't tell us all that 
much about her. You cannot see her or know her by seeing only her severed head. These 
pictures are about our culture, about the institutional need for difference. Those anatomical 
models were made in the seventeenth century, and that woman was put under the bell jar in the 
late nineteenth century, but I see these images as contemporary, because the system which put 
her head in a bell jar is still in place. The world just hasn't changed that much.
(Leonard & Cottingham 1993)
This work explores the relationship between nature and culture. The objects 
of scientific interest were clearly identified as much by gender stereotyping 
as by their actual physiology. The bearded woman was a 'freak show', 
presented under the auspices of educational/scientific interest to be sure; 
but it is clear that her adornment with a lace collar (a cultural indicator of 
femininity) contrasted with the facial hair (a masculine trait) was meant to 
arouse a perverse game of gender identity. Leonard's last statement 
emphasizes the persistence of this facet of our culture. A woman with too 
much facial hair is someone with a 'medical condition'. We, surely, are
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enlightened and sensitive and would not treat her like a freak of nature but 
as someone whose condition could be dealt with, or 'cured'. For Leonard 
the idea that someone should have such a life because of a cultural fixation 
about body hair and gender is tragic. Female facial hair is not life 
threatening, so why should it be regarded as problematic?
Leonard is deeply concerned with the cruelty underlying attitudes toward 
differences, to the seeming need of making labeling aspects of the human 
condition 'normal' or 'abnormal'. Or in the case of illnesses, like the HIV 
virus, the language is imbued with moral ideologies. (When HIV and AIDS 
were first known about there were teaching materials provided for schools 
that portrayed 'innocent' sufferers - with the inevitable corollary implication 
of culpability in some of those suffering from the disease.)^^^
However, it would be a simplistic error to interpret Leonard's work as 
merely the study of the distortion of the natural realm through the cultural. 
Her tree images demonstrate that she is exploring the symbiotic 
relationship between nature and the environment. Her trees are an analogy 
for the resilience of humanity and the capacity we have for being co- 
creative within the strictures of our environments. There is no denying the 
cruelty and injustice of the past. There is no plea for a utopian future. What 
her work does is provide the aesthetic space both for mourning and for the 
real challenge of being vigilant about how we view the world, alerting us to 
be on guard against the prejudices that are inherent in our very 'looking' at 
the world.
The tendency to hold up individuals who are different for some reason still exists, not in the circus as part of a 
display of'frealdshness' but on television under the guise of being ’informative’ and possibly educative. 
Meanwhile our moral temperature is taken through 'confessionals' like the .Terry Springer show or Britain's own 
version the Jeremy Kyle show.
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If we could extract one feature from Leonard's work that could sum up her 
work, it would be the notion of adornment. With the bearded woman, her 
adornment, her lace collar, is intended to alert the viewer and cause some 
discomfort. Pearls and blond hair make for disquiet when they adorn 
mutilated anatomical models.
However, when it comes to the trees, this adornment is not so obvious.
They have gathered their garments from the urban landscape in which they 
dwell. And this is the very point illustrated by Leonard's art work. We 
gather our historical adornment from our environment of living systems, 
present and past. To experience life as other than just a malappropriated 
object, mourning is necessary — but only alongside celebration and hope. 
Leonard crosses the boundaries of time with her study. She is able to 
extend retrospective compassion for a woman who had her head removed 
and placed in a bell jar, merely because she did not fit the 'proper' criteria 
of femininity.
Adornment and entrapment are key themes in Leonard's work. While she 
cannot change the experience of the bearded lady, she can take the official 
documentation of one part of her experience, her head as museum display, 
and use it to question our own grasp of the significance of what is 
displayed before us. This work questions many of the pre-conceptions we 
use to order our experiences of this world.
Leonard examines the build up of the 'carbuncles’, which cling to our 
perceptions of the world, the distortions that arise from them. What is 
particularly interesting about this work is the transcendence of present
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pastoral space, through Leonard’s ability to rework the past and allow it to 
make its own, authentic, contribution to our own experience of the world 
via her creation (from the leftover remnants of life) of present and tangible 
but transient images of loss and death, horror and beauty, sexuality and 
living experience — in sueh a way as to provide a connective residue and 
at the same time confer an intimacy with past injustice.
Another perceptive example of this sensibility is Strange Fruit, a sculpture 
made up from a composite of organic materials, and the process of 
putrefaction evokes the horror of trees with decaying corpses:
Preserving the object is like preserving the experience, the memory, or the set of associations. 
Strange Fruit deals with the conflict between hanging on and letting go. Which in a way is 
what mourning is? The conflict in that piece is that every scrap is saved, painstakingly mended, 
but since the peels themselves are not preserved, they continue to decay. Over time, they 
shrivel, fade. The piece itself is slowly disintegrating. (Leonard 2002, 83)
Leonard's focus on decay is significant, because it stands for both thematic 
persistence and the loss of themes. Her work takes old hurts and wounds 
and offers them up as decaying/fading remnants in her sculptures.
Strange fruit remains a powerful witness to the atrocities of lynching in 
American society. (Alongside Effigy 1994 figure hanging from tree)
One of the themes I work with over and over again is the idea of reconstructed experience: 
memory our desire to remember and the changeable quality of our memories. We constantly 
reconstruct images of our past in order to create our present identity. I'm interested in the 
fissures of this reconstruction the clumsiness, the seams, the breaks.
(Leonard 2002, 79)
This ability to identify with past struggles comes from her personal 
experience as a woman artist. Leonard's work demonstrates how our own
strange Fruit — (1992-97) banana, orange, grapefruit, lemon, avocado peel, thread, buttons, sinew, needles, 
plastic, wire, stickers, fabric and trim wax. (Philadelphia Museum of Art) Discourse JTSMC Page 70 24.2 Spring 
2002
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embodiment can act as a viable connection to injustice past and present. 
What troubles us allows us to identify with universal human experience. 
This process of identification utilizes the empirical imagination. The 
traditional empiricism of the social sciences fails to include this 
transcendent aspect of existence.
6.4 Heather Walton: A Hermeneutic o f Grief Stowaways
and Secret Mourning
Like a baby stillborn.
L ik e  a b ea s t w ith  h is  horn .
I have torn everyone who reached out for me. (Leonard Cohen)
The rhizome names a principle of connectivity. It implies a contact, and movement, between 
different milieus and registers, between areas that are usually thought of as distinct and discrete. 
Such a smearing is creative; it can produce surprising compatibilities and novel synthesis. In 
fact, the making of connections in this sense might be understood as a key modality of creativity 
in general. (O'Sullivan 2006, 17)
Heather Walton is a contemporary practical theologian and feminist. In her 
work, she deploys the tradition of Midrash to open up the narrative of 
sacred texts to new possibilities. Traditional Midrash has its origins in 
ancient Jewish homiletic commentary on scripture, normally using allegory 
to contribute to an understanding of meaning. However, Walton’s approach 
is to intensify this kind of commentary by creating a relationship between 
the theological imagination, scripture and personal experience. Grief and 
mourning become a means of cutting across time to diminish perceptions of 
division between past and present.
Just as Leonard has used the past experience of women to highlight the 
injustices and prejudices of the present, so does Walton — taking some
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very personal experiences to deliver a radical reading of scripture 
interwoven with reflections on contemporary issues of fertility/infertility 
and loss. Walton's work is important because it brings something new to 
the traditional use of Midrash. In addressing the limitations of narrative 
alone as a valid source for the theological imagination, she posits the body 
as a vehicle for wisdom.
The quest for meaning largely through cerebral acts of understanding has 
rather overshadowed many rich resources of insight in our culture. 
Ironically, this has meant that one of the oldest heresies of Christianity, 
gnoseological concupiscence (a denial of the body) persists in our modern 
logocentric interpretations. Walton's work demands that we reach beyond 
the constrictions built into our relationships. Mourning, as a pastoral space, 
enables us both to transcend and to commit to our fate simultaneously. For 
Walton, the experience of mourning, whatever the nature of the loss, 
enables her to re-imagine relationships from scripture and imbue them with 
a new intensity. Thus her work challenges the interpretation of wisdom as 
intellectual mastery and the pursuit of absolute truth. The physical aspect of 
grief overrides historical boundaries and creates a sacred space that is 
revelatory.
Through her radical reworking of the narrative, Walton nonetheless retains 
scripture as part of the raw materials for the construction of a feminist 
theology.
Feminist practical theology is beginning to emerge as women cease to remain complicit in 
networks of institutional power that works against our wellbeing. As feminist scholarship has 
creatively reassessed the significance of gender difference, women practical theologians and 
practitioners are becoming increasingly confident about articulating insights from alternative
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positions. Stressing the significance of a view from elsewhere does mean the adoption of naïve 
essentialism. Women have something different to say to practical theology neither because of an 
ethereal feminine nature nor because they speak from some genetically coded script. It is rather 
that having a woman's body laces us in a particular cultural location from which to make 
political judgments and intervention. (Walton 2001, 7)
Walton's theological readings are more than passive reflections that 
challenge patriarchal origin stories. Her reworking demonstrates that, 
standing alone, traditional interpretations of narrative are often pastorally 
inadequate today. Yet, when these original stories are interpolated with 
personal experience, they can be reassembled anew with new meanings that 
resonate powerfully with contemporary issues.
It is significant that Walton's theological imagination has her own 
experience of infertility as part of the creative source for her particular 
Midrash. Rejecting the principle of'building up Icnowledge progressively', 
Deleuze argued (1995, 139) that the best kind of academic course focuses 
on what is being investigated. It does not merely pass on what is already 
known — for that is always changing anyway. Philosophy has become so 
rooted in 'percepts and affects' and what he referred to as 'nonphilosphical 
understanding' that, while it 'isn't inadequate or provisional', he felt it is 
merely one side of what true philosophy might become. (Deleuze 1995, 
140)
Walton's work leans in this direction. Beginning with her own experiences, 
she redirects the sacred texts. New spaces are created and charted through 
her exploration of infertility from her own personal experience. Ultimately, 
this leads to a call for a pastoral theology that creates, 'new rituals, new 
pedagogies, new ways of preaching and caring' (Walton 2001, 10). The
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body becomes the hermeneutic prism through which environments are 
altered and expanded. The process culminates in the creation of temporary 
communities in which judgments of absolute assuredness are exposed as 
inadequate responses to the complexity of shared fates. Without 
diminishing the individual experience of each woman, Walton creates a 
space for mutuality where stark opposites could have been divisive.
In hospital, while waiting for treatment for her own infertility problems, 
Walton recalls her experience in a ward with a woman who is waiting to 
have labour induced because her baby has died. Yet another sits with them, 
waiting to have an elective abortion. Being confronted with this experience 
causes Walton to reflect upon (and reassess) her own responses. She resists 
the detached sovereign division of right and wrong.
I try to remember how I once felt about this issue. In the abstract it seemed awful putting 
women needing abortions with women losing babies, unable to conceive. In reality it feels there 
can't be any other way. We are together in this place and that doesn't seem like an awful thing, 
not to any of us, even the minister's wife. We are only sorry that she feels so alone, so strained. 
(Walton 1999, 8)
What is so striking about this scenario is that it is those who are hurting the 
most that have the compassion to turn the room into a safe, if temporary, 
communion of shared fate and absolution. The telling comment 'even the 
minister's wife' is a reminder of the world beyond this particular pastoral 
space — a world which awaits their return to a culture in which judgments 
are prescribed and very different responses are more than likely. Yet, in the 
communion of their togetherness, the practical of pastoral theology seems 
full of hope and spirit.
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For Walton, the experience lends deeper significance to her image of God:
I have brought you to a place in which you may recognise God and know yourself. This hospital 
is the same place exactly as the whole universe. When you see this you can smile at the small 
stories of human freedom and divine judgment which are told for children. They are charms 
recited to protect against the passion and the pain. There are darker, deeper tales to tell.
(Walton 1999, 8)
In one particular 'darker, deeper tale', the scriptural narrative she works 
with is the story found in 1 Kings 3:16-28 — the story of the dead infant 
who, in the traditional tale, is the source of sorrow while being (at the same 
time) overshadowed and marginalised by the splendour of the King's 
wisdom. Working with the core elements of the original narrative, Walton 
alters the perspective and reveals the stowaways within:
When reflecting upon the story of Solomon's judgment a painful thought came powerfully to my 
mind. The king stood erect with his sword held high over the vulnerable body of a child is a 
mirror image of a previous judgment. God 'himself stood as both judge and executioner over 
Bathsheba's baby —  Solomon's brother. In this earlier story, however, the sword falls and the 
child is murdered. A divine victim. (Walton 2001, 9)
111 this, the story of the two women who come to King Solomon for his 
judgment, the latter part of the story celebrates of the King's wisdom:
And all Israel heard the judgment which the King had rendered; and they stood in awe of the 
king, because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to render justice.
(I Kings, 3:28)
However, Walton here deploys a hermeneutic of grief that reduces the 
King's role to a mere display of power and reopens the passage to trace the 
threads of a different understanding of wisdom. Where the traditional view 
of the narrative serves to demonstrate the divine power of Solomon,
Walton challenges this reading that the passage becomes an exposition of 
unjust power, exposing misogyny at the core of Judaic and Christian 
traditions.
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The original story is layered with moral judgment, from the status of the 
two women, each claiming to be the rightful mother of the living child to 
the very notion that the King can discern from his high position the 
qualities that make a 'real mother' (1 Kings 3:27).
In Walton's take on the story, the King's 'public' wisdom is put aside. It is 
easy to behave as all-powerful and all seeing when detachment makes 
judgment arbitrary. What Walton is leading into is a space to reflect on the 
women's experience where they are not polarized by their grief, but 
understood. Where the original author was demonstrating royal power, 
Walton seeks for compassion and insight:
In the legends concerning Solomon the pain of his birth and the tragedy of Bethsheba's lost baby 
unsettle the triumphalist narrative. In the story, which is supposed to confirm his wisdom a 
lifeless child lies neglected and abandoned —  a reminder of this unspoken past. It is my hope 
that through accomplishing the proper rites of naming and mourning, that feminist practical 
theology might attend to the birth of a new wisdom. (Walton 2001, 10)
Walton not only contributes to a maturing of how practical theology thinks 
about God but, more significantly for her, sets about claiming the right to 
image God from outside the traditional cultural, educational and patriarchal 
boundaries. For her, women should not have to ask permission for this 
degree of scholastic independence.
From the point of view of this thesis, Walton's work (like that of Hepworth, 
Dean, and Leonard) embodies the theorisation of practical theology by 
lifting her protagonists out of any historical frame of cultural reference and 
shows the spirit at work within. In other words, as Schleiermacher observed 
at the beginning of the discipline, the aesthetic process and religious 
sensibility are both manifestations of the spirit.
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CONCLUSION
As a discipline, practical theology has been shaped largely within the 
modern university. It is therefore one discipline among many others that 
contribute to the understanding and exploration of the human condition. It 
has an educational remit to fulfil and its future is set to continue along this 
path. It therefore shares the responsibility of addressing theoretical issues 
that impact on its practical application. I have argued here that practical 
theology has for some time been over-preoccupied with its professional and 
academic status to the detriment of its more traditional theological concerns 
with, for example, the presence of the divine in the world. I have 
specifically examined some of those theorists who advocate the 
strengthening of the use of the social sciences within the discipline.
I have also argued that an important issue for contemporary practical 
theologians should be whether or not practical theology can exist as a 
discipline that offers its own reason for existence as a discrete subject in 
contemporary academia. That having its academic credibility defined by 
the social sciences should not be its main concern. My key argument is that 
practical theology can construct a strong academic position by way 
rethinldng the contemporary notion of the subject in a manner that 
incorporates the spirit back into the theoretical foundation of the discipline. 
Unlike other disciplines, practical theology has the theological task of 
including the spiritual aspect of existence.
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We might be in danger of diminishing this spiritual component if we 
pursue only a cultural understanding of humanity as in the social sciences. 
This is not to say that these sciences do not have a positive contribution to 
make to practical theology. However, we should be cautious as to how 
much we rely on them as the foundation of our theorising. Part of this 
involves examining the nature of the authority of the discipline. Where is 
practical theology to find its authorisation? What distinguishes the 
practical theologian from the sociologist? Insofar as these questions have 
sometimes been overlooked, much of contemporary practical theology 
seems to have moved a long way towards being simply a method of 
theorising upon contemporary culture. This is not what Tillich envisioned 
when he proposed a theory of correlation.
Many practical theologians still feel the need for the security of 
methodological approaches that will sustain the reputation of practical 
theology within academia. While this need is understandable, it has perhaps 
limited the exploration of alternative approaches. Very often, when reading 
contemporary theory, there seems to be an underlying thought that practical 
theology is a ’new' discipline. Yet practical theology is, in reality, neither a 
struggling nor a fledgling discipline. It is a mature subject area with a solid 
record of committed and excellent research. That I could base this present 
study on the examination of such a collection of reputable work is a tribute 
to its established presence within the academy.
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However, I feel that it is now time for practical theology to become 
confident about the exploration of new ways of bringing notions of the 
spirit into its investigations. I have myself explored a way of achieving 
this, by bringing in such theorists as Deleuze and Guattari, to provide a 
reading of Schleiermacher that makes him relevant as a 'living' author for a 
genuinely postmodern practical theology. Through this procedure it has 
been possible to introduce a theory of aesthetics that permits the creation of 
new pastoral spaces and expands the identity of practical theology to 
include the spirit. Considering Schleiermacher's notion of finite embodied 
spirit in the light of continental philosophy, provides a reading of 
Schleiermacher that has the potential to enrich practical theology.
Some practical theologians who believe that practical theology is very 
much a product of the enlightenment are nervous about the challenges of 
postmodernism. Modernity and postmodernity have distinct and 
incompatible visions of the human subject at the core of their 
understanding. This discord has given rise to theories that seek to contain 
the most favourable elements of modernity whilst trying to incorporate 
aspects of postmodernity. I have argued that this leads to a 
misrepresentation of postmodern theoretical positions. Having examined 
the response to postmodernism through two major theorists, Elaine Graham 
and Friedrich Schweitzer, I have suggested that postmodernism has been 
treated as a dysfunctional element within modernity and that because of 
this perception the potential value of some postmodern thought has been 
neglected.
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This thought brings with it new ontological approaches, which offer 
practical theology the opportunity to make a significant contribution to the 
understanding of how knowledge is transferred and how the experience of 
learning might be enhanced. Because postmodernism has been (incorrectly) 
theorised as creating a crisis within practical theology, the possibility has 
been limited of maximizing new conceptions of the subject in which the 
spirit can be reintroduced. Such responses have compelled practical 
theology to maintain rigid boundaries, in the belief that chaos and nihilism 
would result from failure to police its 'edges' and contain traditional notions 
of morality and truth. However, practical theologians who have tried to 
solve what they perceive to be the problem of relativism have largely been 
working with compromised conceptualizations of postmodernism. 
Postmodernism, if theorised on its own terms, actually possesses such a 
radical view of the subject that it can accommodate the spirit in relation to 
the human condition.
Certainly, I do think contemporary theorists are right to be cautious about 
an overdetermining postmodernism. Nevertheless, as I have argued, this 
can be countered by deploying theories that challenge teleonomy. In 
Autopoiesis for example we have a materialist theory of becoming that is 
not dependent on essences, outcome or an overly determining environment.
There are however, some practical problems for practical theology when it 
seeks to modernise by distancing itself from the metaphysical. Most 
contemporary theologians are uncomfortable with the notion of 
metaphysics and, consequently, historical and psychological explanations 
have been privileged more often than any other.
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Yet these purely historical explanations have despiritualized the subject, 
narrowing the many rich sources for understanding of how human beings 
explain their experiences. Appreciating this constriction (and seeking ways 
of overcoming it) informs my conclusion that aesthetics can go some way 
to enhancing the theological imagination. Art has the capacity to create 
new spaces in which the relationship between the spirit and existence might 
be might be explored.
Barbara Hep worth's sculptures show the human body as a medium for 
engaging with the environment and creating the soul through the materials 
with which she worked. Her work demonstrates Schleiermacher’s 
conception of the soul extending itself into the material world in the 
process of becoming in the world. Hepworth's working process, as much as 
her artwork, demonstrates how the embodied soul is shaped and reconciled 
to its environment.
Zoe Leonard's work memorializes grief and old injustices. Her art very 
often takes the form of allegories of the human condition. Her tree work is 
an example of how allegory can be used in aesthetics to pay tribute to the 
enduring qualities found in individuals to whom life is a struggle because 
they find themselves in particular lives they would not have chosen. 
Leonard uses her art to examine the harsher realities and cruelties of life 
with sadness and grace. In her work she is also able to take the past and 
hold it up as a reflection of the present, indicating that memorialising is an 
ongoing part of existence. Her work itself is a tribute to the embodied spirit 
that endures in inhospitable environments.
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Tacita Dean's work, Disappearance at Sea was used to demonstrate that 
truth and honesty are sometimes present in the most estranged of 
experiences. We are spectators of the Crowhurst story but we are invited to 
redeem ourselves by identifying with him and showing mercy for him.
Finally Heather Walton's reflections that emerge from her own embodied 
sense of loss and hope enable us to see how transient, but nonetheless 
powerful, pastoral spaces can be created that ultimately change the image 
of God in the world.
In the final analysis, I would suggest that becoming 'expert' in specialist 
areas, such as moral science or practical wisdom, is perhaps not the only 
way to invest in the future for practical theology. Identity is an issue for 
the contemporary practical theologian and the professional status of the 
ethical consultant would seem to be the strongest contender for some who 
feel they work in a post-religious culture.
Practical theology can continue to strengthen its place in academia and the 
discipline can contribute a valuable image of the subject imbued with the 
spirit in real and material circumstances, in which the subject remains 
totally human and is enriched with the capacity to change lives and 
transcend historical limitations.
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